Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Acting Secretary of State 95
General Marshall’s last situation report (1549 September 23) presents a somewhat disturbing picture although it is well to bear in mind his own statement that “confused and maddening as are the [Page 227] developments I have not lost hope at all, for maybe yet we can pull this chestnut out of the cross fire which rages around us”.
Briefly, the situation with regard to negotiations is this:
The Communists are demanding a meeting of the three-man “Truce” Committee, of which General Marshall, a Communist representative and a Government representative are members, with the object of having the Government issue a cease-fire order. They are making this a prerequisite to discussion of political problems in the so-called “Stuart Committee”, composed of Ambassador Stuart, two Communist and two Government representatives.
Chiang Kai-shek has so far refused to agree to convening the Truce Committee, arguing that discussions in the “Stuart Committee” would reveal whether or not the Communists sincerely desire to reach a political settlement. If that is found to be the case, presumably Chiang would then be willing to issue a cease-fire order. Chiang has also made it a condition to issuance of a cease-fire order that the Communists publish the names of their delegates to the National Assembly scheduled for November 12.
General Marshall, it appears, will make an effort to obtain Chiang’s agreement to a meeting of the Truce Committee, but at the same time he has clearly indicated his desire that the “Stuart Committee” meet as soon as possible “in the hope that an agreement there would create sufficient trust in the good intentions of both parties to enable us to compromise the military issues”.
Underlying these mechanistic differences are two fundamentals. One is the lack of confidence on the part of either party in the word or intentions of the other party. General Marshall has hoped for these many months that discussions and concrete results would overcome the difficulty. He is still hopeful. The other is the question of whether either party actually or sincerely desires a political and military settlement. It has appeared that the Communists in large measure do desire, for selfish reasons, such a settlement. And it has also appeared that reactionary political and military elements in the Government do not desire a settlement, preferring rather to place their reliance in the use of force. Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude has been questionable. He would like to avoid a spread of civil war but his long and deep-seated antagonism toward the Communists and his fear of sharing governmental responsibility with any group outside his own coterie render it very difficult for him to make concessions.
The military situation, for the moment at least, is developing favorably to the Government, but General Marshall has on several occasions indicated his belief that the Government is not able to carry out the sustained and widescale operations that would be necessary to [Page 228] eliminate Communist opposition and unite the country by force. The fighting, contrary to press predictions but in accord with our own predictions, is not widespread. A number of isolated campaigns are under way, the objective of which is to recover certain key points from the Communists. In Manchuria there has been little or no military activity. The Government seems primarily concerned with obtaining control over transportation lines in north China and, as stated, is being successful in some degree.
A disturbing factor evidenced in General Marshall’s report is the tone adopted by the Communist representative, Chou En-lai, in recent communications to the General. Another is the statement of Chou’s assistant that the Soviet Ambassador “had offered to undertake the role of mediation”. General Marshall says that he takes the statement “with a grain of salt” and it is believed he is right in so doing. However, the time may be near at hand when it will be tactically advisable for the General bluntly to ask the Communists whether they wish to “fish or cut bait”. Although they have many causes for complaint against the National Government, the issues they now raise should not stand in the way of entering upon political discussions in the “Stuart Committee” if, as they claim, they desire a settlement. Therefore, it may be useful for General Marshall to smoke them out.
In the unlikely event that the Communists should decide to terminate all discussions and rely solely on military defense, we would of course have to re-examine our procedures in China if not our policy. We should, it is believed, stay with the problem, keeping General Marshall there on the spot if he is willing to remain, but stay out of the civil war. At the same time we might lift the present ban on credits to China provided those credits were utilized in areas (Yangtze River area and south) where there was no combat and provided also that Chiang actually undertook long overdue and much needed measures of reform in the political, social, economic, and agrarian fields. At present all reports indicate that the Russians are not interfering directly or materially in support of the Communists. It is believed that they would be loath to have a situation develop in China where they would find themselves ranged against us in open military support of the warring Chinese factions. Therefore, it is felt that if we refrain from rendering open military support to Chiang’s forces we can avoid development of a situation which we earnestly desire to avoid; that is, an ill-disguised military contest between ourselves and the Russians over China.
- Mr. Clayton transmitted this memorandum on September 28 to Mr. Acheson who had resumed duties of Acting Secretary of State, with the observation that Mr. Vincent’s memorandum would bring him up to date although the subject had not come up at the Cabinet meeting of September 27.↩