Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 17, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Capt. Soong |
General Chou asked if General Byroade had arrived in Peiping and if he were leaving for Changchun today.
Colonel Caughey said he would probably not go to Changchun today.
General Chou asked if General Marshall would like to discuss the terminations of hostilities in Manchuria first.
General Marshall replied that he would.
General Chou said that this draft,4 except for one or two major points which need further discussion, is quite all right. He expected to receive another copy from General Byroade and therefore delayed making an appointment, but now it seemed there is no need to wait.
Two points need clarification. In the first paragraph a, the January 10 Agreement is mentioned but the March 27th is not. Since one was mentioned, both had better be mentioned. The January 10th is a general agreement applicable to China as a whole, while the March 27th is specifically for Manchuria. The situation has undergone some change and parts of these two agreements have become obsolete. Except for those parts which have become obsolete, the others should continue to be effective.
General Marshall said he could understand that about the 10 January Agreement but not about the 27th of March. This is, to use an American expression, wiping the slate clean. We should say the January 10th Agreement unless modified or amended specifically. Everything after January 10th is out unless covered in this. That is what we are trying to get.
General Marshall said further that the difficulty General Byroade got into with regard to the relationship between the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun and the field teams, so far as concerned the Agreement of March 27th, was that the Generalissimo insisted that that agreement was to be cancelled. What we agreed upon here in the present negotiations was that cancellation would be June 22. He did not want to bring the Agreement of 27 March into the affairs of Changchun but finally reached the compromise General Chou is familiar with. Now, it is anticipated that again this complication would be brought into discussion, thus provoking more delays. Other things being equal, General Marshall was interested in the [Page 1066] time factor. He was completely at a loss to understand either the Generalissimo’s point of view or General Chou’s point of view. Both of them have something in mind that he doesn’t understand. In the meanwhile, the differences put a stop to business. He thought the Manchurian field team agreement wasn’t particularly difficult or important. However, General Chou quite evidently felt it was very important; so did the Generalissimo. General Marshall saw it merely as a stumbling block to progress.
General Chou said his principal thought was that some part of the January 10th Agreement had now lost its effect; that was the part about taking over sovereignty. On 10 January, before Soviet troops had evacuated, until 15 April, that provision was still effective. After 15 April when Soviet troops had completed evacuation, the question of sovereignty no longer existed. He was concerned lest the lack of a footnote to the January 10th Agreement would allow the Generalissimo and Kuomintang leaders to go everywhere under the pretext of restoring sovereignty.
The March 27th Agreement is not so important, but General Chou wanted it mentioned because it governed the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria. Yesterday, the Generalissimo’s secretary declared that the March 27th Agreement was destroyed by the Communist Party when they captured Ssu-ping-chieh. This is ridiculous because the Communists occupied Ssu-ping-chieh prior to March 27th. When the March 27th Agreement was under discussion, Communists offered to withdraw from the area between Mukden and Changchun. Whatever followed, there are facts which can show the logic of the events. Therefore it was his opinion that if part of the January 10th Agreement had become ineffective, it would be mentioned here. Then, of course, there was no need to refer to the March 27th Agreement. Otherwise, it would be necessary to mention it here and that was what he had in mind.
General Marshall said it seemed to him that mention of it here complicated rather than clarified the situation. If General Chou wanted to make a special point, it should be in the form of a definite amendment to the January 10th Agreement or explanatory statement. Next, as to the question of sovereignty, it did not seem to him quite logical. The mere evacuation of Russians did not conclusively determine the question of sovereignty unless, as he presumed General Chou intended to imply, the Communists had taken over sovereignty by the presence of Communist troops. I don’t think that is a fair statement because Communists were definitely not taking over control for the Central Government during the past few months.
General Marshall’s next point, and he hesitated to mention it because it was continually in his troubles—was the response to propaganda [Page 1067] statements about negotiation. There are statements being made in every part of China from the Yangtze north, on both sides, regarding various factors. If he, General Chou, General Hsu and General Yu Ta Wei responded to each one, they had better quit before starting. It was almost an impossible situation. He had given up hope of persuading authorities to moderate their propaganda. He had accepted the fact that he must try to conduct negotiations in spite of conditions. To sum up, he thought General Chou might better prepare a definite amendment to go into the draft rather than just leave a reference to the March 27th Agreement which does not clearly mean one thing or the other.
The control of the teams will come in the other document which General Byroade left with him. It has been altered to show General Chou’s proposals of night before last. He had not acted on it because of other urgent matters and particularly because he had not quite figured out in his own mind how to take the necessary steps.
General Chou said he didn’t think what he had mentioned about the March 27 Agreement was important. What was more important to him was to state here, those terms of the January 10 Agreement which have lost their time effect and which should be excluded. His view on taking over sovereignty may be different. Because such differences exist, there must be a sovereignty clause to cover such places as Harbin or Tsitsihar which have been taken over by the Government.
General Chou stated that the outstanding questions are the disposition of troops and the administrative affairs. If the question of taking over sovereignty is brought up again, then the Government might create lots of complications. Many places which Soviet troops evacuated have not been touched upon. The Government may insist on sending troops to these places on the basis that they have not yet completed occupation. If that goes on, there will be invincible difficulties. General Chou wanted to have no dispute over this issue and that the matter be settled as is. Therefore he suggested having such a clause.
General Marshall said the question of Government occupations, he thought, would be covered in the special agreement regarding redispositions in Manchuria, where changes were to take place in prescribed periods. Therefore, he did not think it came into this particular document. It was his idea, as originally stated to General Chou, to have a preliminary understanding that paragraph c of the announcement regarding the cessation of aggressive actions, would carry for Manchuria the precise details as to where troops were to go. This particular document now being discussed, had a paragraph a which pertained to the immediate details of stopping the fighting and to that only. Now, if General Chou felt that some specific statement [Page 1068] should be made, he should give it to General Marshall today in writing. Were there any other comments on this particular document?
General Chou said he had no comment on b. Comment on c: First, about the restriction of specified distance, he thought 15 li instead of 30 li would be more practicable. The reason was that when one talks about the restoration agreement, he should realize that inevitably Communists will have to withdraw more than Nationalists. This is only an interim arrangement at this time. First, Government troops are largely stationed in cities, while Communists troops are outside cities. When this paper comes into effect, the Communists will have to withdraw from the besieged state. Second, railways are guarded by Nationalists troops while the Communists troops are away from the railway lines. If separation of forces has to take place, it may be it will depend on previous arrangements. Probably, Nationalist troops will not withdraw from railways, and so again it will be a unilateral withdrawal of Communists troops.
As to the other two cases where both troops are confronting each other in rural areas or on a front crossing the railroad lines, then, of course, both sides should withdraw to the same distance. If the distance of withdrawal were 15 li instead of 30, it might be more easily practiced. The second point, I think, is that the regular position should be that as of 12 noon, June 7. That is his suggestion, General Chou has in mind that position has to be restored.
General Marshall said he used the expression “believe” because he thought they would have a difficult time finding out accurately just what happened. He asked how General Chou wanted it worded.
General Chou said he wanted it stated very definitely here. He said, of course, there might be some argument over what happened. If stated less definitely, then argument would arise as to what arrangement should be made. For example, if it is testified that Communist troops entered Lafa after 12 noon, then of course, Communists troops should withdraw. On the other hand, Nationalist troops also took some places after 7 June. Equal arrangements should be made. If stated definitely here, it would facilitate making a decision in the field.
General Marshall asked how he wanted it stated.
General Chou suggested that the situation as it existed at noon 7 June, 1946 should be restored—the troop positions.
General Marshall said he could not say positions at noon of June 7 without qualification. If there was a heavy fight in which Communists held the town and Nationalist forces had not yet captured the town, but from which maybe at 5:00 in the evening Communists were driven out by Nationalists. Then if you restore the situation as of noon on 7 June, that would mean both Nationalist and Communist troops would probably be back in the town and on the verge of a new fight. [Page 1069] According to General Chou, the Nationalists have to go back 15 li if they don’t want to perpetuate the situation where they are in close contact. If you say the situation is restored as of noon 7 June, it will be restored in the middle of battle, and will then be back where they are fighting nose to nose. General Marshall said he was trying to have the situation considered as of 7 June and then adjusted accordingly. If you put the Communist or the Nationalist back in town find the other surrounding the town and say now stay there, your English will defeat you. That is the reason General Marshall said “special consideration.” He used the wording “special” rather than merely “consideration.” General Marshall explained he phrased it in this manner to provide the basis for determining the readjustment of the troops involved.
General Chou said his third point pertained to the final decision. He said he did not want to repeat his reasons why he is not in a position to accept it. What he wants stated is that in event no unanimous agreement is reached among team members, then the team would immediately report it. In event no agreement could be reached among team members or at Advance Section, then the American representative of the Advance Section would immediately report the situation to Peiping or Nanking, requesting instructions or orders, which, upon receipt, the American representative would be empowered to carry out despite disagreement by the Chinese members. He explained this to General Byroade before.
General Marshall asked if General Chou wanted it reported to both Nanking and Peiping.
General Chou said either.
General Marshall suggested that the choice should depend on the importance or urgency.
General Chou said yes, just as General Byroade had written down in his document. According to paragraph d at the end, it said, “may be carried out if previously cleared with the field team.” The word “cleared” is not very clear to General Chou.
General Marshall explained it meant they have to notify that team.
General Chou suggested they might simply use “report to the team.” He wanted to add in case the report was found to be not corresponding to fact, then the field team would be authorized to take corrective action.
General Marshall said that did not go with the facts. That is the way they originally had it—he didn’t know why they changed it.
General Chou said coming back to paragraph e, he suggested instead of 7 days to put 15 days because 7 days was too short for the Communists to prepare an overall list. The list will show the strength, locations and commanders on or above the regimental level because it [Page 1070] is rather difficult to get the junior rank within the 15 days. That could be submitted later on.
General Chou referred to paragraph a concerning the stipulation which has lost its time effect because the situation has changed. General Chou said, as General Marshall had just stated, he had better make a statement. He suggested the wording “will govern except terms which have lost time effect or as hereinafter specifically modified.”
General Marshall suggested that he meant that which passage of time had altered. General Marshall didn’t think it would work, but he would try to get it down to this specific thing.
At this time, there was off-the-record discussion.
General Marshall suggested how about adding “or as later directed by the Committee of Three.”
Colonel Caughey remarked that he thought they had all the changes suggested by General Chou.
General Chou suggested the use of the wording “Government troops” instead of “Nationalist troops.” In paragraph f, the word “Government” should be used in lieu of “National.”
General Marshall said he wanted to talk to General Chou about paragraphs a, b and c, in other words about reorganization. What has happened so far as the Government is concerned, is they have worked out various proposals. They gave these proposals to him Saturday morning. The Generalissimo desired to have them put into formal shape; that is the exact phrasing and arrangements of amendments of the orders—the exact statement as though it were an accomplished agreement. That is what he was engaged in Saturday afternoon, Saturday night and Sunday morning. He was working on amendments to the original February 25 Agreement—the special annex covering the details of redistribution in Manchuria—and some other similar matters. The Government officials spent Sunday afternoon and night getting them translated into Chinese for the consideration of the Generalissimo, he having previously indicated his thoughts on the subject. General Marshall had hoped that he would be notified this morning of what his conclusions were but was not. Instead, the Generalissimo sent word a few minutes ago that he wanted to see me [him] at 6:00 o’clock tonight.
The situation is that while General Marshall didn’t know yet just what the proposals of the Government would be, he did know some of the various possibilities. However, he was not authorized to state those at the present time. His greatest difficulty was that he didn’t know anything definite from the Communist Party, a fact which made him fearful that he would find himself in a position where matters will have gone too far on the part of one side or the [Page 1071] other for him to do much by way of persuasion in an effort to moderate proposals. For example, he assumed that tonight, the Generalissimo would tell him quite definitely what he had decided would be the conditions to be put forward. That left him merely guessing at what General Chou would think was an equitable readjustment. Hence, he was not in a position to influence matters at the critical moment.
General Chou had given him one very, very general statement Saturday morning. That was all he knew. When it comes to a Government proposal that he, for instance, might feel would not be acceptable to the Communist Party, he would have merely to guess as to whether or not that was the case. That would build up a situation which would make it very hard later on to mediate or moderate. Once people have taken a position, it is difficult to bend them from that position. That was particularly true in the case of the Generalissimo. Whatever he had been able to do in connection with the development of the Government position had been greatly limited because he was only guessing. People don’t take him very seriously when he has to admit he was merely guessing.
General Chou said regarding paragraph c, that he had in previous conferences tried to give a general impression and a general understanding of the Communist attitude. Of course, his statement was not concrete because during the present negotiations, the Communist Party assumed an attitude of wanting to make concessions. For example, on the three paragraphs concerning restoration of communications, on teams or officials, and on reorganization, the Communist Party is ready to make concessions to reach a settlement. This is very clear. At present, it is clear that the Government’s attitude regarding restoration of communications is still unknown.
There is a fourth question which is the political problem. The Communists would have certain claims to make. Because they feared that this might affect negotiations on other parts, they delayed the matter to a later period. Regardless of the three subjects, all are difficult. The Communist attitude is to make concessions to reach agreement. That is why Communists did not make any proposal. They wanted first to see what the Government’s proposal would be and then to negotiate. For example, the draft for restoration of communications5 was the work of Colonel Hill. General Chou made certain suggestions but did not touch the framework.
Since the question of the attitude toward army reorganization has again been raised, General Chou wanted to present a few more ideas. The Communists put forth only the question of altering comparative strengths and of making some specific redistribution of troops. [Page 1072] Whether Communist troops would be concentrated in one area or scattered over three or four, the number of places to be garrisoned by them will be limited. The Government side might also make proposals on where they would like to stay. They might even propose more places for the Government troops. General Chou said he had also stated before that he would consider some places which should be left ungarrisoned. He anticipated that the Government might raise the question of Harbin. He had turned over in his mind what kind of solution would be best.
Then there was the question of administration in Manchuria. He did not want to bring up this question at present. A status quo should be maintained pending settlement. Some procedure would be worked out for conduct of further negotiations. General Chou guessed the Government might want to send troops to the nine provincial capitals in Manchuria and to send members to the provincial government—a governor and the ministers. The Government might want to send those people they had appointed to various provincial governments so that in the political field, the Government would make no concession at all. This would place the Communists in a very difficult position. If Communists now proposed that the Northeast Political and Economic Council be reorganized and that the provincial government be reorganized too, neither would hardly be acceptable to the Government. That is why he would rather discuss it after the 15-day period. Then they would only discuss the three points stipulated and leave everything else to later—that in itself was a concession on their part. If the Government wanted them to make concessions on every subject, that would be difficult too. They have already conceded certain questions on the traffic operation and administration. The inspection and destruction of fortifications in areas other than railroads would be discussed later. This constituted a concession.
Coming back to the termination of hostilities, when they talked about separation of forces, inevitably Communist troops had to withdraw more than Nationalists because of positions held. That was the second concession. General Chou said the third was the army reorganization. The Government would raise certain claims. They would want Communist troops concentrated. On administrative matters, they would insist that the Government had the right to take over various provincial governments and to force Communists to make concessions too. This would be no political settlement at all. On the contrary just forcing Communists to recognize a Government which had been assigned by the Kuomintang was an arrangement that could not be beneficial to a political settlement.
General Chou recalled that when General Marshall returned from the United States this time, he wanted a four-point proposal for [Page 1073] Manchuria in which it was suggested that the status quo for the local government be maintained. This status quo will not persist indefinitely and elections will take place. They could get this fixed up after the termination of hostilities is effective. At that time, the Communists would submit a list of their armies, send people to survey Communist areas and get the exact strengths of the Communist forces, etc.
General Marshall thanked General Chou for that statement.
General Chou said to suppose the function of the Advance Section had been determined, then field teams could go to various places to stop the fighting and to make readjustments. They could also direct the concentration of troops. After hostilities had completely stopped, it would also prove helpful to the solution of administrative and political matters. As the Generalissimo had suggested that administrative matters be discussed by the Committee of Three, it seemed a way out. Maybe other parties did not quite agree with this idea because they would rather have the P. C. C. solve the problems. General Chou suggested that the matter be discussed, both by the Committee of Three and the P. C. C. in parallel and try to reach a solution at the same time but after the 15 days.
General Chou hoped the Government’s proposals on the army reorganization plan, paragraph c of this draft, could be made ready earlier so that he could have time for reconsideration. He needed some time before reaching a solution, particularly since he had to take it up with Communist leaders in Manchuria. After the situation in Manchuria was stabilized, he thought it would be easy to reach a complete settlement on the situation in China proper. He hoped, after the discussion with Colonel Hill this afternoon, they would reach a conclusion on the restoration of the railways problem.
General Chou stated that General Hwang,6 who is the Communist head of the Communications Group, arrived here yesterday and talked with General Chou with regard to fortifications. At first, General Marshall had suggested that fortifications at bridges and tunnels be maintained. Then the Government added to that, railroad stations, water towers, depots, stock and repair facilities, etc. In that case, it might turn out that no fortifications need be destroyed. Right now, the stations are very close to each other and there are a lot of small bridges. General Chou said that he lacked knowledge of the actual situation because he was working all alone on the different matters, while the bulk of his staff was in Executive Headquarters. They had poor communications with Peiping. He knew very little about the details.
[Page 1074]General Marshall asked what he meant by poor communications.
General Chou had mentioned to General Byroade that he would like to have regular air service between here and Peiping in order to have his own people come down to make reports because he cannot convey through the radio the whole idea or get all the details from them. General Byroade said he also thought it necessary to have some regular air service, and that he would consider this matter when he got back.