Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 30, 1946, 9:30 a.m.
The Generalissimo opened the meeting by stating that he was willing to compromise in the matter of Chengte but insisted that the evacuation of Kiangsu to the north of the Lunghai railroad must be completed within one month. He wished to know what chance I thought there was of the Communists agreeing to the general terms under these conditions. I told him I thought none at all, that the issue in Kiangsu was serious, that it would be practically impossible logistically to evacuate to the north of the Lunghai railroad in one month, that I had thought that if the evacuation northward to Huai-an was accepted by the Generalissimo upon a one-month basis that there was a possibility that I could secure an agreement of the Communists to evacuate to the north of the Lunghai railroad at the end of three months or more.
I have felt the most serious factor was the Communists’ insistence on continuation of local governments and with regard to the Peace Preservation Corps units. I stated that it was for this reason I was very anxious to see a compromise solution attempted on the basis of continuing the local governments while an immediately convening political or especially arranged civil group work out an agreement regarding the modification of those local governments and the matter of the Peace Preservation Corps units. A lengthy discussion followed in which the Generalissimo stated his views again and his concern over the future peace of China unless the requirements he had imposed were fulfilled. He did not indicate arguments of the opposition for a civil group convened for the settlement of the local political problem.
I stated in brief that I thought he should have in mind that all of the demands in North China were on the part of the Government and no compromise whatever had been offered the Communsits, except in the way of some modification of terms. Further, that I felt that the situation was being dominated by a military group. I had seen in the paper yesterday that General Ho Ying-chin, whose position was well-known and who had been recently retired from active duty, had been successfully visiting the troubled spots, including Mukden. And that, following his visit to Mukden, I read in the paper this morning, on my way to the Generalissimo’s, the public statement of the Chief of Staff of the Manchurian Command; all of which indicated clearly that a military group were attempting to dominate the situation. I told him I had received a first hand report yesterday on some most remarkable statements by the leading political [Page 1264] member of the Kuomintang Party, Mr. Chen Li Fu, which were quite evidently intended for my ears and which were reported to me from written notes. I stated that the procedure now being followed to me indicated plainly that the Government was washing its hands of any democratic procedure and was pursuing a dictatorial policy of military force. I further stated that the comparison would be inevitable of the army leaders’ procedure in this case with that of the army dictatorship in the case of Japan, which led to the destruction of that nation.
The Generalissimo made a lengthy and very frank statement, particularly of his personal reactions and disclaming responsibility for the expressions of officials who were using certain freedom of speech. To this I replied that my comments were addressed to responsible officers in high positions whose statements in frank opposition to the procedure of the Government in Nanking could only be taken as disloyal or almost revolutionary proposals.
The Generalissimo covered most of the difficulties of the situation, the personal insults to which he had been submitted, his singleness of purpose to bring peace to China, and his strong feeling he could not ignore or fail the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were dependent upon him. To this last I replied that it seemed to me that he must measure whether his efforts in favor of the refugees, which were to produce a civil war, actually would benefit the refugees and would that not result in untold agony and suffering to most of the population of North China and Manchuria.
This discussion was very lengthy and very frank. Finally the Generalissimo said that he had already issued orders to his armies that they should not undertake any offensive action except by way of defense, and that he hoped that with this further stay of the fighting the negotiations might be successfully completed and he trusted in me to use my influence to this end.
I told him that I thought it imperative that we introduce a political discussion at this time and referred to the proposition of the previous afternoon of General Chou En-lai, which I had suggested, that three high Government officials, two civil and one military—the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a leading member of the PCC—should meet with the corresponding Communist group and endeavor to thrash out the difficulties regarding local civil governments and any other points in our present negotiations that they might be able to compromise. He said he would consider doing this. I then proposed that he see General Chou En-lai personally. He agreed to this and it was later understood he, after talking to his own people, would suggest to General Chou En-lai the meeting of the special group above referred to.
[Page 1265]He then produced the draft of announcements regarding the further stay of aggressive fighting and asked my view and corrections. I made a number of changes in the document, all of which were accepted by him, and I believe it is now being released to the press.