Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 5, 1946, 6:10 p.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey84
Lt. Col. Hutchin

Dr. Stuart stated he had come to report on a verbal reply from General Chou En Lai, brought to him by Mr. Wang Ping Nan. Mr. Wang had stated that General Chou was acting with authority from Yenan and hence this constituted an official reply.

The Communists had considered the four points suggested to them by Dr. Stuart on 3 October.85 Concerning the first point on the membership in the State Council, General Chou En Lai felt that the Communist and Democratic League Parties had the original right to 14 members between the two parties, and that arrangements between the two parties would be left up to them. At this point Mr. Wang Ping Nan reiterated to Dr. Stuart all the old arguments of why they need 14 seats in the State Council.

General Marshall said that of course Dr. Stuart realized the Generalissimo would deny that the Communist Party had a right to 14 seats.

Dr. Stuart stated that on the second point, the withdrawal from Northern Kiangsu, General Chou said that this could go to the Committee of Three and be settled in conjunction with the reorganization and the disposition of troops agreement.

Point three concerned furnishing the names of the Communist delegates to the National Assembly. General Chou, through Mr. Wang, told Dr. Stuart that this would be all right but there were certain things that the Steering Committee of the PCC really had to clear up first. For example, the number of non-party members in the Assembly had not been agreed. When everybody had a set number of [Page 296] delegates to the Assembly, then the Communist Party would be ready to proceed.

As for the 4th point concerning the Communist withdrawal from Tatung, General Chou stated that the Communist Party had already made that announcement.

Other points brought up by Mr. Wang Ping Nan included the general cessation of hostilities order; the fact that fighting should stop now, especially at Kalgan; etc.

General Marshall then stated, “Let’s see what they have given us as a reply to our suggestion.” As he saw it the Communist Party had accepted none of the proposals of the mediators. Having accepted none, it looks like no progress resulted from their delay while waiting for an answer from General Chou.

General Marshall also pointed out that in the section of Mr. Sprouse’s report concerning the PCC,86 he remembered that the minority parties were unable to decide on the representation ratio. Because of this, they requested the Generalissimo to propose what the ratio should be. The Generalissimo then suggested the ratio at 8–4–4–4, and there the matter remained—in disagreement. General Marshall was certain the Generalissimo would deny that the Communist Party and the Democratic League were to have 14 minority votes.

As for Kiangsu being handled in the Committee of Three, General Marshall pointed out that anything settled in the Committee of Three required unanimous agreement, that Chou En Lai could object and thus preclude there being an agreement. As a result no adjustment of differences appeared probable there.

As for the number of delegates in the National Assembly belonging to a particular party, that requires unanimous vote by the Steering Committee of the PCC. Each party has one vote and hence any one party could keep the issue from being settled, with the result that the Communist Party would never have to announce their list of delegates.

In short, it would appear that none of General Marshall’s and Dr. Stuart’s suggestions were accepted.

Dr. Stuart stated he had been thinking about one other thing and that concerned the Generalissimo’s nomination of the 4 non-party members to the State Council. He thought that the PCC’s agreements provided that ⅓ of the 36 party members could veto the nomination of any one of the non-party members. In other words, the Communist Party and Democratic League Party, 12 or 13 seats together, would constitute a sufficient veto of any non-party delegate that was not acceptable to them.

  1. Col. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall’s staff.
  2. See last three paragraphs of notes on meeting of October 3, p. 274.
  3. Probably a reference to the chapter on the PCC in the Final Report (not printed) which was being written at this time.