Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Messrs. Tung Pi-wu and Wang Ping-nan, Communist Party Delegation, at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 1, 1946, 10:05 a.m.

Also present: Lt. Colonel Hutchin
Mr. Wu26
Capt. Soong27

Mister Tung: I received a memorandum this morning instructing me to transmit a memorandum28 to you.

General Marshall: Yes, I have it here.

Mister Tung: The last time I had a conversation with you, I laid emphasis on the point that the Government attack against Kalgan is very serious. Since the breakdown of negotiations in June, Government troops have successively attacked Communist areas and have succeeded in occupying many cities and towns. The areas in which the Government forces have staged offensives are Hopeh, Shansi, Northern Kiangsu, Anwhei, Shantung, Jehol and Southern Shensi. The Government said it would open attack on Chengteh, Kalgan and Yenan on the pretext that Communist forces besieged the city of [Page 263] Tatung. We beseiged Tatung because our forces were attacked in Southern Shansi. Therefore that action must be regarded as a counter-measure.

Under the aforementioned pretext, the Government has occupied the vicinity of Chining and some other cities in Eastern Suiyuan. We have already announced the lifting of the seige on Tatung, but the Government has not, as yet, ceased their offensive on the aforementioned places. During this period, the Government has occupied almost all the cities in Eastern Hopeh which originally were under Communist jurisdiction.

The Government has already opened a three-pronged attack on Kalgan. On account of this attack, the field team in Kalgan has been withdrawn. In Government newspapers yesterday, it was publicly announced that Government forces have opened an attack on Kalgan. It is very clear that the object of the Government is to seize one of the big political and military centers of the Communist forces, that is Kalgan, by its own military force. When I last had a conversation with you, the Government had not yet publicly announced the attack on Kalgan. After returning to our office from our last conference, I saw Mr. Fugh,29 who is an associate of Dr. Stuart, and I told him that the attack on Kalgan was regarded by the Communists as very serious. I asked Mr. Fugh to transmit this information to Dr. Stuart and to General Marshall. The public announcement by the Government of its attack on Kalgan has come to the attention of the Yenan authorities who therefore instructed General Chou to forward this memorandum to you. We have notified the Government authorities to the same effect.

General Marshall: This memorandum asks me to notify the Government. You just stated that you had already notified the Government.

Mister Tung: The Communist Party has also directly notified the Government. At the same time, General Chou hoped that you would officially bring this matter up with the Government. In his memorandum, it is stated that the attack on Kalgan means that the Government intends to ruin our efforts for peaceful political settlement and means that the relation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang Party has entered its last stage.

The foregoing is what I wished to bring up today. As to the participation of the Communist Party in the Committee of Three, and in the Five Man Group, General Chou said he would not consider participating in the Committee of Three or in Dr. Stuart’s Five Man Group until you had given him a reply on the subject you brought up last [Page 264] time. He wants to wait until he gets a reply as to the Government reaction towards your proposal of a simultaneous meeting of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group. If the Government continues to drive against Kalgan, it will also be impossible for General Chou to consider convening the Committee of Three to discuss the cessation of hostilities, while the Committee of Five is discussing the reorganization of the Government. General Chou felt, in his last conversation with you, that the Communist Party could participate in the two meetings, but that was before the Government made its announcement regarding Kalgan. That is something new.

Mister Wang: That means that if the National Government continues to drive against Kalgan, the Communist Party will not consider participating in the Committee of Three. A cessation of the drive against Kalgan is a condition precedent to Communist participation in the simultaneous convening of the two committees.

Mister Tung: I would like you to transmit that statement to the Government.

General Marshall: I will answer Mr. Tung’s last comments first. I told you gentlemen the other day that my suggestions to the Government “included” the simultaneous meeting of the two committees. Now he has used the expression that my proposal is “for” a simultaneous meeting of the two committees.

Mister Tung: I understood you correctly. I pointed out to General Chou that this was only one point of the proposal.

General Marshall: I have read the memorandum you sent me this morning most carefully and it says much the same thing as Mr. Tung’s statement. I will do what is requested of me.

As to Kalgan and the immediate importance which is attached to the Government’s public announcement, I was informed by General Chou, and I believe it is a matter of record, that the Chief of Staff of the Army30 made an announcement about Kalgan several weeks ago.

I think it is important that you gentlemen understand my view of the situation at the present time. I have made it clear to the Government, and I wish to make it clear to you, that I have not been in agreement either with the Government’s course of action or the course of the Communist Party. The situation has almost reached the point where I will not continue to put myself in a position of a mediator. I can no longer continue to be the middle man in a continued series of accusations and counter-accusations or of proposals and counterproposals. My endurance has about reached the limit. I also have to consider the position of the U. S. Government that I represent.

Now while I am struggling with the Government in my endeavor to have terms proposed that I think have a fair chance of being accepted [Page 265] by the Communist Party, that party comes forward with an announcement about the delegates to the National Assembly, and, while I am struggling with you gentlemen about a basis for agreement, the Government comes out with an announcement regarding the attack on Kalgan. It has continued this way week after week and month after month. Dr. Stuart and I proposed an approach which we thought presented a fair chance for reaching an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. With great difficulty I persuaded the Government to acquiesce, but we misunderstood General Chou as we thought we also and first had his agreement.

The point I want to make is that the procedure which the Communist Party followed inevitably was productive of the long delay during which the military operations continued—the very thing that Dr. Stuart and I were trying to prevent, until now we have reached the present crisis. The two sides can go on trading terms indefinitely and even if the decision indicated in this memorandum of this morning was carried out, it would not terminate hostilities. It would merely make them more wide-spread.

I repeat that I will discuss this statement of General Chou’s with the Government, and I will do my best to see if I can prevail on the Government to action which will increase the possibility of a peaceful settlement. I repeat again that I do not agree with either the stand of the Government or of the Communist Party; and I think possibly, in my position, I have the best understanding of the fears of each side with regard to the other. Distrust, fear and suspicion are the roots of the trouble.

I recall that Mr. Tung reminded me the other day that on three occasions General Chou had agreed to my request to suppress Communist propaganda and had carefully carried it out. And, while I feel that an important part of our trouble at the present time is the result of vicious propaganda from both sides, I would not dare again request a truce on propaganda because I do not think it would be observed, tho I think it is a major cause of our difficulties. For example, when I was pressing General Chou sometime ago to an agreement for the meeting of this Five Man Committee, there were three Government statements in one day which he quoted as influencing him in his refusal to agree to the meeting. One of those was by the Chief of Staff regarding Kalgan. When I was talking with the Government last night over the situation and pressing a certain course of action on the Government, the Communist statement regarding the National Assembly delegates appeared. Now this morning you gentlemen come to me with a very serious memorandum which is based on a Government declaration in the press. This procedure goes from side to side, each announcement further embarrassing what Doctor Stuart and I have been trying to do.

[Page 266]

You can tell General Chou for me that I will do my best in the next few days to compromise this situation, and that I recognize its seriousness. I do not know anything else that I can say at this time.

Mister Tung: I will transmit your statements this morning to General Chou immediately.

In General Chou’s last letter to you he mentioned that he did not think the Government has the intention to cease fire. That is the reason why he asks you to obtain from the Government some official expression regarding cessation of hostilities.

Now coming to the question of the National Assembly, the date of the meeting is drawing closer and closer, and the date for handing in the list of delegates is near its expiration. Of course the Communist Party could not participate in the National Assembly if the Government does not follow the resolutions of the PCC, but if the Government does follow the resolutions of the PCC, naturally the Communists will join.

(Mr. Wu’s change to foregoing statement). As the expiration date is approaching, if the Communist Party does not make a public statement, then it would be understood by the Government that the Communist Party would attend the National Assembly. That is why we have to make a public announcement regarding that point. In this statement on the National Assembly all the words are those which we have expressed in the past, not a new one has been added.

We feel very much gratified that General Marshall will do his best to better the situation, and we hope his efforts will be crowned with success immediately.

  1. Presumably Wu Yu-chang, member of the Chinese Communist delegation.
  2. Capt. John L. Soong, U. S. Army, interpreter for General Marshall.
  3. Memorandum by General Chou En-lai, September 30, p. 258.
  4. Philip C. Fugh, assistant to Ambassador Stuart.
  5. Gen. Chen Cheng.