Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 21, 1946, 5:10 p.m.

Nanking, June 21, 1946, 5:10 p.m.

Also present:	Mr. Chang
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Chou: It is very important how we shall continue our work during the next 9 days. As far as I can see, to work out some arrangement for termination of hostilities and restoration of communications should not be difficult. The difficulty lies in arrangements for army reorganization. My views on army reorganization were explained this morning. However, I wish to state that prior to the announcement of the armistice in Manchuria, we have in our discussion on army reorganization, entirely talked about army strengths, the disposition of troops in Manchuria, and the completion of reorganization at an earlier date. We did not touch upon the redistribution of troops in North China or Central China, and therefore in this respect, I have had the impression that the matter concerning North China and Central China will be discussed after formal announcement of the termination of hostilities in Manchuria. Of course, this does not imply that I would not discuss North China and Central China affairs, but I thought we would discuss it after these 15 days. Therefore, we have not prepared nor thought about any detailed proposal with regard to China proper. Whether the North China and Central China problem be drawn into our discussion, either in the form of stipulations to the settlement of the Manchurian matter as proposed by Generalissimo, or in the form that it was presented today within the scope of army disposition, I find no way to give it consideration. But suppose that it becomes necessary to discuss it in the next eight days and that we are asked to present detailed proposals regarding the army disposition for mutual discussion, then we can agree to have it in the procedure, in the agenda, and we will duly prepare data for a counter proposal. However, I must admit that in this subject, the distance between the two parties is greater than in any other problem.

Secondly, regarding the power of final decision, it seems that the Government itself is not entirely clear on the matter. In the previous letters exchanged, and that includes the letter from Madame Chiang Kai-shek,⁵¹ the Government always referred to it by the wording “final decision”. Then in the press, they issued propaganda saying that what they mean is “arbitration” and saying that the Communists have deliberately confused it with “final decision”. Today, they seemed again to have changed their mind in repeating this demand. They no longer use the words “final decision” or “arbitration”; they have changed to the words “majority vote”. It seems that the Government itself is not entirely clear on this point, but they still put forward this question to embarrass us because they are perfectly aware that we did not accept this proposal. Therefore, they would interject this question as an intermezzo.

Now, regarding the field teams—we have already obtained settlement on three matters. The first one is the power of the American member to render reports as was stipulated in the agreement at the time when General Byroade came up from Hankow. The second thing is the right to make decisions for investigations, as I agreed this morning. That means to make decisions for the conduct of investigations. And, thirdly, execution power for cessation of hostilities.

Yesterday, as regard to one section, I agreed on two things. The first is the power of American officers to render reports. The second is the execution power of instructions and orders, as I conveyed to General Byroade. As far as I am concerned, I have done everything possible within my power and I do not want to go further into this matter.

In a word, what we are thinking now is what should be done in the next eight days to reach an agreement. Should we go back to what we planned to do, as you suggested about the time the armistice was announced, that is that we go over various subjects one by one so that solution of one matter would facilitate solution of the next one.

We have been thinking that repair of the railroad can be settled prior to others and that repair work can be started immediately. I have the impression that the Government would not accept or agree to it because only two days ago there was a turn of the Government’s attitude toward the Yellow River business. As you know, everybody has been anxious regarding the repair of the Yellow River, in particular Mr. Ray and Mr. Todd. In accordance with our agreement, Communists have already mobilized 210,000 laborers to repair the dikes, and work has been going on for over 10 days. According to that agreement flour, trucks, transportation and money will be furnished by Government agencies and CNRRA. However, up to now, only a very little amount of flour, only a few tons, have arrived in Communist areas. However, UNRRA and CNRRA in Shanghai are devoting their efforts to sending more to Communist areas—to send the required amount, but then there is a turn in that situation. Day before yesterday, the Executive Yuan decided they would supply no more flour and money for work in that area. Instead they want the Communists to advance the money and food. The Government would issue only a promissory note which later on would be refunded by food or paid back in kind. Of course, both UNRRA and CNRRA understand what it means. Therefore, it seems rather difficult to solve matters one by one. I am wondering whether we should conceive some other methods or measures to attack the problem and still maintain the principle of settling the matters one by one, but at the same time have trial talks on the disposition of troops within the scope of army reorganization. However, I wish to point out definitely that the scheme, as the Generalissimo wished could not be achieved regardless of what means would be adopted, because we find it entirely unacceptable. According to this plan, the Communists should evacuate from places they now garrison and they should evacuate to the poorest places; while the Government side, by virtue of the military district system, aggrandizes.

Furthermore, there is no assurance at all for the settlement of political matters. The Generalissimo is forcing the Communists to make commitments in the military aspect without making any promise on political matters. This is entirely contradictory to President Truman’s statement,⁵² as well as the Moscow Communiqué of the Big Three.⁵³

I would like to know your views on procedure which I should adopt. I have expressed several times my views on procedure and would like to know yours.

General Marshall: After listening to General Chou’s presentation, I am inclined to think that it would be best to have an immediate meeting of the Committee of Three around a table and take up first, the order for the cessation of hostilities and then immediately after that, complete the agreement for restoration of communications. At the same time, I think General Chou should bring forward his definite proposals regarding redistribution of troops. He has all the Government proposals along with the modifications I have succeeded in having made. Matters will be accelerated if we, as quickly as possible, get his presentation even though we do not bring it to an immediate decision.

My suggestion then would be that we have a meeting tomorrow morning, either here or over at Army Headquarters. I don’t care which. Probably it would be best over there. We could make a start on the draft of the order for cease-firing in Manchuria and, if by a miracle we finish that, we can immediately start on the disagreements regarding communications. Now in making that suggestion, I am involved in two ways: One on the Committee of Three and the other as an advisor to the military sub-committee. Paragraphs a and b are the Committee of Three, paragraph c is the military sub-committee of which I am an advisor.

If that seems agreeable to General Chou, I will endeavor to secure governmental agreement to the procedure and to set a time for the first meeting, which I suggest be 11 o’clock.

General Chou: Very good.

General Marshall: That will give us several hours to get matters into shape.

General Chou: I agree with this procedure and ask whether there is some preliminary draft which will form a basis for discussion on cessation of hostilities and restoration of lines of communication.

General Marshall: I submitted a proposal which General Chou modified and I turned it over to General Hsu. General Hsu has not talked to me about it but he sent me a letter proposing several changes. I did not answer the letter as I did not want to handle it in writing. This will bring it to date at the table with my proposal, General Chou’s amendments, and I assume, General Hsu’s.

General Chou: And how about the restoration of communications?

General Marshall: I do not know. I gave General Chou the only paper I had and that was General Yu Ta Wei’s last paper. Has Colonel Hill a paper?

General Chou: Altogether there are at least three papers. I have a copy of Colonel Hill’s draft and so has General Yu Ta-wei. I assume the meeting will be based on Colonel Hill’s last draft. Colonel Hill told General Huang that, in presenting his draft to General Marshall, he would annex to it the suggestions and differences of view, and the remarks of General Chou and General Yu.

General Marshall: I have their various points and comments. There are about five points of disagreement.

General Chou: Not that many. There are a few major and some minor differences but they are not important.

General Marshall: All right. My endeavor will be to take that up as it is. Now I will have to find out if the Government will agree to the meeting tomorrow morning. They will, of course, want to know from me, General Chou’s reply to this paper I gave him today. I will tell them that General Chou stated he is going to present a proposition of the Communist Party and it is my suggestion that we start tomorrow morning on the cessation of hostilities.

Now I must say to General Chou as we enter into this last effort, and it certainly is the last effort, that my difficulty as I see it is largely this: As I have often stated the matter, the Government, meaning a number of leading officials of the Government, are firmly of the opinion that Communist procedure will be to drag out negotiations interminably and always add something else to the discussion and that, if we get an agreement, some method will be found to obstruct its implementation. The Government also fears, of course, as I have said before, that the Chinese Communist Party policy is either coordinated or dictated with or by Soviet Russia.

On the other hand, as General Chou knows better than I do, Communist leaders are equally convinced that the Government will not go through with an agreement or will force a decision which threatens the Communist Party’s continued existence. This will be done they fear in various ways: through failure to carry out with sincerity agreed political measures for reorganization of China’s government in a truly democratic manner; through use of secret police to terrorize or obstruct the Communist party; through control of the press and news agencies; and through the actions of some generals who are convinced in their own minds that only a policy of force will settle the matter.

This is very frank speaking but that is the condition of affairs as I see it, and that is my difficulty. The greatest part of that difficulty I think lies in the fact that neither side fully, or even partially, estimates what the fears are of the other side in regard to any particular matter that comes up. They can see only their own fears and, therefore, draw many false conclusions.

Now I am going to talk just as frankly to the Government representatives in this final effort to see if we can’t get at least a little bit away from these deep and deadly suspicions which make agreements over the simplest matters almost impossible of fruitful results.

General Chou: I feel this should not be the “last effort” as General Marshall stated. I hope this will not be the last effort because it appears hopeful that many matters will have been settled within the next eight days while possibly many other matters will not and hence will have to be solved after that time. The Chinese people will be sorry if everything has not been solved.

There is the opinion of certain Government officials that Communists are stalling negotiations or that they are raising new demands every time. Well, I do not want to refer back to previous events all the time but certainly, it does not apply to us this time. This time we have made no new demands nor have we been trying to stall negotiations because we followed the line as General Marshall suggested.

Now in talking about the cessation of hostilities, it was the Government side which raised the question of the power of final decision. And, with regard to restoration of lines of communication, I almost fully agree with the draft prepared by Colonel Hill at Peiping. It was General Yu Ta-wei who raised some new questions, such as the railroad police, and it was General Yu Ta-wei who made some revisions on Colonel Hill’s original draft. It is true that I did put forward the question of increasing Communist areas in Manchuria but that was raised earlier than the announcement of the armistice. From that time, I made no new claim at all. All the new demands are brought up by the government and, therefore, it is not in accord with fact to say that I have made any new demands or have been trying to stall negotiations.

Regarding procedure: In the past we advocated trying to solve all problems at one time while the Government wanted to solve them one by one. Now that we have begun to solve them one by one and again, it becomes disagreeable to the Government. So today I am making a proposal to the Government for an over all settlement of problems. I have written a letter⁵⁴ to the Government along that line as I told you yesterday and this morning, and a part of this letter will also be forwarded to you. The situation now is indeed extremely critical but, from the angle of the Chinese people, the friendship between China and the United States, and the situation in the Far East, I may say that civil war in China should no longer be continued. It is the Generalissimo who would run a great risk if he believes that he can speed his aim within the time of six months. I can predict that this he will never accomplish. He might be thinking that he is being backed up by the United States. However, I think, as the situation now is, the United States may help him and also continue to help him. But, if China is thrown into a complete chaos by civil war, then it is very doubtful whether assistance would still come from the United States. At this time, he should not only think about one possibility; that is, getting further assistance from the United States but he must think about the other possibility too.

As far as Communists are concerned, they should keep in mind the possibility that the United States would keep on assisting the Government. However, the Kuomintang ought to pay a little attention to the fact that the United States might stop giving that assistance. If both parties would view everything in this light, it would be far easier to solve the questions.

With regard to the view that Soviet Russia is exercising influence on the policies or other matters of the Chinese Communist Party, I must say that it is entirely groundless. The truth is that more and more, in North China, we are seeking cooperation with the United States. Even in Manchuria, after the termination of hostilities, we would welcome American representatives and people to visit and to investigate Communist areas. We are not laying a curtain around the Communist area. Instead, we adopt a policy of free traffic. These few instances would illustrate the difference of our policy and that of Soviet Russia, not to mention other aspects.

General Marshall: When I used the expression “last effort”, I was referring to the effort to bring hostilities to a conclusion. I was not referring to the necessity for a continued effort toward political reorganization of the Government. I have frequent occasion to remind Government representatives of an attitude which I think has been wrong or has been on a false basis, particularly when it blinds them as to the real merits of the case. Now, in judging the present situation, in estimating the purpose of the Central Government, which General Chou has referred to as not being in accord with the desire for successful negotiations, and particularly when judging the attitude of Nationalist generals in Manchuria whom I think have made it very difficult for us, I would like for General Chou to keep in mind what I said about Communist generals in Manchuria about two months ago when I thought they were causing us exactly the same trouble. The Government only remembers that and does not take into consideration the present attitude of Nationalist generals. General Chou is thinking of the present attitude of Nationalist generals and may have forgotten the previous attitude of Communist generals. Both of them have made negotiations extremely difficult. General Chou will recall that he, on a number of times, used the expression, particularly with regard to modification of the stipulation as to Manchuria of the Cease-Fire Agreement of January 10 and to the agreement in the document of February 25, setting forth the eventual strength in Manchuria, he frequently used the expression in justifying his action that “the conditions have greatly changed”. Now the Government man looks at me and says “conditions have changed”. I resent both of those points of view. I think they are wrong and that they are both alike. But they are both very human. I am reminding General Chou of it just as I continually remind the Government people of theirs. My purpose is to clear the air as much as possible, to wipe out as many suspicions as I can preliminary to these final discussions. That is my only purpose in reciting these various circumstances.

I suppose I am prejudiced, and I would be very glad if General Chou would tell me confidentially what he thinks my prejudice is. But I assert that I do not belong to the Kuomintang Party and I do not belong to the Communist Party, and I don’t enjoy my job. I am merely doing the best I can.

General Chou: I appreciate and feel very grateful toward the efforts you have made. Since you ask me whether you have any prejudice or not, and because I know you so well, I would like to express a viewpoint which might have some connection. The Kuomintang stands for the Central Government, while we only stand for the local authorities. Everything the Kuomintang is doing can be made legal while Communists are charged with being illegal in our actions and in our demands. Their demands are mostly for the interest of big cities and are made from the industrial point of view. From the viewpoint of the Communist, this is more comprehensible to the Westerner, while we, viewing it from the angle of villagers and people find it less easy to be comprehended by Westerners.

In trying for various schemes, we are often left in a passive position because the Government can always maintain that they speak for the unification of China. Since you ask my opinion on this point, I want to relate those to you. However, I wish to repeat that I firmly believe in all your efforts for establishing peace and stability for China. As to the conviction of certain Kuomintang generals that they have the continued assistance of the United States, seeing that now they are going to have Marines and naval vessels and that new airplanes are coming to set up a new Chinese Air Force, and that the Congress is now discussing the prolongation of the Lend-Lease Act,⁵⁵ so that the fighting strength of the Kuomintang will be increased—that is, of course, a different matter.

General Marshall: I thank the General for his comments, and I am very glad to have them. But regarding first the Chinese Navy, the crews were assembled in Miami Beach, Florida, in December 1944 and the vessels were assembled there I think about April 1945. That is a lapse of time of a year and a half. As to the consideration of Congress that has been lying about in the hands of the War Department and State Department for, I think, about eight months or longer than that, almost a year, it is largely a routine act which unfortunately never could be taken up before because of the bitter battles going on in Congress. I had forgotten all about it until I read in the paper of Secretary Byrnes’ statement⁵⁶ and I had to have it recalled to me as being almost a year old.

However, the day I left Washington, I wrote a letter⁵⁷ to the chairman of the two Foreign Relations Committees of Congress and asked them to clear the legislation needed to support this Military Advisory Group. They had that for more than six months and had not acted on it. I had gotten into the embarrassing commitment of going ahead and organizing the group; otherwise, the officers released by demobilization would have gone back to the United States, but more particularly, I needed their services. Therefore, without awaiting the action of Congress, I had General Wedemeyer⁵⁸ whip the group together and start them to work. Their first job incidentally was the organization of the Kalgan school and the National Government has not attacked them on that yet. I brought out 100 officers and noncommissioned officers for that school, and if you would stop this damned fighting, I could get them to work up there. I sent ten to Peiping today and have sent others. Congress has not yet passed legislation though the Committees have reported it. That is Democratic action. But it all happens to come up at this moment though it had its inception, or beginning, a long time back. They are things which you cannot stop and start, as I told General Chou before, like turning off water at a faucet. It takes a year to get started, then a year to revive them, if it ever could be done.

51. Letter No. 1, May 24, p. 891.
52. December 15, 1945; United States Relations With China, p. 607, or Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945.
53. December 27, 1945; see Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, pp. 1027, 1030 (section IV, China), or Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 815 and 821.
54. Supra.
55. Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.
56. The Secretary of State was in Paris for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers; for statement on June 19 by the Acting Secretary of State before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1946, p. 1115.
57. For General Marshall’s letter of April 12 to the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, see vol. x, p. 827.
58. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the China Theater until April.