Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Mr. Stuart, Mr. Price and Mr. Mills²⁹ at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 20, 1946, 11 a.m.

Nanking, June 20, 1946, 11 a.m.

Mister Price started the meeting by telling General Marshall he and Dr. Stuart wanted to report briefly on two rather significant conversations held yesterday with General Chou En-lai and last evening with the Generalissimo.

Doctor Stuart said they had quite a frank talk with General Chou last evening. In substance, General Chou said that he and his Communist party want and are ready for a continuance of unconditional cessation of hostilities. That is the language he used. In other words, it amounts to an end of the war without conditions. He is ready for this procedure to go ahead in any possible way. Priority of this or that topic does not matter. It is better to clear up an issue if it can be done and then to go on to something else rather than wait until the over-all problem is completely covered and one has a total conclusion.

The chief point General Chou objects to, on the other side, is the Manchurian settlement. Probably, that is a condition which can be settled by further negotiations. He objects definitely to the proposal within the Great Wall and thinks arguments for the proposal have been unreasonable. On the railways, he feels the solution is joint control of all railway lines rather than having a railway police system with secret police throughout the country under the guise of railway police or plainclothesmen. General Chou thought the thing to do is to get the railways protected and operating, rather than to institute a system of special railway police.

These are the main points General Chou and his whole party want in the cessation of hostilities agreement. They are ready to go ahead with negotiations looking toward a stable peace and a socialized democratic system. He sees danger from American withdrawal and from Russian influence as clearly as any other Chinese patriot. He wants American help in every way and feels there is probably no objection to that from the Nationalist standpoint. General Chou did not commit himself much on Russia, but he sees danger from Russian complications in Chinese affairs.

The other and most important issue is the reorganization of the army. Now is the time for Nationalist and Communist troops to go under American guidance and receive American technical assistance—that seems to be the solution. It results in a strong army for China. The very presence of America would tend to unify things. General Chou knows he is speaking for his party in saying that they would be welcome.

On the point of the American, or rather of your³⁰ final authority, he said that for an American to become the final authority and to make decisions would impinge upon the sovereignty of China. If that were known, it would put all concerned in a very bad light. That also bears upon what Mr. Price and I have in mind for a proposal when these reports are completed. Dr. Stuart thought that was the substance of General Chou’s remarks. He was trying to make it as brief as possible.

Dr. Stuart saw the Generalissimo for the second time yesterday afternoon—and saw him for a half hour the day before. Yesterday’s conference lasted one hour and ten minutes. It was one of the longest talks Dr. Stuart had had in a year or two with the Generalissimo, and one of the few times in which no one else was present—just the two of them. It was entirely in Chinese, of course, and it was a very frank talk, one in which Dr. Stuart expressed his own opinion as influenced by recent conversations with General Marshall. He quoted no one, and urged as strongly as he could that this was his own opinion for peace and for continued negotiations. Dr. Stuart wanted General Marshall to realize that, in quoting the Generalissimo, what were the points he made in the course of the conversation. These points would not be new to General Marshall but might help him to understand the Generalissimo’s attitude. That was what he was trying to do yesterday in his efforts to express the situation in its present stage. The Generalissimo’s main points were:

1. The Communists have been the chief offenders and breakers of agreements. The Generalissimo admitted faults on the Nationalist side, but charged that the Communists were the chief offenders.

2. The Communists do not really want to cooperate. Instead, they want to drag out negotiations, prolong the present situation, and create difficulties for the Nationalist Government. The last thing they want is a real coalition Government with democratic reforms. The Communists must convince the Nationalists by their actions that they really want to cooperate.

3. The Generalissimo admitted many evils and mentioned comments made recently by articles in Time and Ta Kung Pao, but charged that the Communists were exaggerating these affairs to embarrass the Government. The Government was making reforms and would continue to make reforms, but it could not have certain conditions improved overnight. The same situation is true in other countries—Manila, etc., and in Shanghai.

4. The Generalissimo believes that the Chinese Government can continue, even under present difficulties, for years economically. Parenthetically, Dr. Stuart thought his greatest weakness was in the field of economics. The Generalissimo tentatively admitted that, except in Government, he did not see economic problems clearly. He charged that the Communists are the chief obstacle to economic recovery. They must restore the railways.

5. These next points were more toward the end of the conversation, and came after he, Dr. Stuart, had presented his opinion and the opinions of other friends of China. The Generalissimo said they would meet half way any effort at sincere cooperation from the Communists, but that they had made more concessions than the Communists had. The Generalissimo asked Mao Tze Tung to come to Chungking immediately to seek an end to hostilities, repeatedly. His associates and friends implied criticism of him in that he had lowered his own dignity because it meant that he was recognizing him almost as head of another government. He made a very sincere effort and now did not think it was his place to cater any more to the Communists, but he would meet them half way for the future welfare of the country.

6. Dr. Stuart could see from the conversation that the Generalissimo was much influenced by his party and military advisers in how to seek military decision over the Communists. Toward the end, the Generalissimo said (given in Chinese) “put your heart down, we will not attack but we will defend. We will keep the door open and I will continue to work for a peaceful settlement”.

7. The Generalissimo did not fully realize the loss of confidence of the people in the Nationalist Government because he trusted too much, like Churchill³¹ did, to his personal popularity rather than to a future program. Dr. Stuart thought he was making the same mistake Churchill did.

General Marshall asked if he had made that point to him.

Dr. Stuart said: No, he did not like to make that kind of a comparison to him. Dr. Stuart thought the Generalissimo’s own prestige was higher than the prestige of the Nationalist Government, which in turn was higher than the prestige of the Kuomintang party. He thought the danger was for him to capitalize on this personal popularity. The Generalissimo did not fully realize his lack of confidence. He believed the high men in his cabinet are honest and competent. He magnified Communist mistreatment of people, but minimized mistreatment of people by Nationalist soldiers. He said he was trying and asked Dr. Stuart to look at his record and his commitments to reform his party and to his treatment of the people.

8. The Generalissimo would accept mediation by General Marshall. He would have again and again invited the Communist leaders to mediate but they have rejected this. But we³² trust General Marshall and would like to have him mediate for us.

9. Dr. Stuart referred to a statement the Generalissimo made again and again in prior conversations and quoted often by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who says his father has no permanent enemies. The Generalissimo points to the record that he has been able to win over his political and military enemies and names them, Pai Chung-Hsi, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Chung-jen, who at one time or another opposed him in military ways but now are his supporters. The Generalissimo said that in 1937 [1936] in the kidnapping,³³ his diary proved he had been sincere in his effort to unify the country.

Mr. Price stated that out of the conversation this morning with Dr. Stuart, they agreed that there would be a chance if now the discussions could be lifted to a new level in a new atmosphere with a fresh approach by General Chou. If he would go, preferably with General Marshall, to the Generalissimo and say very sincerely that he wanted to cooperate and to work together in this crisis, toward a united and a democratic China, the Generalissimo would meet him half way. Cooperation will have to be demonstrated by concrete measures in all different fields in which there have been discussions. They also would like to urge General Marshall to make concrete proposals on points or areas of disagreement, perhaps even official mediation of discussions held in the field. Mr. Price and Doctor Stuart still hoped for peace. They thought the Generalissimo, in spite of his advisers, would be rather reluctant to enter into a war because he begins to understand what the effect of it might be. If the 15 days’ period ends with no new agreement and there remains the possibility of civil war, there will be sky-rocketing of prices. There will be riots and disturbances upon which Communists will capitalize. The Generalissimo believes that if war starts, Communists will have their agents, spies and saboteurs working everywhere. It will not be clear-cut fighting against each other. The Generalissimo should see what that will lead to if he capitalizes too much on his popularity. He has a sincere belief in the Chinese nation and he does not want to go back to the period of civil war.

Dr. Stuart said he would suggest, if General Chou was willing, for him to go with General Marshall and see the Generalissimo, and would suggest they begin with his proposal that they declare a permanent unconditional cessation of hostilities. With that agreed upon, they can get at once to the matters in order of urgency. For instance, if railways are the most important, then agree on a control system for railways. General Marshall shouldn’t hesitate to take advantage of the power the Generalissimo is willing to give, as he said he will abide by your³⁴ decision.

General Marshall asked if he meant the Generalissimo would abide.

Dr. Stuart said yes, on those points, and that General Chou had already agreed.

General Marshall said “You don’t mean that. He has not agreed to my having the power of decision—he has resented it.”

Dr. Stuart said General Chou has agreed on recommending immediate cessation of hostilities. Whether General Chou agrees in principle to General Marshall’s making decisions does not matter if he could say to the Generalissimo that it was his decision that concessions first be made on the method railways would be controlled.

General Marshall asked what was meant by “my decision”, and suggested using the word “judgment”.

Dr. Stuart said that judgment was a better word, and asked if he might be excused.

Dr. Mills wanted to say one thing before Dr. Stuart leaves, that if it was possible for General Marshall, General Yu, General Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart, for the four of them to be present and discuss conditions. He could get in touch with General Chou En-lai and see if he is willing to go with General Marshall to the Generalissimo for that expressed purpose.

Dr. Stuart suggested that if one of them was needed at the meeting, Mr. Price was the better person.

29. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, Peiping; Dr. Frank W. Price, former adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and Dr. W. P. Mills, head of the American missionary group at Nanking.
30. General Marshall’s.
31. Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940–45. The Conservative Party which he headed lost to the Labor Party in the elections of July 1945.
32. The Chinese.
33. At Sian, December 1936; see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iv, pp. 414 ff.
34. General Marshall’s.