Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 21, 1946, 12:05 p.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Captain Soong |
General Marshall: I saw the Generalissimo last night and also saw him again this morning. The situation is roughly this, so far as he is concerned and I am concerned. I was proceeding on the basis that the stipulations regarding Jehol and Chahar, and regarding Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei, were unacceptable as proposed to the Communist Party, and that my problem was to see if I could find any method of approach to the Government regarding their position in this matter. I discussed two things in detail—first, dropping the stipulations as such and making everything referring to North China merely the development of details under the Agreement of February 25 regarding the redistribution of troops. Of course, that involved not only an additional general approach to planning the locations of armies, an approach which had not been touched on before. It also touched on whether or not there was any probability that I could persuade the Government to modify the conditions in the stipulations—in the special document called stipulations. The other point I discussed at length was the extension of the period from June 22nd.
Now to go to the first matter concerning the redistribution of troops. I took the draft46 prepared by the Chinese Staff and discussed with the Generalissimo modifications of it on the assumption that its terms were unacceptable to the Communist Party. While I could not, at the time, get a firm commitment, I did obtain an understanding of the possibility of Government acceptance of the modifications I proposed and which I discussed in general terms.
I had a further talk with the Generalissimo this morning regarding this same matter to see if I could get a firm commitment. While I did not obtain his commitment, I do feel that I have a better basis, at least so far as the Government side is concerned, for negotiating details with General Chou. Again I must comment on the fact that it is extremely difficult for me to do this when I have not a definite outline [Page 1116] of the Communist proposal—that has been my embarrassment throughout.
There is another factor I have not mentioned but which is intimately connected with the northern part of North China, and that is the basis for an agreement in Manchuria. When I originally received the first Government proposals regarding Manchuria, I felt they would be wholly unacceptable to the Communists. Therefore, it became my task to see what I might do to moderate the Government proposals. While I did obtain large modifications, though they may not seem so to General Chou but in the light of the original Government position they were very large, the Generalissimo attached to each concession from his original proposition, one of these stipulations regarding North China. That is where these stipulations grew up.
For example, when I was proposing that Nun Kiang, in which province Tsitsihar is located, be included, the stipulation regarding Jehol came in. When I secured modification of the Government proposal in northeast Manchuria which had to do with Huiyuan, in order to give Communist troops a position on the railroad leading into western Kirin and into a more prosperous area it seemed to me, the stipulation regarding Chahar developed, and so on. I am merely telling General Chou this so he will know the ropes and so he will understand why I have been in difficulties because he did not give me a very definite stipulation.
There was also considered the concentration of the entire Communist force. I opposed that because I thought it gave a better opportunity for supply and general living if they had these other regions. I then discussed in greater detail with the Generalissimo the proposition of extending the period of this so-called truce, that is the suspension of aggressive action, and he has not given me a firm commitment on that. However, I was led to understand that one of his staff would either see me or telephone me at about 1:30 this afternoon to tell me his final decision. General Marshall said he would pass that information immediately to General Chou.
Now, in my efforts to find a middle ground, I have first taken the points on which I found the Government apparently unbending. Then I have taken the situation of the Communist troops and General Chou’s statements—his general statements—and I have done the best I could with these various strong stands to find a basis for a middle course. I am talking now about North China. This diagram47 starts as a modification of the work of the Chinese staff and with additions which are entirely mine. The Chinese army staff did not take into account the large numbers of troops involved, it seemed to me, during the first part of the period. So I endeavored to make a start from some of [Page 1117] their proposals and so enlarged the areas to the extent that I thought would be necessary. I added additional areas, and especially an entirely new proposal regarding Jehol and Chahar regarding which the Government had taken a very strong stand. This has all been hurriedly done and I apologize for the rough appearance of the map It shows the Communist forces in red, the Government forces in blue. And in the red, it shows first a larger outline with little hashmarks, or perpendicular lines. Those marks indicate the general areas in which troops would first be concentrated by 1 October. During that period, there would be a simultaneous demobilization of Government and Communist troops which would greatly reduce the total strength involved in those areas. Following up to the end of the year, there would be a continuous demobilization, so that there would be a large total reduction in strength by the first of January. Therefore, the smaller areas of concentration, the area by Kalgan and Chahar, is not shown with the hashmarks. But it was intended that in the later period, the Communist concentration would be confined to the section of Chahar outlined on this map.
The Government dispositions are complicated as are the Communists by the fact that little demobilization has occurred among the Government troops in North China. The Government has been engaged in demobilization south of the Yangtze and in the west about 30 divisions have been reduced to brigades. This, of course, means that the further demobilization will largely be confined to units in North China and Manchuria. So far as I know the Communists have not yet started any demobilization. The Government demobilization, as I understand it, has been carried out by reducing divisions which lack full strength to brigades, giving them full strength. In other words, if a division had about 6,000 men, as many of them had, it is probable that the new brigade would have a strength of 6,000 men, but the division headquarters, headquarters troops and all of the officer personnel and headquarters personnel of the other brigade would have been done away with. The officers themselves, largely the generals, have been concentrated here. Some have been put in civil positions and some are not yet assigned. The point I am making is if this is done between July 1st and December 31st or January 1st, a very heavy demobilization is involved in North China on both the Government side and the Communist side.
General Marshall passed a copy of the overlay to General Chou.
General Chou inquired if General Marshall was finished. General Marshall replied, “Yes”.
Chou: Regarding North China, no matter how many reasons there are, I think that should not be brought into discussion during this 15 days when we are discussing the army reorganization plan in Manchuria. [Page 1118] In accordance with the Army Reorganization Agreement of 25 February, what we should do is to work out detailed arrangements with regard to the disposition of the armies in all of China. This is the work of the military sub-committee and its staff. Therefore, in the first place, I take exception to such a procedure. By this, I mean that the disposition of troops in North and Central China should be discussed after this 15 day period. Regarding the matter of North China, General Marshall has not discussed with me before, nor has the Generalissimo ever informed me about it. Hence, I made no preparation for it at all. This is the first reason why North China should not be brought into discussion at this moment.
The second reason is that if we have to have a discussion of troop dispositions in China Proper, then it should be discussed in a general scope, not restricting it to North China alone but taking into consideration troop disposition of Central, West, and Northwest China as well. The procedure for working out such an arrangement should be that the staffs of both parties should first have an exchange of views on technical matters as was done with regard to the demobilization plan which was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under an American chairman.
It seems to me that the present procedure is not proper in which the Generalissimo appointed some of his staff to work out his demands and leave me entirely unprepared to discuss the problem. This is not appropriate procedure for the Committee of Three and, therefore, I decline to agree to such a method of procedure.
The third reason is that the present proposal is entirely a unilateral proposal, taking only the view of the Government. According to this plan, Communist troops will be concentrated in places which are away from railway lines, except in Kalgan area. Perhaps this plan is what General Marshall, through his efforts, is trying to get back because General Hsu told me the Government idea of having such a troop disposition. I also told you yesterday about it.
General Marshall: Such a troop disposition being what?
General Chou: Such an arrangement of troop disposition to have five areas off the railway lines and away from the big cities, with the exception of the Kalgan area.
This plan is entirely in accordance with the Generalissimo’s intention to get Communist troops away from railway lines and big cities so that Communists will occupy areas which least menace the Generalissimo’s position. Then he can wipe out the Communists at any time he wishes. If we accept this proposal, he can achieve his goal by peaceful means; and, if we don’t accept it, he would achieve it by force. The aim is just the same, only the methods are different. This is the first part of my observation of this plan.
My second observation is that the strength of the armies in North [Page 1119] China has also been changed from the original army reorganization plan. During the first period there will be 11 armies, four Communist and seven Government armies. On our side, we have no intention of changing the strength of the four armies, thus still leaving the 5th Communist army in Central China. Now the Government wants the 5th Army also to be sent to North China while on their own part they increase their number to 9 armies. This is against the Army Reorganization Plan in China Proper.
My third observation pertains to the disposition of troops. I presume that only in the location of the divisions should cities be stipulated. That applies also to the location of the Army Headquarters because these troops will be used for no other purpose than for training. It would not interfere with civil administration or with local security and, therefore, the military arrangement system should not be re-introduced as you have told me when we discussed the Army Reorganization Plan. I still think there should be no change in the army system.
My fourth observation is that actually in our area we have already done much of the demobilization work. It is not that the demobilization has not already been started.
On the basis of these four points, I find no way to consider this plan. As the matter now stands, whenever we talk about Manchuria, the Generalissimo would have it linked up with North China as a means to press the Communists or to put forward such demands such as that we should withdraw from Jehol, Chahar, Chefoo and Wei Hai Wei in exchange; or that he would only discuss troop disposition in North China and leave only the Kalgan City, itself, to the Communists. Such an attitude leaves me no ground to give consideration to his demands. I appreciate General Marshall’s efforts and still hope that he will bend his efforts for an extension of the suspension of aggressive actions.
Therefore, first, I repeat my yesterday’s proposal. Yenan asked me to repeat this proposal that the Committee of Three should immediately decide to stop the fighting in the Northeast and to reassert the cessation of hostilities in China also. A new order to this effect should be issued with the additional stipulation which was raised yesterday to the effect that American members of field teams should have the power to execute this order. Yesterday also brought up the question of the power to make investigations and the Democratic leader also proposed that this power be given. This point was first brought here by General Byroade and Colonel Caughey mentioned it again yesterday. I now would like to take the responsibility to agree on this point so that a guaranty can be given, both in Manchuria and China Proper, to effectively stop the fighting. Wherever hostilities crop up, the American representative of the field team has the power [Page 1120] to decide what investigations are to be made within his area of control and to order the cessation of fighting. This is a powerful guarantee and it surely will be welcome to the Chinese people and, I assume, also to the Allied Nations.
In the second place, after the true cessation of fighting, we will immediately work out a plan for the restoration of communications. We pledge that the repair work of the railways will be started before everything else.
Third, after the cessation of fighting, we shall immediately begin to work out an arrangement with regard to the reorganization and demobilization in the entire country, including Manchuria. The staff of both parties, under the leadership of the American staffs will work out a plan for the Committee of Three and the plan will then be carried out according to schedule.
Fourth, as I mentioned yesterday, a second session of the Committee of Three should be convened to discuss the reorganization of the Government, the protection of the people’s rights and the salvation of the people’s livelihood. At this moment, the livelihood of the people has reached a most perilous stage. We should also discuss completing the unification of the local administration; by which I imply that both in China Proper and Manchuria the local governments should be reorganized and free elections held. Since the government declines to settle the various issues one by one and intends to force us to accept their proposal within one day’s time, this is practically impossible and therefore I propose one overall settlement of all the issues. China is now coming to a most critical moment and either we should follow the line proposed by President Truman to stop the fighting and to have a peaceful negotiation for the reorganization of the Government and the integration and reorganization of the armies, or that we should give the Generalissimo a free hand to act according to his own line. In the latter case, it would be an immense tragedy to the country.
One more addition: The army reorganization, integration, and training is the point which the Generalissimo feels most uneasy about and, therefore, he can leave everything aside. But on this one particular point, he wants his desire to be complied with. If his desire is realized and he can feel at ease, then we can’t be at ease because we would have no assurance on everything else which has not yet been discussed. This is the crucial point of issue. Everything else he thinks rather minor so he gets all his means to press us to accept this demand. He may make concessions on individual items such as Kalgan or Tsitsihar but he would make no concession in his over all plan. We cannot feel at ease about it since there is no assurance.
This leads me to a new thought. Suppose the Generalissimo would not change his mind, yet we have no way of accepting his demands. [Page 1121] The war has got to be stopped. We differ from the Generalissimo in this respect that no matter what the differences of views, the fighting should be stopped. The Generalissimo is not thinking this way. He is thinking if his aims cannot be achieved by negotiation, he would gain it by war. The matter now is that he cannot achieve his aim by war.
Therefore, I come to the conclusion it would be more advisable if during the processes of army reorganization, Communist troops will be reorganized in Communist areas and Government troops in Government areas. Reorganization will be carried out in separate armies and training will be undertaken by the American Officer Corps since we all trust the Americans. They are helping China to get unified, reconstructed, and become a democratic country. Then it might be better if after this interim, we bring the two forces together and then effect the integration. We are all aware that the training by the American officers would not lead China to civil war. Actually the distribution of force as it now is would not permit China to wage civil war. We know the Generalissimo has perfect confidence in the actions of American officers and we also place confidence in them. I think this might be a workable scheme. I could not think of anything else.
General Marshall: Referring to General Chou’s first comments regarding the detailed expansion of agreement of 25 February concerning the redistribution of troops in North China, the Generalissimo’s statement when he made the decision to issue orders for cessation of aggressive action on 6 June was this expression in paragraph c: “A definite basis for carrying out, without further delay, agreement of February 25, 1946, for the demobilization, reorganization and integration of the armed forces in China”. Whatever General Chou may have gathered from that statement, I know that the Generalissimo had in mind in the use of the term “a definite basis” exactly the character of the proposals that have just been made. The injection of the so-called stipulations occurred in connection with the proposals [on] Manchuria and, as I explained to General Chou, the stipulations were precipitated by my insistence for the broadening of the areas proposed for the Communists in Manchuria.
So far as the omission of dispositions of the armed forces in south and northwest and other portions of China, I did not undertake to present that because I was working very fast on this particular paper that I have given General Chou this morning (indicating overlay of troop dispositions). I think that would be a comparatively simple matter to remedy, at least the simplest of the complex problems we now have on our hands. I entirely agree with General Chou that we should get action as quickly as possible for the exact terms of the cessation of hostilities and the exact terms for the resumption of lines [Page 1122] of communication, but I am also of the opinion that we will have to have a pretty precise understanding as to what the Communists’ demands will be in connection with redistribution of troops in North China. This redistribution should have been decided upon in March and April. The Communists were to have submitted a list of troops, as I recall, three weeks after February 25th and another list three weeks later. The Government prepared a list. We have never yet received the Communist list. Had those lists been submitted, presumably the combined staffs could at least have made a proposal or a report of their differences regarding the redistribution of troops in North China. But, as I have said, that should have been done during March and April, certainly completed in May, and now we are approaching the first of July. I, therefore, do not think the Generalissimo’s insistence, particularly in view of his public statement, is illogical.
I have just received this telephone message from the Generalissimo: “With reference to our conversation of yesterday and today regarding the extension of my order for the cessation of advances, attacks and pursuits, I have given orders to my army commanders that the suspension of aggressive action; that is, advances, attacks, and pursuits will be continued in force (that is the suspension will continue) until noon of 30 June 1946.[”]
Now I repeat that I agree with General Chou as to the need for immediate consideration of the order for the cessation of hostilities and the immediate consideration of an agreement for the resumption of communications but I urgently appeal to him not to wreck this last possibility of reaching a preliminary agreement on the military considerations by 30 June. I say to General Chou that I will use my very best efforts to persuade the Generalissimo to make the announcement or definite commitments regarding the PCC and certain other matters in connection with the political reorganization of the government. It was my hope in approaching this present crisis that we might clear the way with these basic military agreements and have an announcement made coincident with the announcement of their successful conclusion regarding the purely political matters immediately to be considered or put into effect.
I have several other proposals for immediate action by the Generalissimo in governmental matters of a political nature which I am not now prepared to discuss with General Chou but which are of a practical nature; that is, they can be put into effect instantly without debate or delay.
One last matter: In the telephone message to me the Generalissimo requested that I take up with General Chou the release of Chou Ching Mai, Mayor of Changchun; and other Central Government personnel; [Page 1123] General Pai [Pan Hsuo-tuan], commander of the 184th Division; and the other officers and men, I assume, of that division, that they be handed back to the Central Government authorities by 30 June.