Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart16 at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 1, 1946, 9:40 a.m.
| Also present: | Lt. Col. Hutchin17 |
Doctor Stuart opened the conversation by stating that he had been thinking over the present deplorable situation in China and that he now had a suggestion to make. His suggestion was that he and General Marshall urge the immediate and simultaneous meeting of the two committees and that they urge General Chou En Lai to return to Nanking for these meetings or invite Tung Pi Wu18 to take his place. The Five Man Committee meeting19 could be held in the morning and the Committee of Three20 could be held that same afternoon.
General Marshall told Doctor Stuart that General Yu Ta Wei21 had called on him the day before primarily to discuss the conditions under which the Government would consent to enter into a meeting of the Committee of Three and the informal Five Man Committee. Yu Ta Wei reiterated what he thought was the key to the situation and that was the locations and dispositions of the 18 Communist divisions.
General Marshall did not agree with Yu Ta Wei that this was the key to the present situation. He believed that there were several more important matters pertaining to the PCC agreements.
General Marshall was more emphatic in this discussion with Yu Ta Wei than he had intended to be. During the conference, the Generalissimo22 called Yu Ta Wei to the telephone to discuss a press announcement of the Government proposal for a simultaneous meeting of the two committees to be made that evening.
General Marshall told General Yu Ta Wei that he would agree to participate in the meetings of the Committee of Three, but he didn’t think the Communists would agree to the simultaneous meetings or that they would succeed under the conditions to be imposed by the Government. If the meetings did not succeed, that is, if they resulted in a stalemate General Marshall was finished. He would not continue to go along in further delays and long dragged out procedures [Page 261] leading nowhere. He would not become a party to the Government’s evident delays in negotiations while proceeding with a Kalgan campaign against the Communists. He could not sit in these meetings in good faith while such activity by the Government was under way.
Doctor Stuart agreed with General Marshall that probably Yu Ta Wei was the man that had spoiled the latest hope for real progress, although, of course, Chen Li-fu23 probably helped some.
General Marshall was turning over in his mind notifying the Generalissimo that the present procedure put the United States in an untenable position which could no longer be accepted, that therefore he was considering withdrawing from the present negotiations. General Marshall expressed grave concern for the latest turn of events, especially considering that he felt that he and Doctor Stuart were, in effect, being made “stooges.”
Doctor Stuart reported that last night he had for dinner Chang Li-sheng and Wu Teh Chen, who are the Nationalist members of the Committee of Five, and also Shao Li-tse,24 and that he spoke to them with great frankness about the American position in China. He pointed out the strain now put on the American Government and General Marshall’s responsibilities for protecting the position and integrity of the United States Government. He told them that the situation was intolerable and that they could not continue to be a party to negotiations if the present situation continued. It might be necessary to even withdraw American mediation and, in turn, other American support to China. Naturally there would have to be a statement as to why it was done.
General Marshall then stated that his 24 hours of waiting would be up tonight. He stated that if the Government came to him with a letter for the Communists he would transmit it but he wouldn’t carry any verbal message. General Marshall’s inclination was to force the Government leaders to back down on some of their contentions. He thought it was important that the Generalissimo learn that the American mediators were now the ones who are adamant. The Generalissimo has been going along for three months now with his campaigns. Perhaps the best idea would be to send some sort of a memorandum to the Generalissimo25 late this afternoon, informing him that General Marshall had practically come to the conclusion that the United States Government could no longer continue to be a third party to the present procedure. It was now apparent that the Chinese Government [Page 262] was no longer in a dangerous military position, the campaign for Kalgan could not be justified except on the basis of all-out war. He (General Marshall) could not put himself in the position of mediating during a continued series of military campaigns. He must have some real and positive assurances from the Government that there was a reasonable basis for a compromise which offered the possibility of success. General Marshall thought he might add in the letter that otherwise, it would be necessary for him to recommend to Washington that the United States should now terminate its efforts of mediation, the Executive Headquarters, and suspend the activation of the Military Advisory Group.
Doctor Stuart said that he certainly agreed with General Marshall’s idea of sending a letter to the Generalissimo at this time. Doctor Stuart suggested that something be included to the effect that the American course of action was based upon moral grounds, that it was absolutely indefensible for the United States to continue mediation when no grounds existed for a possible settlement. Doctor Stuart thought the letter might mean more on moral grounds than material, more on the moral inconsistency of our position rather than severing all aid to China.
- J. Leighton Stuart, Ambassador in China.↩
- Claire E. Hutchin, member of General Marshall’s staff.↩
- Member of the Chinese Communist delegation.↩
- Proposed by Ambassador Stuart in July to arrange for setting up the coalition State Council.↩
- Set up early in January to arrange for truce and to settle other military matters.↩
- Chinese Minister of Communications and liaison for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with General Marshall.↩
- Chiang Kai-shek.↩
- Member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Minister of Kuomintang Organization Board.↩
- Secretary General of the People’s Political Council (PPC).↩
- See memorandum OSE 476 by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. October 1. p. 267.↩