Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 16, 1946, 6 p.m.

Nanking, July 16, 1946, 6 p.m.

Also present:	Mr. Chang
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Chou: I would first like to thank you for providing the plane to make the trip to Shanghai. This trip was the first I had made to Shanghai in the last ten years. I had conferences all day yesterday, in the forenoon and afternoon. The trouble is that in Shanghai they require too much efficiency, and Dr. T. F. Tsiang²⁵ is too occupied in other things. He could not hold a conference in the evening to bring this to completion. This morning Dr. Tsiang had to come to Nanking to attend a meeting at the Executive Yuan and tomorrow he has to attend the UNRRA²⁶ Far Eastern Committee meeting. So he will not be free until Thursday. I could not wait in Shanghai today and tomorrow because of other things here, so I came back today, but will have to go back to Shanghai tomorrow afternoon. Dr. Tsiang thinks it is not proper to meet here because the CNRRA and UNRRA personnel are all in Shanghai and they can have all the materials at hand.

I hope the Yellow River business can be settled in complete separation from the political and military factors. I hope that through a whole day’s meeting day after tomorrow everything can be settled. I also hope I can make a flight with Mr. Todd,²⁷ the engineer, to the Yellow River to see in the field progress of the work and make a decision on the diversion. Possibly we can make the trip to Honan Friday and come back on the week end. I again have to ask your kindness for transportation facilities, first to Shanghai and then to Honan.

I would like to inquire as to the Government’s reaction of my last proposal of sending a field team in connection with the Yellow River supervision.

Regarding general relief affairs, I brought up the same points which I have written to Mr. LaGuardia²⁸ and which I mentioned to you, Mr. Ray²⁹ of UNRRA and Dr. T. F. Tsiang of CNRRA. Dr. Tsiang merely accepted the third point, that is the institution of an Inspection Mission to see in the field about the distribution and to make recommendations. As to permitting Communist representation on the Allocation Committees or on the staff of CNRRA, he said he can merely consider the matter but cannot accept it right now.

While in Shanghai, I also met Mr. Price³⁰ and Dr. Falconer, the deputy director of UNRRA. Mr. Ray is away. They accepted my proposal to have constant contact with my representative in Shanghai regarding such matters as transportation, recommendations for the distribution of supplies to the Communist areas and information about our difficulties. At the same time while we are making representation to CNRRA we will also inform UNRRA on the situation through the liaison man. The UNRRA accepted all the proposals and they are very eager to help along this line. They further made certain suggestions regarding medical supplies and other things and in general were very enthusiastic and cooperative. I feel sure fruitful result will come out of this discussion. UNRRA also supports my proposal to ask CNRRA to provide office room for my representative in CNRRA so that that representative can keep himself informed about the current situation and make recommendations. I am too occupied in so many things that I do not want everything referred to Nanking. I hope CNRRA will also accept this principle. That would diminish misunderstanding and increase efficiency of the work, which would also be beneficial to CNRRA.

During these two days’ absence the situation in the field has become more aggravated. The first is regarding North Kiangsu. On July 13 I mentioned that the Government was contemplating open attack on the 15th. Now, this has been verified by the actual fight. The papers reported on the 13th and 14th of fighting, alleging the Communists are attacking, but actually the Kuomintang was making preparation to start the attack on the 15th. General Tang En Po³¹ gave an order to his units to attack. He deployed three divisions under his command in the immediate northern bank of the Yangtze River for that purpose. The 49th Division is attacking toward Ju-kao. The 83rd Division attacked to the west of Ju-kao, while the 25th Division is attacking toward Kiang Yen. Apart from that they sent the 5th Army at the same time to attack Tien-chang and Hsu-yu, and a part of the 25th Division was also sent to attack Shao-po. This is merely for the purpose of manoeuvering. Their purpose is to capture as a first step Ju-kao to Kiang Yin. In the western part they occupy the Tien-chang-Hsu-yu line. At the same time they are using the Chinese navy to hold complete control of the Kiang Yin and Chin Kiang. At each place they have two battalions covering the river crossing of the Nationalist troops. At the same time the 5th group of the Chinese Air Force is deployed to coordinate with the ground force actions.

At the same time to the south of the Yangtze River they are disposing the 21st division from Shanghai to Chung-ming. This force can be used in an emergency and they have the 65th Division in the vicinity of Kiang Yin. Those two divisions can be thrown into action whenever it becomes necessary and they can be sent across the river. So, there are two army units in the front line and one army held in reserve all told. This is the situation to the south of the North Kiangsu Communist area at the time of July 15.

I further learned that military operations are also going on in the Hsuchow–Pang Pu sector. They are attacking from Hsuchow southward and from Pang Pu eastward. Because I have not received the detailed information about the plan of operation of the Nationalist troops I am not yet in a position to inform you of the details.

General Marshall: I would like to read from a memorandum³² I just received this afternoon from General Hsu:

“A Communist force of 40,000 began a siege on Tai-hsing on July 13 and occupied the town on the 15th. They continued to attack Tai-hsien and other important towns and river ports along the north bank of the Yangtze. We strongly and seriously protest. Please notify General Chou En-lai immediately to halt these operations, evacuate the cities and towns so occupied and punish the responsible persons. Otherwise, the Government, for protection of the capitol, must adopt self-defense actions.”

Since we came out here on the porch I received this note from General Yu Ta Wei:

“The Government has captured Tai Hsing, but with heavy losses. There were ten National officers killed in the action.”

Further than that General Yu Ta Wei came to me this morning and reported certain attacks. He appealed to me to stop the attacks. He told me the Government dispositions, which would seem entirely contrary to offensive purposes.

General Chou: What is the position of the Government troops according to General Yu Ta-wei?

General Marshall: I am not at liberty to tell you that. It is purely defensive and not in the numbers you mentioned at all. Also, where they did have an army, it has now become a division by virtue of their demobilization plan. They have done away with two of the three divisions and built up one division reenforced (three brigades). There is no longer a three division army. They are really all reenforced divisions. Of course, I would think the enlisted strength has not changed much, but the officers’ strength has changed. They are doing away with division and brigade officers and I assume the brigades are at full strength, where heretofore they were weak. I would assume that the enlisted strength of the reenforced division is not much below the enlisted strength of the former three divisions. The officers’ strength would be very much below their former strength. These are assumptions that are in accord with the pattern of their demobilization scheme.

General Chou: This can be easily clarified. I feel sure that the information I received regarding the designation of the Nationalist forces is reliable because they are based on the order issued by General Tang En-po. In that order, according to the Communist information, the designations are all based on the reorganization basis—divisions instead of armies. For example, the 49th Division which is attacking Tukao has left the 105th Brigade to garrison Haimen and Nan-tung. This implies, of course, that the original 49th Army is involved and the original 105th Division, which is now a brigade, is used to garrison those two places. I forgot to mention that attached to the 83rd Division, which is deployed to attack the western part of Tukao, there is the 299th Brigade of the 69th Division and the 148th Brigade of the 25th Division. They are concentrated between Tai-hsiang and Tsing-kiang. There are concentrated all told five brigades. According to General Tang’s order, the troops will be ready at their assigned positions before July 14 so that the attack could be opened on the 15th. As to the 5th Army, it is still organized on the old basis so there are no brigades because they just arrived from the south.

It is not true that the Nationalist troops are merely taking defensive positions, because today’s Shanghai newspaper reported Communists’ attack on Taihsing but without mentioning that we have occupied that place. Therefore it is most improbable that the Communists could have occupied that place at July 15. That may account for the reason why General Yu Ta-wei sent a telephone message to correct the previous statement. The outskirts of Taihsing are in the hands of the Communists. Because I had informed the Communist commander of a prospective Nationalist attack, they took the necessary preparations. As soon as the Nationalists opened attack, the Communist forces resisted and dealt them, no doubt, a good blow so that the Nationalists were forced back to the city, but certainly the Communist forces did not take that town. Of course both sides would have suffered casualties. The true light of the situation can be easily disclosed if the fighting is continued in the next few days since then we can find out whose forces are occupying what places. If both parties showed their sincere desire for stopping the hostilities, then the field team at Huai-an should be sent to the field to effect the seizure of orders. Not only lip service should be paid but instead the field team should be allowed to go to the front line to survey the situation.

Now, coming to the Shantung area, the Nationalist forces succeeded in occupying the entire section of the western part of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad on June 13–14. They occupied Chang-tien, Tse-chuan and are attacking Po-shan, the important coal mine. In this way they hold in control the whole section from Wei-hsien to Tsinan. The only place that is still in obscurity is I-tu since the Government forces were reported to have taken I-tu but the Communists were still resisting. The situation is not very clear at this moment. Now to the north of Tsinan the Government forces occupy the city Chi-yang and therefore the fighting along the Tsingta-Tsinan railroad is flaring up.

Now, as to southwest Shansi, the New 1st Army under General Hu Tsung Nan’s command crossed the Yellow River and occupied Wen-hsi on July 14 and also the southern part of Wen-hsi, including Mou-ching Ferry and the nearby city.

From the above it seems that the fighting will be spread in the three localities, Shensi, Shangtung, and North Kiangsu. We received information that the Government was sending reenforced troops to those places so we could anticipate that the fighting is bound to be enlarged. While, on the other hand, in Jehol and Manchuria where the Government has not sent reenforced troops the fighting did not spread out. This was because the Communists did not take this advantage to instigate hostilities.

I further learned, but can get no confirmation, that the Government is now reenforcing one more army to go to Tientsin and Chin-wang-tao, and this possibly may lead to an attack from Tientsin southward.

General Marshall: A telephone message just came in from General Yu Ta Wei. He states Communists are attacking en masse on a 100 mile front between Tai-hsien and Tai-hsing with 18 regiments. The main attack is at a place called Hsien Kai Pao with six regiments, which are a part of the 18. The Communists were repulsed and are retreating eastward. The Nationalist losses: 20 officers and 4500 men. The Communist loss estimated at 10,000, including 1,000 prisoners. Attack has been in progress for three days. He will give me a written report tomorrow.

Can General Chou come over in the morning at 10:30? I will try to see General Yu Ta-wei at 9:30.

Now this is just for General Chou to think about tonight. My own reaction to this present situation—I mean the fact that we are not proceeding with negotiations—is that it cannot continue without developing into general fighting. That is, the situation cannot be controlled and the fighting will not continue local. It will soon become general. It seems to me that unless we find a basis for issuing the cease-fire order, everything will be out of control. All agreements will be wiped out and there will be a general civil war. I told the Generalissimo that before he left for Kuling. I tell General Chou that now. It also seems to me that we have gotten very close to a solution regarding military dispositions. Therefore, I feel that we should make an extraordinary effort to find some solution to the civil government dilemma. I take it that General Chou does not want to make a local decision because he feels that it may be utilized as a precedent to eliminate from further consideration the PCC as a basis for general political settlements. It seems to me that that is a dangerous attitude considering that a general civil war is in the offing. Also General Chou must consider that I might be able to get an agreement that there will be a meeting of the PCC. If the situation degenerates, as I think it will, into a general civil war, with every field commander thinking the other side is taking advantage of him, then the PCC will have no useful purpose whatsoever. Not this year at any rate. Therefore, I repeat that we should make an extraordinary effort to find a basis for the acceptance of the special agreement so that immediately we can issue the cease fire order. I cannot persuade the Generalissimo to issue the cease fire order unless we have some agreement on that special agreement. The issue then is a small one militarily but a very difficult one politically.

I have commented several times that it was very difficult for me to make any suggestions for compromise regarding local administration. However, I am going to make a proposal now for General Chou to think about. Would there be any possibility, for example, of the Communists accepting an arrangement in Kiangsu that wherever they controlled a hsien prior to Japanese surrender they would continue that local administration according to their own procedure? That where their occupation followed the Japanese surrender, they would not resist the Government control of local administration which might or might not be left in the hands of the present official? That possibly some temporary agreement could be reached regarding the land adjustments in those hsiens which have been taken over by the Communists since the Japanese surrender. In the hsiens which were held by the Communists prior to the Japanese surrender the land adjustments would await the reorganization of the Government. I’ll just leave that with General Chou as a thought.

I feel that if we don’t find some solution in the next four or five days it will be too late, General Chou tells me of the Government actions and the Government side tells me the Communist actions and each one is outraged with the other. The situation is developing into a straight civil war and unless something is done quickly it will be too late.

25. Director-General of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).
26. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
27. Oliver J. Todd, UNRRA adviser to the Yellow River Commission.
28. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City and Director-General of UNRRA.
29. J. Franklin Ray, Acting Director of the UNRRA China Office.
30. Presumably Frank W. Price, American former adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
31. Garrison Commander of Nanking area.
32. Not printed.