Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 30, 1946, 2:15 p.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Captain Soong |
General Marshall: I suppose General Chou got my message that the Generalissimo had some time previous to 12:00 issued orders that his army should not engage in any aggressive action except to defend their positions. I did not see the terms of the order.
I have no specific points to bring to General Chou’s attention at this time regarding possible compromises on the part of the Government. But it was a clearly expressed intention on the part of the Generalissimo to go ahead with negotiations. The questions discussed between us were almost entirely regarding the larger issues, that is, those issues I thought were the most serious difficulties in the way of agreements. I should make it clear here that there was no suggestion on my part to the prolongation of the period of restraint from aggressive action. I previously said to the Generalissimo, and to General Chou, that I feared the mere prolongation would result in a violent rupture due to the tense feeling in political as well as military circles and among the people in general.
In searching for some better method to find a solution I suggested to the Generalissimo the desirability of his receiving General Chou [Page 1266] and their having intimate discussions. He acquiesced, or agreed, to that suggestion. When I asked him if I should make the appointment and if so, when would he see General Chou, he said tomorrow or the following day. I expressed the view that the day after tomorrow was too long a delay and I thought it was very important that he see General Chou as quickly as possible. I left with the impression that he would probably propose some time tomorrow. I wanted General Chou to know this as soon as possible, and also to know that the notes containing his suggestions as to a possible course of procedure which he made yesterday afternoon had been read by the Generalissimo.
General Chou: Asked whether the Generalissimo had explained to General Marshall the order he issued for the continuation of the cessation of aggressive action. Does it contain a time limit or not?
General Marshall: I did not see the order. I will add that he was intending to make a press release regarding that and spoke to me about possible time limits. Just what his decision was I do not know. But my reaction was there should be no time limit. Not because I thought more time should be given to the negotiation of a special agreement but on the contrary because I thought we must complete it as quickly as possible with a very minimum of delays. Otherwise the situation would get out of hand and be completely beyond control. I frankly suggested that he put no period in but terminate his part of the affair if he felt there was no chance of reaching a satisfactory conclusion on a peaceful basis. I think the Generalissimo rather favored putting in a date, but his reasons and mine would be quite different. I was after speed, and yet I could not say just how many days would be required. I don’t know whether I make my meaning clear or not. Maybe I can explain my position better this way. The Generalissimo’s desire is to conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible. I have exactly the same desire but we disagreed as to the procedure that would best produce that result. He seemed to favor a limiting date. I felt that he would have to put that so far off in the future, in order to make certain of the possibility of completing negotiations, that he might well be prolonging rather than shortening negotiations. I am of the opinion that we have very little time, before we would be overtaken by the situation. I have talked a good bit about this but I wanted to make the position clear. It may be we will find a date mentioned in the release. If no date is mentioned it would mean he took my suggestion which has for its purpose the earlier termination of negotiations.
General Chou: The second question you raised is to have an interview between the Generalissimo and General Chou; that procedure seems highly desirable because the position can be explained much [Page 1267] clearer by both parties. I thank you for your assistance in arranging such an appointment. The main thing is to continue the discussion on the special agreement. I am not sure whether to continue to discuss the entire amended basic agreement or still discuss on the basis of this special agreement.
General Marshall: I believe it should be the special agreement. The Generalissimo would prefer the entire agreement but I don’t believe you can hope to complete that without long delay. I feel certain the situation, as I previously expressed it, will overtake us.
The Generalissimo did not like the special agreement but it was evident to me that that was the only hope of managing an early issuance of formal instructions for the final termination of hostilities. It was my hope that if we got this special agreement agreed to, not only would the order for the cessation of hostilities be issued, but we could then proceed in a more harmonious manner, like last February, to complete the amendments to the basic agreement of February 25.
General Chou: Regarding the hostilities, as far as I know, the situation in Manchuria is rather satisfactory at the present moment. General Yao, whom you have asked to come here before going to Yenan, just told me that the situation in Manchuria is fairly satisfactory and there are no significant hostilities and that the field teams have also gone up to Harbin and the same thing with Ambassador Pauley’s16 mission. From the foregoing, it seems to me that the chief trouble might be in China Proper. If the Generalissimo’s order is restricted to Manchuria then the situation in China Proper might be getting serious.
I learned from General Yao that a field team is scheduled to leave for Harbin today. Two other teams are still delayed by the Government side from going to places indicated in General Byroade’s original plan. For this reason the Communists will also delay the dispatch of the team to Tsitsihar until clearance by the Government is given to the ether two teams. Another reason there is no conflict in Tsitsihar. They may have to decide to move the Tsitsihar team to some other place.
Regarding the hostilities in China Proper. In the first place I have already mentioned twice the situation in the area north of Hankow. Right now, Government Troops have occupied four or five localities and they compelled the Communists’ forces to take up self defense, the result of which would be complete chaos in that area. So far, I have not received a formal reply from the Government and I feel very much concerned.
General Marshall: Has he names of the localities?
[Page 1268]General Chou: I sent over a memorandum this morning.17 Secondly, regarding the situation in North Kiangsu. The so-called refugees are now going to be armed by the Government and rifles have been issued and the so-called refugees organized in Nanking, Chekiang, Kiangsu and it is possible that they will, within a few days, launch an assault on the Communist area.
Thirdly, regarding the four blown-up bridges on the Tsingtao–Tsinan RR; the reason for the destruction was due to the fact that the Nationalist Eighth Army recently occupied Yitu. After the occupation of Yitu, the Communists, to defend themselves, blew up the bridges.
Fourthly, regarding the situation in Jehol, I sent a memorandum also showing the disposition of Nationalists troops. The main assault was made from the east side and in the western side they also have taken concerted actions.
Fifthly, regarding the situation in Tatung, I learned that General Yen Hsi Shan has considerably over-colored the situation and also that the American member of the field team sent a report on the concentration of troops. I sent two wires about the matter. I received one reply. In the reply assurance was given that the Communists will not attack Tatung but does admit the Communists made some preparations in that area because General Yen Hsi Shan is planning to attack west and along the Tung-pu RR. For this reason the Communists have massed troops forming a menace to Tatung but it has no intention to attack it. The preparation is merely to tie up General Yen’s forces so that they could not launch an attack further east. I received a memorandum from General Hsu yesterday regarding this matter, and I have also a reply along these which I have given him. Therefore I am much concerned over the conflict in China proper. It is quite possible that present events will [lead to] conflagration in China proper, particularly in the four places mentioned, Hopeh, North Kiangsu, Tsingtao–Tsinan RR and in Jehol. This situation is serious too, because once fighting starts in one or two places it would affect the whole of China proper. Therefore I share your view that we should continue our discussion on the basis of this special agreement and have it completed as quickly as possible. I have thought over this special agreement, and it seems to me that the issues pertaining to Manchuria should not be so hard for a solution. I do not know whether you would agree with me or not. Maybe I am wrong. To me it seems the main difficulties lie in the issues of North Kiangsu, the Tientsin–Pukou RR line and Jehol. I learned that the Generalissimo is very stubborn on these three points. He is very unyielding [Page 1269] in his three points. In order to loosen the knot we have to start from these three points. If the Generalissimo would persist in his demands then we may reach an impasse. This seems to me the crucial point of issue now. I do not know whether my impression is right or wrong.
General Marshall: I think those particular points are great difficulties, but I am also inclined to believe that the matter of the local civil governments is one of equal difficulty.
General Chou: We will talk about the local civil government. Do you have in mind the local civil government in general or do you refer particularly to North Kiangsu and Jehol?
General Marshall: I am referring particularly to those places the Communists are to evacuate, which will be Kiangsu, Jehol, south of the latitude of Chengte and similar areas which have been under Communist control. I would assume, though I don’t know, that in Manchuria the situation is a little different. It is more of a general proposition than in Kiangsu, for example. In most parts of Manchuria neither the Communists or the Nationalist Government have been there but for a short time but it is quite different in North China. It also [is] greatly complicated by the problem of what happens to the refugees on their return.
General Chou: Is there any inclination for the Government representative like Dr. Wang Shih Chieh to participate?
General Marshall: I could not say. Dr. Wang read General Chou’s proposals but made no commitment. I would hope that they might be discussed when you see the Generalissimo.
General Chou: Now, where should we make a point to start?
General Marshall: At the present moment all I can see that can be done is to make a careful review of the papers, see if there are any modification or points of view or any suggestions that might loosen the knots, and await the result of this conversation between the Generalissimo and General Chou. I have no basis for discussion with General Chou regarding the readjustment of these points unless he has something to suggest as a possible rearrangement that might be more acceptable to the Government and still be acceptable to the Communists. However, at this moment I have nothing from the Government side to go on. I am hopeful that their conversation may lead to some adjustments or some procedure that would tend to facilitate matters. Our immediate problem is to prevent a further outbreak of hostilities in North China. The trouble is that the Government feels the Communists’ action in Shantung from June 9 until the 13th or 14th were very hostile and aggressive. The Government also feels that Communist concentrations around Tatung are very threatening [Page 1270] and the destruction of bridges, which included a large bridge near Chinchow[,] are hardly evidences of good faith.
On the Communist side, General Chou feels that the Government action north of Hopeh and the action he described along the Tung-pu RR constitute aggressive threats. Now, how to compose these conflicting situations is an immediate problem. In the hope Thursday that we had found a basis for the issuance of the formal agreement for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria I had drafted this further agreement concerning North China:
“Instructions have just been agreed to and issued by the Government and Communist Party for the formal termination of hostilities in Manchuria. All fighting and offensive military movements will immediately cease in North and Central China in strict accordance with the terms of Agreement of January 10, 1946. Detailed orders regarding the redisposition of troops will be issued later.”
General Chou: Will the order for cessation of hostilities in North China be issued at the same time as for Manchuria?
General Marshall: That is which [what] I had it ready for. It is evident we cannot issue it now. What we should do, and what I will try to work out this afternoon, is to secure the status quo in North China. The complication in the matter as I see it is that while aggressive and offensive action has been forbidden, I think, by the Generalissimo to all his armies in North China and Central China, as well as Manchuria, yet at the same time the troops, including the Communists, have been engaged in retaking what they were forced out of, particularly at those points involved in the violent changes of situation since 7 June. Since there has been no formal order for the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, it has greatly complicated the understanding of the situation in North China and I have not reasoned out exactly how to straighten matters out, particularly in view of the inevitable procedure of retaliations which are evidently in progress in many places.
I am going to see if I can develop some workable proposal, but if General Chou can find some suggestion I would be very glad to have it. That is the critical phase of the matter until we get into the further negotiation tomorrow.
General Chou: Since I have not yet been informed about the order of the Government or the press release of the Generalissimo, I would like first to read them before making up my mind to any suggestions. Also, I will meet the third parties because they are scheduled to meet the Government representative yesterday and today. Therefore, I may have some suggestions tonight or tomorrow. I will try to let you know and make an appointment with you either before [Page 1271] or after the meeting with the Generalissimo, depending on what time the Generalissimo’s meeting will be. I have nothing further right now.
The meeting was adjourned.