Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, July 11, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

July 11, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

Also present:	Mr. Chang
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Marshall: I would like to speak first about the teams that came down from north of Hankow. My desire was to bring in the American team members to get their opinion of the situation. I suggested that the Communist and the National Government members could come down by the same plane if they cared to do so. General Chou desired to have the Communist team members report to Nanking. The National Government did not desire to have their team members come in. However, the instructions to the American team members that were sent from Peiping misled them into feeling that this was a team movement and that therefore both the Communists and Government members should accompany the American members to Nanking. When Colonel Hutchin arrived at Hankow the American members were at the air field ready to leave but the others were not. He went into the city and got in touch with the other people, and they all came, the Government members through a complete misunderstanding, the purpose of my invitation not having been made clear.

This morning the American team members notified the office here that the National members had stated that they felt they should be present when I talked to the Communist members. The fact of the matter was I had no intention of discussing the matter with the Communist members, reserving my discussion entirely to General Chou. Also I learned from General Yu Ta Wei this morning that he, representing the Government side of the Committee of Three, did not wish to have a meeting of the team members with the Committee. I had not proposed it because the Government members arrived here through the action of my people without reference to the Government. Therefore, I did not feel that I should next propose team meetings with the Committee of Three. I contented myself with a lengthy discussion with the American members and then had them draw up for me their recommendations, which I will presently read to General Chou.

First, I wish to say that the impression I got from the American members is that both sides are at fault in the development of the present situation. The Communist[s] were in a very critical position. The Government forces had been reenforced. The filtering out movement of Communists in small groups had been almost continuous. The strengthening of the Government position had also been continuous and the result was almost a foregone conclusion. I myself felt that the situation was so critical that it was well-nigh impossible to keep it in balance. I also thought, after listening to the Americans, that the situation was so indefinite at the present time that specific instructions could not be given from here unless there was a Government agreement to the evacuation of the Communist forces to the north or concentration in some other nearby area. Lacking that basis, the American team members recommended that Team No. 32 and a part of Team No. 9, with the necessary light radio equipment, be sent by air to Laohokow or Hsiangyang, where there are supposed to be landing fields, and that they there establish a field headquarters for themselves. From that headquarters one team would go to the vicinity of Tsao-yang and the other to the vicinity of Sui-hsien. Their first problem would be to regain touch with the Communist commanders, and endeavor to secure General Li’s agreement to halting his northern advance and also to secure Government agreement not to move forward in pursuit. They selected those places based on the best available information which indicated that those were the localities where they might best regain touch with the situation.

I saw no immediate probability of securing a new agreement here, I therefore felt the best thing, so far as the Americans were concerned, was to endeavor to regain contact, see what local arrangements might be made and then report to Peiping, or here, or both. The local arrangements would depend upon whatever would appear to be the best adjustment in the light of the actual situation and the attitude of the respective commanders. I had no other proposal to make and therefore authorized them to return today, leaving at 1:00 o’clock. I am referring solely to the American members, though of course transportation for the National and Communist members was also available.

General Chou: I can almost entirely agree with your views. I have but the following to add, which I arrived at after my conversation with the Communist team representatives and which I would like to mention as an explanation. Since the last time we came back from Hankow in May the Government has constantly sent reenforcements to the border of the Communist area to the east of the railroad line, and as you just said the American members also have this impression. As to the two Communist areas to the west of the railroad line at the border of Honan and Hupeh, in May when we were there we already had heard about two conflicts, which were investigated. Second, the Government team representative said that that area was under the jurisdiction of General Liu in Honan and therefore the Government representative was not responsible for that area. This is of course not sensible because, as the Government representative, he should have the full authorization to deal with the whole matter. But anyhow the team negotiated directly with the headquarters in Hsuchow for over a month in order to coordinate the matter, and this caused much delay in the operation of the field teams. Part of the team returned to Hankow only when the latest incident occurred. By that time the Communist area to the west of the railroad line was almost completely crushed. This is one of the direct factors which caused resentment among the Communist troops. The Communist troops in Hankow captured an order issued by the Government on June 22nd which directed an annihilation attack on the Communist troops. This seems to correspond to actual fact because the original 15-days armistice was to have expired on June 22nd and it is very logical that the Government should have made preparations for open attack and that this order only reached the field army units on June 22nd. Later on we agreed to an extension of the armistice here in Nanking, which of course reached the field army units later than June 22nd. The Communist troops captured this order of attack between the time of June 22nd and June 26th, which caused much alarm among them.

At the same time during the 8-day extension of the armistice the Government side continued their preparations and reenforced troops and took up positions at strategical points, and fighting therefore took place at many points. One of those was witnessed by Field Team No. 32 at Hokou.

As the Government was reenforcing and advancing, the Communists also moved troops but these were small units and only in the Communist areas. As I was told by Colonel White, as well as the Communist members, it seems that on about June 29th General Li, then in Hsinyang, finally arrived at his decision to force an exit and that the main force of the Communist forces crossed the railway on June 30th and July 1st.

Due to communication difficulties, it was only on 26 June that the field team sent a wire to Peiping informing it of the hostilities at Hokou and the Government order of attack on 22 June. This message was relayed to me on 28 June. A second report was dispatched by the Hopei Communists on 2 July after the main force had crossed the railroad. By that time they were in a more or less safe position and therefore they installed the radio equipment and sent the message. Based on that message that I furnished a second memorandum to you indicating that I received some information on the situation. Those troops reported as to where the Government troops advanced on the eastern side of the railroad and what Government army units were pursuing them to the west of the railroad. It was further reported that a part of the Communist troops were still left in the eastern section. The Government team members said that that unit was either at Ma-ching or Shang-cheng. I have no way to determine the true facts. Also, a considerable part of the Communist civil officials and local troops, such as Peace Preservation Corps, are still left on the eastern side of the railroad and their present whereabouts and status are completely unknown. The whole area now has been penetrated by the Government troops since 2 July. The main force of the Communist forces seem to be marching on in the night, resting in the daytime, so they have no way to install their radio communication. They could not establish further contact with the Hankow radio station of the Communist field team branch because, as you know, that radio station has been seized by the Government side for over 20 hours. In addition the Communist forces no longer trust that station because they are afraid the code has been taken over by the Government side. Therefore, they would only establish radio contact with Peiping. Our Hankow team can only radio Peiping in “the clear” because Peiping is not sure whether or not the code is still safe. When the Communist members came here I made some arrangements for new codes for them. Right now, however, there is no way to determine the true status of the Communist forces.

As to what measures we should adopt, I fully agree with the suggestion you have just made. I have no special comments to make but I wish to point out that unless the Government promises to stop pursuing and attacking those Communists and permit them to go to the north, it would be impossible for the Communist forces to feel assured of their safety. It is quite certain that the Communist forces would not march through big towns because it takes too much time to enter those places. While they are being pursued it is too much to their disadvantage and therefore they will only go to those places where there are few Government troops, that is, further westward. I have no intention of asking the Government to demarcate a new area for the Communist forces. The Government does not have many troops to the west and the Communists have operated in the area along the border of Shansi and Szechwan in earlier days. Therefore they know the terrain of that area very well.

I also learned, I do not know whether or not it is true, that the Generalissimo went to Chungking yesterday. I am afraid he is going there to make preparations.

General Marshall: The Generalissimo is in Nanking today. He was going to Shanghai but that was cancelled.

General Chou: I have no intention of raising new demarcation areas for Communists, rather I would like to secure a Government promise to let Communist troops go to the North.

General Marshall: Any particular place?

General Chou: I would leave to the Government to say what particular point is most suitable. I see no way that they can be assigned a new area south of the Yellow River.

The first question which arises is that we must not only secure a temporary agreement with General Chen Chien in Hankow but also General Liu Chih at Honan because the movement of the troops will affect the Honan area also, and without the agreement of the Honan Governor General much delay and trouble would be caused.

The second question is regarding the Communist forces that remain to the east of the railroad. Their present status is still obscure and we never had contact with their small radio station. In fact I am not sure whether they have small radios. I hope that field team #9 will make investigation. The two American team members have been very enthusiastic and working hard on this matter and I feel very grateful for their efforts. They also promised that they will try to establish contact with the remaining Communists. Since the present situation with regard to the Communists in the eastern part is entirely unknown to me I have no particular suggestion to make at this moment. The Communist team representative will go back with the two American members today. According to my representative’s report at the time when the Communist forces were just crossing the river line the American representative suggested that the field team go immediately to the spot and establish contact. My people fully supported that suggestion but the Government side declined so the team did not go. Anyway, the Communist team members promised to cooperate to the fullest with the American members.

General Marshall: I had a lengthy discussion day before yesterday with Doctor Wang, Mr. Shao and the Chief of Staff,⁹ during which they gave me their point of view as to the discussions they had with General Chou. I was told at this meeting that in all probability they would take up with General Chou some further meeting in an endeavor to find some basis of agreement. I have heard nothing further in the matter. Has another meeting been arranged?

General Chou: We met each other again yesterday and had a two hours’ talk with no result. Fundamentally the Government representatives cannot alter the essence of the Generalissimo’s directive regarding the civil administration of those four areas—North Kiangsu, Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, part south of Chengte, and Antung. They can only adopt a procedure which tackles those four places one by one. Regarding the taking over of the civil administration, they merely promised that while taking over they would take into consideration the Communist Party agencies. Such a basis was not acceptable to me. I proposed that perhaps we should have a general discussion on the civil administration of all the Communist areas so that when we are discussing the local civil administration in those four places we would also reach an overall solution for all areas. They say that the problem of the other areas can only be taken up after the reorganization of the National Government. This is to say that while the Communists are to turn over the local administration of those four areas, no security or no definite status is given to the other Communist areas. I stated that while I may consider a further reduction of Communist forces stationed in those areas, I cannot accept a complete withdrawal of the Communist forces and Communist administration. Therefore no agreement could be reached. At this juncture, Dr. Wang asked whether the whole question should be referred back to General Marshall. I replied, “If there is no other way out, that seems the only appropriate procedure.”

When parting, we promised that we would make further efforts today and tomorrow. If still no conclusion could be arrived at, we would make a decision tomorrow as to whether or not it will be referred back to you. I also told them that I presumed you would first settle the military question. I had reference to the question which has a bearing on the army reorganization, on the distribution of troops, etc., and try to get the signing of the special agreement.

General Marshall: I would like to discuss in a very general way the current events which are endangering the possibility of successful negotiation. The problem, as usual, is one of the serious effects of the Chinese procedure of retaliations. I have frequently presented to the Government the view that it was wrong to continue the campaign along the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, particularly as [it] involved places which had not been occupied by the Communists after 7 June. I stated that I thought it probably would have been possible very quickly to get an agreement to evacuate those places that were occupied since 7 June rather than have a campaign of attacks in order to recapture them. I have no accurate information as to whether or not the military operations along the railroad have been slowed up or discontinued. Meanwhile the Government brought to my attention this morning the threatening movements of Communist troops to the west of the Grand Canal and not very far north of Nanking, also against the Tsingtao railroad from the north, and from the south. The Government referred to the Tatung situation but I did not see any report of renewed Communist troop movements in that region. Also, Communist troops are operating against the Tsinan–Pukow railroad between Tehsien and Changhsien.

Then, also, we had the release of the Communist Yenan statement of 7 July, regarding which General Chou sent me a memo on 8 July which I have here. Now, I have avoided any comments regarding propaganda statements from Yenan, and regarding the Government statements in Nanking. I use the word “propaganda” because in my opinion this was pure propaganda. I regard propaganda as inevitable but I had not intended to comment to General Chou regarding this incident until the receipt of his memorandum, and I debated even then whether or not I would make any reply to him. However, the coincidence of events has caused me to reconsider the matter this morning, and I have this to say: This statement from Yenan comes at the same time as propaganda releases from Moscow, along the same line, are made public. That fact alone does not help me in my efforts at negotitiation with the National Government. But, what is much more important in regard to my negotiations and my understanding with General Chou, is this factor; the Yenan release makes an aggressive, really a bitter, attack on Americans and American policy. It asserts an American imperialistic intention regarding China—which it violently denounces. It is difficult for me to characterize that procedure. It is very much like disputing a man who says “night is day.” What is one going to say? This is a routine example of Communistic propaganda, whether in Europe or in the Far East, and I accept it as such. In other words, it is a technique that is followed regardless of the facts.

But now to the more personal aspect of this matter. In the first place, as I have already explained very carefully and very frankly to General Chou, since the President’s public statement of policy regarding China last December, I have received no other instructions from the American Government. That is a fact. That is not propaganda. Therefore, if this release is correct in its statement, then I am the “reactionary party.” I am the guilty party in all of these matters since early December. I would like General Chou to tell Yenan that I am the so-called “reactionary party” according to their release. Nobody else can be charged with this but me, personally.

The other more serious aspect is the fact that this bitter, anti-American attack deliberately leads to violent reactions against my officers and Americans generally. I mentioned one day to General Chou that the American field team member at Chengte had given me a report on the situation and recommended the immediate withdrawal of the Americans in the region of Chengte. Later, the same American stated that within 24 hours there had been a change of attitude and he then recommended that the Americans continue in their efforts in that locality. Now he reports that his bedroom was invaded by a group of Communists who told him to get out and cautioned him that he could not go abroad without danger to his life. But the more important fact was that no agency of the Communist governmental administration in that vicinity took any measures to prevent this violation of his quarters. They simply disappeared from the scene. Now, this hostility is being developed on every hand against my officers and men, whose sole effort is to find some way to bring hostilities to an end. What is said, particularly of a bitter nature, is very difficult to unsay, and just how the Communist Party expects me to help them in an effort to secure a cessation of hostilities is beyond my comprehension. I have made no statement to the American people. I read the violent attacks on American policy in the Daily Worker in New York, which of course seized on this recent, propaganda to exploit for its purpose, I don’t want to be a involved in the necessity of a public statement but it is useless to expect that I can serve any useful purpose towards terminating hostilities with this type of propaganda being carried on. In all probability it was the opinion of those who drafted this paper that it would produce a helpful result in the United States. If “helpful result” means a precipitation of a chaotic condition in China, then probably they are correct. But the responsibility for the chaotic condition will be very clearly placed by any more of that procedure.

I would like to repeat again this aspect, which I previously explained very clearly to General Chou, that I and I alone have dictated what was being done out here by the U. S. since December, so they have attacked me direct. If the procedure has been wrong, then I am the person who has done that wrong, and not a group of reactionaries in the United States.

I wish to assure you, General Chou, that I have spoken with complete frankness so that there will be no doubt as to my own view of the matter. I wish to assure you that I will go ahead in the effort to secure a successful conclusion of these negotiations and the issue of the cease fire order without any regard to this matter I have just discussed. I feel certain you will proceed in the same manner. To use an American expression, “that is water over the dam.”

General Chou: I appreciate the frank manner in which you have given me your reaction to that statement. I would like very much to have another chance to talk to you tomorrow in regard to this matter. But I share the conclusion you just reached and the last part of what you said. Yesterday I learned of the nomination of Dr. Leighton Stuart as American Ambassador, and that certainly gives a good impression to the Chinese people. I feel sure you did much in making this recommendation to the U. S. Government.

9. General Chen Cheng.