Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Three at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 22, 1946, 11 a.m.

Nanking, June 22, 1946, 11 a.m.

Present:62	General Hsu Yung Chang
	General Yu Ta Wei
	General T. K. Pee
	General Kuo
	General Hsu
	General Chou En-lai
	General Huang
	General Teng
	General Tung
	Mr. Chang
	General Marshall
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Marshall: The meeting will come to order. Unless you have objection, we will start with consideration of the draft prepared by me⁶³ for the detailed arrangements for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria. Taking the first paragraph, “On the basis of …” is that acceptable to you gentlemen?

General Hsu: Yes.

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: The second paragraph.

General Hsu: Do you care to read the paragraph in English for the record?

General Marshall: All right. “On the basis of orders of June 6, 1946 stopping all advances, attacks and pursuits for a period of 15 days commencing at noon of June 7th which will be continued in effect, we the Committee of Three announce the following instructions to govern a complete termination of hostilities in Manchuria.”

General Hsu and General Chou approved.

General Marshall: Turning to paragraph a. which reads: “The terms of 10 January 1946 for the cessation of hostilities will govern except as hereinafter specifically modified.”

General Chou: I propose the addition of the following words. After the word “modified”, add the words, “or later directed by the Committee of Three”. Is that acceptable to General Hsu?

General Hsu: I would like General Chou to repeat the clause in Chinese.

General Chou read the clause in Chinese.

General Hsu: That is acceptable.

General Marshall: General Hsu states that the amendment is acceptable to the Government. The paragraph is therefore cleared. Paragraph b. “Commanders of forces in close contact or who are in actual fighting will immediately direct their troops to cease fighting and will seek to secure a local truce by establishing liaison with the opposing commanders, pending the arrival of a field team. They should both immediately withdraw their respective troops from close contact.” Is that agreeable to General Hsu?

General Hsu: That is acceptable to the Government.

General Chou: That is acceptable.

General Marshall: Paragraph b is cleared. Paragraph c. “The adjustment of troops found to be in close contact or actually engaged in fighting will be directed by the field team on the ground by requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 30 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances. Special consideration will be given to the local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946. In the event of disagreement, the decision of the senior American officer in the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun will be accepted.”

General Chou: I propose that the 30 li be changed to 15 li. What are General Hsu’s comments?

General Hsu: Paragraph c as written is perfectly acceptable to me.

General Marshall: The proposed change is from 30 li to 15 li. I am going to ask General Hsu if he would take it sentence by sentence.

General Hsu: I favor 30 li over 15 li because the further the forces are separated, the less chance there is of conflict.

General Chou: Regarding the distance of separation, I think it is necessary to have an appendix stipulating the distance in each case because in the past, disputes have taken place in Executive Headquarters as to how far troops should withdraw. I think that there are 4 cases under which separation should be varied according to circumstances.

1. Suppose troops of one party are stationed within the city and troops of the other party are outside. In that case, the withdrawal could only be carried out by one party—the party on the outside of the city.

2. Suppose the troops of one party are stationed along the railway lines, or that one is on the railroad lines. Under such circumstances, troops on railroad lines shall withdraw away from railroad lines. The other party will draw nearer to the railway line because the party stationed along the railway lines will move away.

3. Suppose the line of separation is perpendicular to the railroad track. In that case, of course, both troops will withdraw an equal distance.

4. Suppose the two forces meet in open country. In that case it can be easily settled by withdrawal of both parties the same distance.

I (Chou) think it is advisable we have a stipulation covering those four cases. This would help a great deal for the settlement of the issue on the ground. Therefore, I propose the four points based on experience of Executive Headquarters. Of course, such stipulations would be more advantageous to that party whose troops are stationed within the city. I think 15 li would be perfectly sufficient for separating forces because the situation in Manchuria differs from that of China proper in that there are fewer villages in Manchuria and troops of both parties in most cases meet in places where there is a cluster of villages holding together. If troops withdraw too far away, it would be difficult for them to be quartered near a second cluster of villages. According to my proposed stipulation, each party would withdraw 15 li so the total separation of the two armies will be 30 li which is entirely sufficient to avoid any further conflict.

General Marshal: Might I ask how General Chou would give official expression to those four examples? He spoke of an appendix. How would it be issued? How do we put it out to the teams? Is this document for instance in its general form satisfactory for general distribution and would his proposals be sent to the Executive Headquarters to be given individually to team members as part of their detailed instructions? How would he give expression to his proposal officially?

General Chou: My proposal can be presented in the form of an appendix to this document or as a separate decision or instruction. It is immaterial to me whether that decision will be circulated together with this paper or be sent to Executive Headquarters for distribution to the various field teams.

General Marshall: General Hsu?

General Hsu: In the original phrasing of paragraph c, it states that “the troops will be directed by the field teams on the ground requiring the withdrawal for specified distances, normally 30 li, of one or both forces according to the circumstances.” It says “according to the circumstances”. The first example given by General Chou was that if one party is in the town and one party is outside, only one party is to be withdrawn. The other example given by General Chou required both forces to be withdrawn. It stated “according to the circumstances” and so it seems to be clear enough to decide which party should withdraw no matter whether there is one force or both forces to be withdrawn. Of course, if some detailed arrangement is made, it may help to lessen the difficulties.

General Marshall: I assume from that statement that General Hsu is not opposed to considering the issue of detailed instructions to the Executive Headquarters for the teams and if that is correct I suggest that either General Chou or I prepare a draft of such detailed instructions.

General Hsu: In that draft, will we stipulate those different circumstances and the manner to withdraw and how about the distance? General Chou said it would be covered by the main agreement—this distance.

General Marshall: Does General Chou wish me to draft the paragraph or will he draft it?

General Chou: I would like you to do it.

General Marshall: I will do it, that is I will have some staff officer do it for me. Let’s return to the 30 li and the 15 li issue. We have a difference of view here. Is there anything further to be said by either General Hsu or General Chou?

General Hsu: I favor the 30 li distance for two reasons.

1. The wider the forces are separated, the less chance for possible conflict.

2. Contrary to what General Chou thinks, the distance between the towns is most likely 30 or 70 li, and in between at 30 li there is an intermediate station or village. It is more likely that troops, if they withdraw 30 li, will find some villages, whereas if they withdraw only 15 li, it is very likely that there will be no villages around and they will find difficulty in getting quartered. Hence, I prefer to retain the 30 li as was written before by General Marshall.

General Chou: What General Hsu has just stated certainly applies to the actual situation in China Proper. That is, the different stations along the highways in China are about 30 li or 90 li distance from each other, but in Manchuria the situation is far different from in China Proper. In Manchuria, villages are rather concentrated at one place forming a cluster of villages. The nearest distance from one riding station to the next one is approximately 90 to 100 li. Since the Japanese came to Manchuria, many villages have been wiped out and many villages have concentrated into larger groups. This is particularly so along communications lines. I made my proposal entirely having in mind the actual situation existing there. Of course the purpose of my proposal is to stop hostilities. For the purpose of making a compromise, I suggest the distance of 20 li instead of 15 so there would be no more dispute on this small question. Of course there might be certain cases where General Hsu’s statement might be correct. In that case then the troops, if necessary, can also withdraw to 60 or 80 li as the circumstances require. Certainly, they could not use that as a pretext to withdraw less than 20 li just because there is no village at 20 li. The statement I have just made is entirely based on the actual situation in Manchuria as described by people who recently came here from Manchuria. I only have in mind how to stop the conflict and to separate forces. That is why I mentioned the cases of troops stationed within the city who should not withdraw because the cities are so close.

General Marshall: Would General Hsu reconsider the 20 li proposition?

General Hsu: After reading carefully the original draft, I think that the way it is written is very flexible because it stated “for specified distances, normally 30 li”. It may be 25, may be 35 or it may be 30; take 30 li as standard. I will have no objection to the change to 20 li provided there is some agency to handle the withdrawal and to determine the so-called “specified distance” and the so-called “according to circumstances”. If circumstances necessitate that troops withdraw, whether it be 30 or 40 or 20 li is immaterial, but the main thing is that we must have some agency to determine that specified distance.

General Marshall: As we have not reached an agreement on the 15 li, I suggest that we suspend discussion of such an agency for the present and proceed to the next sentence. Is that agreeable?

General Hsu: No objection.

General Chou: No objection.

General Marshall: I understood General Hsu to attach certain conditions, so I prefer not to continue with this particular discussion until some later time. Is that agreeable to General Hsu?

General Hsu: Yes.

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: The next sentence reads, “Special consideration will be given to the local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946.” That sentence of mine was later redrafted by me to reads as follows: “The local situation believed to have existed at noon of June 7, 1946 will be the basis for the readjustment of the troops involved.” I made the change because it was a better phrasing and better English. Is that change of mine acceptable? I used the word “believed” because if we waited for an accurate determination it would be some time, but meanwhile a fighting incident has to be settled on the ground. I was trying to make the construction one of practical application actually to stop the fighting today or tomorrow and not six months from now.

General Hsu: I have no objection to that change but ask to have put down here that change which I mentioned to General Marshall regarding the situation believed to have existed prior to 7 June which implies that some sort of agency has to decide the position of the troops at that particular date.

General Marshall: You cannot well write that into the sentence.

General Hsu: It is of the same nature as the 20 li business that hung on the agency to decide the situation on that particular date.

General Marshall: May I put it this way then: That no matter if each sentence is clear, there is the final oportunity for consideration of matters before the clearance or acceptance of the entire paragraph. I fear that if as we take each sentence and then introduce other matters that pertain to other parts of the paragraph, we will make little or no progress whatsoever.

General Hsu: Shall we proceed?

General Marshall: I am still waiting to hear about that sentence.

General Hsu: Do you want to know what the two parties’ substitution is for that sentence?

General Marshall: I can leave it or I can suspend discussion on it. I cannot leave it unless both parties tell me it is all right or decline to accept it.

General Hsu: I am afraid that the sentence leaves ground for future argument. One side will say a certain place was held by them at that particular date and the other side will state otherwise. That will cause some argument in the future.

General Marshall: Then I suggest that we leave this sentence for future discussion.

General Chou: I entirely agree with this sentence as it now stands, but if General Marshall suggests postponing discussion of this paragraph and General Hsu accepts it, then I will accept also.

General Marshall: The next sentence reads: “In the event of disagreement, the decision of the senior American officer in the Advance Section of the Executive Headquarters will be accepted.” General Chou proposed this alteration: Following the word “Changchun”: “The senior American officer at Changchun will report the situation to Executive Headquarters at Peiping or to the Committee of Three at Nanking, depending upon the urgency of the situation.” In view of General Chou’s statements to me of yesterday and the day before, has he any alterations to propose to his amendment that I have just read?

General Chou: Regarding the special authority of the American officers, I think it best that we do not put it in here. Instead, I suggest that we prepare a separate decision on all matters regarding field teams and that the section regarding American officers be as a separate paper. This involves not only Manchuria but also China Proper. If we put such a clause in this paragraph, then we will have to write something else in other papers. In every paper we would have to go back to the same clause. The functions and authority of the different levels are also different. Therefore, I propose that we work out a separate draft stipulating the matters for increasing the effective operation of the Advance Section, the field teams, and the Executive Headquarters. First General Hsu has previously proposed to me the empowering American officers with final decision and yesterday I received another letter from General Hsu stating the proposal has been changed to a majority vote on matters of interpretation of agreements and methods of implementation of agreements. Therefore, I came to the idea that we better have a separate agreement on this matter. Otherwise we have to insert something of that kind in every paper. So far I have thought of the following methods to expedite the function of the field teams, the Advance Section in Changchun, and the Headquarters in Peiping. Of course this does not yet cover all the points.

In the first place, regarding the function of the field teams, I have thought of three stipulations: The first one is the authority to make reports on matters of urgency. The American officer will be authorized to render a report directly despite disagreements of the Chinese officers.

Second, the authority to decide [on] making investigations. This was originally proposed by General Byroade. It was his idea that the American officer of the field team may decide as to where and when to go to investigate military activities within areas under a team’s control.

Third, is the authority to take actions on military hostilities. If hostilities have been found to take place, then he can immediately issue orders to stop the hostilities and also can order special troops to withdraw, because the withdrawal has already been stipulated according to this agreement.

Now regarding field teams. Since the crucial question confronting field teams is the armed hostilities, if the American officer in the team will be authorized with those three powers (mentioned above) then we have demonstrated our respect of the American officer. On the other hand, we would not place too much difficulty upon him. Since both Chinese parties are willing to stop the fighting, they will certainly take the decision of the American officer in this respect.

Second, regarding the Advance Section in Changchun and Executive Headquarters in Peiping, so far I have two points:

a. The authority to render reports on urgent matters by the American senior officer, and

b. Apart from the general agreements reached by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, the American officer may take actions to implement the instructions and orders issued by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters in case there is disagreement among the parties concerned.

General Marshall: I am confused about what American officer you are talking about.

General Chou: This principle applies both to the American officers in Peiping or Changchun.

General Marshall: Will you please repeat that last statement in order that we may have it correctly.

General Chou: Apart from the general agreements reached by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, the American senior officer (either at Changchun or Peiping) may take actions to implement the instructions and orders issued by the higher level, the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters, in case of disagreement among the parties concerned.

Apart from that, yesterday I made a new proposal; that is the right to interpret agreements. Since, I have received General Hsu’s report only yesterday and as yet have had no time to consider it, I am willing to have a separate draft on all the matters which I have mentioned. Of course there might be some other points which have not come to my consideration but I believe we should have a separate draft as we are now trying to settle outstanding problems and we will try our best to reach a decision.

General Marshall: Is General Hsu agreeable to treating this matter in a separate paper, applicable to agreements both in China and Manchuria according to January 10 agreement and later agreements?

General Hsu: I agree to General Chou’s suggestion to have a separate paper dealing with the authority given American senior members but I fear its being stated in the same paragraph about making 20 or 30 li withdrawals according to circumstances together with the local situation believed to have existed on noon 7 June 46. That is bound to have arguments in the field. There were many arguments in North China in the past so it brings the same conditions in Manchuria without a third party to interfere to break the deadlock. Although we have passed that paper and issued orders, I am afraid that nothing important can be accomplished and arguments will still exist. Therefore I hope that the separate paper can be worked out to settle all those disputes. Then, that paragraph c as it stands can be implemented with any other future entanglements.

General Marshall: That is what I understood was the purpose of this special document General Chou proposed. Now, as General Hsu has expressed a willingness to have a special document drafted and submitted here for consideration and approval, it would not appear practicable to continue the discussion regarding the remainder of paragraph c at this time, nor to settle the issues raised by General Hsu and by General Chou regarding the preceding portions of the paragraph. Therefore I suggest that we defer action on the paragraph until we obtain agreement regarding the special document. Is that agreeable?

General Chou: I have one question: on account of General Hsu’s statement to the effect that if the last sentence of this paragraph be omitted, he sees no way to put this paper into effect. This causes me to ask what the Government’s intention would be if this clause regarding the arrangement were omitted. As is stated in the last sentence, the Government would be willing to carry out this paper immediately in Manchuria to terminate the hostilities. If my understanding is correct, then I am willing to make a large concession on this sentence so that the termination of hostilities in Manchuria can be materialized immediately.

General Hsu: I intended to make a statement at the start but entered into the discussion of this particular paper. I take this opportunity to make that statement.

The three problems; that is the restoration of communications, implementation of the reorganization plan and cessation of hostilities in Manchuria constitute an overall problem. I would like to have those three problems solved once and for all and if any documents are to be signed, I hope to sign those agreements all at the same time. By doing that I hope to settle all those problems once and for all and they will no longer trouble both Manchuria and North China. Because the Government has already issued an order to cease offensive actions for eight more days, there are practically no conflicts in Manchuria now. Therefore, we can take our time to work on those three problems as a whole. The Government views those three problems as a single over-all problem so they should be solved together and not solve one and then solve the next one at some other date.

General Chou: If General Hsu would like the three papers to be signed all at the same time (perhaps there will be four papers) I believe there should be no objection to the clearing of this paragraph at this moment because, after all, the paper is not being signed right now. But, by taking such a procedure might demonstrate a smooth proceeding of our meeting and would create a much better atmosphere and effect.

General Marshall: Gentlemen, I hardly know what to say. There is so much sparring going on here, to use an American expression, that I am having considerable difficulty in following matters. It is understood I believe now by General Chou that the Government wishes to have all the papers completed before it signs them. It was my proposal that we start with this paper this morning. We had to start somewhere and I thought maybe this would be the least of our difficulties. Now we have arrived at what appears to me to be a very practical place to consider General Chou’s proposal to draw up a separate document giving specific terms in relation to decisions regarding teams and Executive Headquarters. If a satisfactory document is so agreed to, there would probably be no necessity for the last sentence of paragraph c. My confusion arises from the apparent point General Chou is making that General Hsu had suggested the last sentence be not regarded and that General Chou is taking issue with that now. I understand General Chou to say that we can complete the document down to and excluding the last sentence, depending on the future agreement to the special instructions. Now that last proposal appeals to me as a reasonable one.

General Hsu: Some sort of provision had to be made if we agreed to handle this in a separate annex. This clause at present contains too many words like “normally” and “believed”.

General Marshall: My reply to that is this. I thought we had already agreed that I should have drawn up a set of instructions for terms which it seems to me would cover the points that you have just made, instructions on detailed matters which the members of the team could receive and could absorb. These present instructions under consideration go to thousands for the general understanding of the armies and of the people. Every troop commander, company, battalion, regiment and division cannot be expected to see the detailed instructions for teams. So it appeared necessary to indicate in general what the conditions were to be under which this cessation of hostilities order would be carried out. If you do not say normally 20 li or 30 li, the implication is that you must say specifically 18, 17, 14 or 50. That would be entirely impractical because the circumstances vary. We could scratch out the words “normally 15 li” or “30 li” and not refer to distances at all. That is one way of settling this. I think it is a poor one though because you would not give a general idea to the armies.

As the requirement for distances will vary, the expression was used “according to the circumstances”. You could omit that, but then you would have everybody in the army asking what you meant by specified distances. As to the choice of the word “believed”, that was chosen specifically for the reason that we are trying to stop a fight today and not at some very much later date. If you wait for an accurate determination of that matter, let us say by a recognized legal method, it would bear no present relation whatever to the termination of hostilities. For example, we were at least a month endeavoring to determine the situation at Chihfeng as of January 13th. I say one month, but I don’t believe they have determined it yet to anyone’s particular satisfaction. Therefore the use of the word “believed”. It is conceivable that at some later date after the presentation of more formal evidence there might be a readjustment because the original decision had not been entirely right in the face of later evidence. The main point is that this is for a wider distribution and therefore the matter has to be expressed in general terms if at all.

General Yu: The only reason that I make any comment is that the question will arise tomorrow with reference to communications. Now I like paragraph c in the original form as drafted by General Marshall because we can’t avoid the use of the words “according to the circumstances”. We have to give a certain amount of elasticity to all these stipulations, but General Marshall has provided an instrument for procedure by which we can reach a decision in event of a debate or disagreement. General Hsu proposed to delete that sentence altogether. It seems to me we have to state that in case of disagreement, provisions would be made to reach decision to be covered in a separate annex or these words would not make much sense. I want to stress today that we attach the greatest importance to this separate annex. There will be differences of opinion. This is normal. We are making a most painstaking effort to get something that will be carried out this time.

General Marshall: Provisions will be made in a separate annex to cover disagreements. That is the last sentence of paragraph c. Provisions would be made in a separate document or annex to cover disagreements. General Chou also proposed a separate paper and they are proposing a sentence to that paper rather than any details.

Gentlemen, it is now after 1 o’clock and there is still more of this document, I suggest we adjourn until tomorrow morning.

General Pee: Revisions will be made in a separate document to cover disagreements.

General Marshall: General Chou proposed a separate document and they refer in this that there is a separate document. However, I am proposing with a passage of time that we suspend discussion and decide on when we have the next meeting to complete consideration of this document. Would 10:30 tomorrow morning be all right?

General Chou: General Chou asked whether the Government side has many provisions to make on the following paragraphs. If there is not so much revision maybe we can go through the rest of the paper.

General Marshall: We are still involved in paragraph c. We have to have that rewritten.

General Yu: We will leave that to General Marshall to formulate and save time.

General Marshall: There may be some debate. I believe it would be better to adjourn until morning tomorrow. Is it agreeable to hold the meetings here or would you prefer to hold them some place else.

General Hsu: This is the right place.

General Marshall: I just realized that I have violated a Chinese habit of giving tea. You may think I did that to force a decision, but that may be the very reason why we haven’t reached a decision.

General Chou: Do we have anything to say to the press?

General Marshall: I would very much prefer not to have any press announcement at this time.

General Hsu: I wish to remind General Chou that while we are talking about the cease fire in Manchuria and the restoration of communications, he should alert his staff to do some preparatory work on the problem of demobilization and integration plan, so that after finishing the first two problems we can tackle the third problem.

General Marshall: General Chou had already told me he was doing that.

General Chou: General Huang and the two General Tung’s⁶⁴ can have a staff meeting with General Kuo and General Hsu.

General Marshall: If there is no further business, we will adjourn until 10:30 tomorrow morning in this room.

62. Names listed in three columns in these and other similar minutes are respectively those of representatives and their assistants of the Chinese National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States.
63. See draft of June 13, p. 1044.
64. Generals Teng and Tung.