Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum Prepared by the Plans Staff of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer44
To determine the feasibility of integrating Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist armies including consideration of:
- Integration within armies.
- Integration at the Army Group level, and
- The interchange of Commanders, the provision of integrated staffs and a thorough liaison system between integrated units.
Facts Bearing on the Problem
The directive initiating this study (Appendix “A”).45
The order of battle of Chinese Communist forces (Appendix “B”).
The order of battle of Chinese Nationalist forces (Appendix “C”).
Information on the Chinese Communists and political factors involved in any program of integration of Communist and Nationalist forces (Appendix “D”).
That negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists are successful to a degree permitting peaceful compromise of the present armed conflict.
That some form of coalition Government will evolve which will be the only source of authority controlling military forces in China, and,
That both Nationalist and Communist forces, whether integrated or acting independently, will serve only the recognized governing authority in China.
See Appendix “E” for discussion showing advantages of integration at the Army Group level and disadvantages of integration at this time at the division or army level.
It is concluded that any program of integration of Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces should be along the following lines:
- If there is to be a real compromise of differences between the Nationalist and Communist elements in China the present armed forces [Page 179]of these two factions must be brought under the control of a single governmental authority and, in time, these two forces must be integrated into a single military system. To insure the necessary unified control and to avoid further conflict the integration plan adopted must provide that neither the Nationalists nor the Communists will maintain, secret, independent military forces.
- However, integration by units should be considered a temporary expedient pending the establishment of a modern Chinese army based upon a list system for both officers and men, without regard to territorial or political affiliations.
- Because of the present conflicts between Nationalist and Communist forces in matters of training, equipment, language, organization and political beliefs, it would be unwise initially to attempt integration of the two forces within divisions or armies.
- Integration must be accomplished step by step and the beginning point is in the Government itself. Before there can be integration in the field units there must be understanding and mutual cooperation in higher headquarters. After this necessary preliminary integration has been accomplished at higher levels there must be a period of reorientation of field forces before integration of basic field units is undertaken. If this preliminary step is not taken, there is a real risk of chaos which would only accentuate present misunderstanding and further delay peaceful compromise and integration.
- Initially, integration should not be attempted below the Army Group level. Each integrated Army Group established should be composed of one Chinese Nationalist army and a Chinese Communist army of equivalent organization and size.
- The Nationalist and Communist armies involved should retain their own commanders and staffs but there should be provision for complete liaison from headquarters down to lower units, between armies and where possible between divisions in each Army Group.
- For each integrated Army Group commanded by a Nationalist commander there should be another commanded by a Communist commander and they should have integrated staffs. Such Army Groups should be responsible to an area commander. There again, commands should be divided as between Communist and Nationalist commanders and the integrated staff should be repeated. These area commanders should be responsible to the Supreme Field Commander of Chinese Forces who in turn should be responsible to the National Military Council. Appropriate Communist representation should be provided both on the staff of the Supreme Field Commander and in the National Military Council. The number of integrated Army Groups to be formed should be determined by the number of Communist troops to be brought into the Chinese Armed Forces. Other Communist forces should be either reorganized into local police battalions or inactivated. (See chart46 attached to Appendix “E”).
- Any integration program adopted should provide that Communist units will be furnished equipment comparable to that issued to Nationalist units.
It is recommended that this study be furnished General Marshall for his consideration.
- Forwarded by General Wedemeyer to General Marshall by courier.↩
- Appendix “A” not printed; it was a memorandum of December 21, 1945, by Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Forces, China Theater, to the Assistant Chief of Staff Plans, directing that a study be undertaken to determine the best means for integration of Nationalist and Communist armies in China.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).↩
- Chinese Communist Party.↩
- For summary, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 577; for other correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 455–476 ff.↩
- Table of organization.↩
- Table of equipment.↩
- Order of battle.↩
- Army Group.↩
- Military Intelligence Division.↩
- Chinese Air Patrol.↩
- Not printed.↩