Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
To recapitulate our conversation regarding General Marshall’s problem and prospects:
In the absence of any clear indication from the General that he would wish the President to make some public statement or confidential statement to Chiang, we in this Office think that the President should, in the event General Marshall is to come home, simply state that he is being recalled for consultation and add that pending such consultation he has no comment to make. Incidentally, we think that the chances are better than 50–50 that the jig is not up; that there is better than an even chance that the General will be successful in calling Chiang’s hand.
General Marshall is obviously mad. He has virtually accused the Government leaders of duplicity, particularly with regard to the attack on Kalgan. The Government leaders would like to keep the question of the negotiations in the air for three weeks to allow them time to capture Kalgan. The Communist leader has clearly indicated [Page 277] that a continuance of the campaign against Kalgan would be a signal for complete severance of negotiations and relations. Quite apart from the Communist attitude, however, is the attitude of General Marshall. He clearly feels that his honor is at stake. Chiang promised him that he would not endeavor to take Kalgan and the General may have told the Communists this. In any event, I am sure that he would not participate in negotiations the objective of which, as Chiang and T. V. Soong none too subtly suggest, would be to give time for the capture of Kalgan, after which the Government would probably agree to Communist proposals in the main.
There are three conditions under which the negotiations might break down: (1) Chiang might refuse flatly to meet what General Marshall might consider reasonable conditions; (2) the Communists might precipitate a break in a manner which the General might consider unreasonable; and (3) it might be impracticable to clearly place responsibility for the break. In any case General Marshall would come home.
In case of (1) I think that we would be obliged to reiterate our position that no assistance could go to China while civil war and political disunity continue. We might have to modify this position later but, in fairness to General Marshall, I think it would perforce have to be the attitude to adopt currently.
In case of (2) I think we should seriously consider modifying our policy with regard to assistance to permit credits to China for constructive purposes not directly connected with the civil war or for use in the civil war areas. A condition to the advancement of such loans should be immediate concrete steps taken by the Chinese Government to effect political and economic (agrarian) reforms.
In case of (3) we might follow a line similar to that described for the second contingency, but somewhat modified. The point is that we cannot, just because of a breakdown in our mediatory effort, delay for long efforts to bring about an improvement in economic conditions in areas of China unaffected by civil war.
In any event we should make it clear to the Chinese and to our own public that we mean to stay with the problem but stay out of involvement in the civil war.
In the event of General Marshall’s return the American military personnel connected with Executive Headquarters would, it seems natural to expect, be recalled. I think we should also carefully consider whether this is not the appropriate time to withdraw the Marines from north China and withdraw the U. S. Army Military Advisory Group from Nanking and other points. I would not suggest any alteration with regard to the Navy.