Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chang Chih-chung, at House 28, Chungking, January 25, 1946, 11 a.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Shepley
Colonel Pee
Captain Sung71

General Chang commenced the meeting by discussing the various elements of a draft paper on the subject of reorganization of the armies of China previously given him by General Marshall.72

With reference to Command, General Chang stated that he concurred in principle but that there may be technical questions with reference to wording.

With reference to Organization, General Chang pointed out that the Military Sub-Committee was to concern itself, according to its directive, in the reorganization of Communist units, but that he was very willing to permit this study to extend to, and include, a study on the reorganization of all armies. General Chang further pointed out that the ratio of two National divisions to one Communist division was far beyond the ratio previously demanded by the Communists.

With reference to Demobilization, General Chang again referred again to the ratio and stated that the Communists would be very happy to accept a ratio of 6 to 1; that the Minister of War wanted to announce that the armies would be organized into 60 National division[s] and 20 Communist division[s] or a ratio of 1 to 4.5 but that General Chang had recommended against this announcement. General Chang then stated that there were two alternatives:

1.
Organization into 90 National divisions and 20 Communist divisions (authorized by the 10 October Gmo [–] Mao Agreement73) or a total of 110 divisions or
2.
Reorganization into 90 divisions which would include 10 or more Communist divisions.

General Chang stated that since the Communists made no demands with reference to Air and Naval forces they should therefore not be mentioned in order to avoid “complexities”. General Chang stated that he was in complete accord with the 8 Service Areas although boundaries may be changed due to the change in provincial boundaries. At this point General Marshall stated that Chahar and Jehol [Page 200]had been separated on purpose but that the remaining boundaries were immaterial; that the main object was to separate the service function from troop command.

With reference to Demilitarization and Demobilization, General Chang asked if the demobilized officers would be concentrated in a single area and be fed and paid. General Marshall remained noncommittal and General Chang stated that the Ministry of War was preparing a plan for handling demobilized personnel and he asked that the following statement be included, “deactivate[d] officers will be taken care of by plans being developed by the Ministry of War’.

With reference to Development, General Chang stated that there was a close relationship between this and the ratio of divisions in the armies of China. General Chang agreed with the general division of strategic areas and stated that there was no need for combining and mixing National and Communist divisions in areas located in the south and west of China since the Communists have made no demands of this nature. General Marshall stated that this was done in order to break up the Communist concentration.

With reference to Administration, General Chang agreed.

With reference to Militia, General Chang stated that the militia belongs to the provinces by Chinese custom and that there is no relationship between the officers of the militia and those on the active list. General Marshall pointed out that his idea was to avoid difficulties with a so-called “local army”. General Chang then outlined his ideas with reference to the militia: Create districts separate from the provinces; each province to decide strength on its capability to support a militia subject to approval of the National Military Council. General Marshall stated that it was his idea to avoid provincial control so as to keep the militia away from political complications. General Chang stated that he understood the spirit of General Marshall’s proposal but felt that a different approach must be made. General Chang then objected to permitting the Communists to nominate governors in Kansu, Shansi, and Ningshia Provinces since Communist control of these provinces is very small.

With reference to Military Police, General Chang suggested that they not be included in this study.

With reference to Puppet Troops, General Chang agreed.

With reference to Secret Independent Forces, General Chang agreed.

General Marshall stated that he would prepare a new paper based on this discussion which will contain a combined Army, Navy, and Air program and that after this was prepared those parts that are applicable could be extracted for consideration by the Military Sub-Committee. General Chang agreed.

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General Chang asked that the plan be kept secret and that[,] in turn, the Communists be asked for their suggestions regarding the organization of troops. General Marshall feared this procedure, due to obvious complications and great embarrassment and stated that it would be better to follow the present approach.

J. H[art] C[aughey]
  1. Capt. John L. Soong, language officer, U. S. Army.
  2. Not printed; it probably was draft No. 5, about January 25.
  3. See summary of conversations between President Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung as issued October 11, 1945, at Chungking, United States Relations With China, p. 577, and telegram No. 1833, October 19, from the Chargé in China, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, p. 475.