Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 3, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Lt. Col. Hutchin |
Dr. Stuart opened the discussion by stating that last night, Mr. Wang Ping Nan called on him and asked him the question, “Where do the Americans stand now?” Mr. Wang Ping Nan planned to call again at 1100 this morning and Dr. Stuart wondered what he should tell him. He wondered if General Marshall had made any decisions concerning the present situation which could be related to Mr. Wang. He pointed out the blame that would probably be heaped upon Americans by both sides through misunderstandings.
[Page 275]General Marshall informed Dr. Stuart that he had been considering just what Mr. Wang Ping Nan should be told ever since he had received Dr. Stuart’s message earlier in the morning. He found that was difficult to state at this time largely because almost anything that was said would immediately find its way into the newspapers and become public information.
General Marshall felt that the Government had used American mediation to their own advantage and that they would continue to do so as a cloak for their military campaigns for as long as he let them get away with it. This last attitude on the part of the Government concerning the operations against Kalgan was so definite that there was no escaping this conclusion.
The letter received from the Generalissimo had not been particularly helpful to the situation. The second part of the letter involved data not without lengthy procedure during which the Kalgan offensive was being carried to a conclusion, a procedure which General Marshall could not be a party to.
The problem of what to say to Wang Ping Nan was another matter. If General Marshall were in Chou En Lai’s shoes, he would come back at the Government with a categorical statement to the effect that the Communists will listen to Government Proposals if the Government would stop its attack on Kalgan. General Marshall thought possibly that would be Chou En Lai’s answer anyway; but in the present situation we couldn’t recommend to the Communists that that be their answer.
Then the next step would probably be that the Government would insist on going into Kalgan, practically dictating terms of surrender, General Marshall on his side would have to recommend his recall by the U. S. Government.
Perhaps the only thing to tell Wang Ping Nan was that the American mediators have labored with the Government to get an acceptable proposal and that this letter from the Generalissimo was the result.
Dr. Stuart asked if General Marshall thought it was possible to arrange a truce, one which would last for a stipulated number of days. Perhaps the Communists would agree to evacuate Kalgan.
General Marshall did not think that the Communists would agree to evacuate Kalgan nor could he personally insist that they do evacuate Kalgan. The one thing that the Generalissimo had agreed some time ago was that the Communists could keep Kalgan. The Communists gave considerable evidence of good faith last June, except possibly in their stipulations concerning the Peace Preservation troops in certain localities. Only time could have determined their sincerity in this matter.
In this present situation it is plainly evident that the Government [Page 276] does not want to halt its advances. They are so intent on capturing Kalgan that they can’t see, or ignore, other issues.
General Marshall then suggested that Dr. Stuart informally discuss with Mr. Wang Ping Nan a course of action that the Communists might adopt, a course which would include meeting the Government’s so-called concessions with some concessions of their own, but accompanied by their demand that the Government halt its advance on Kalgan. There are three concessions which the Communists might well make: the first of which is to agree to designate their delegates to the National Assembly; second, agree to accept 9 Communist members and 4 Democratic League members as their minority in the State Council and; third, agree to evacuate the northern tip of Kiangsu without further discussion. They were being driven out anyway.
Dr. Stuart agreed to discuss this with Mr. Wang Ping Nan.
(Later in the morning, during the discussion with Mr. Brad Connors,46 General Marshall thought of a fourth concession which could be put forward by the Communists and that was that the Communists would withdraw from vicinity of Tatung. This further concession was transmitted by note to Dr. Stuart.)
- W. Bradley Connors, Public Affairs Officer at Shanghai.↩