Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai, June 14, 1946, 11:10 a.m.
General Marshall opened the meeting by telling General Chou he had talked to General Yu Ta Wei about communications issues and [Page 1048] also about preparing a number of documents. He asked if General Chou received the first draft86 of a possible statement of terms for the termination of hostilities in Manchuria.
General Chou answered yes.
General Marshall said he endeavored to make this as simple as possible because all the complications are going to appear in the re-draft of the details regarding the re-organization and redistribution of troops in Manchuria.
General Marshall expressed his concern to General Chou over information that General Byroade brought him. General Byroade told him that both National Government and Communist officials in Peiping tried to persuade General Byroade not to go to Changchun because there was no hope of reaching any agreements. If the representatives of one side had taken such action, he could understand that. However, he was surprised and concerned to find that representatives of both sides not only take a gloomy view of the prospects but definitely were advising General Byroade not to establish an Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun. Would General Chou comment on this?
General Chou replied that he was not entirely informed about this situation. He had learned something from General Wang, who came down with General Byroade. The prevalent feeling in Peiping may be due to certain factors:
First, there is distrustfulness between the two parties. On the Communist side, the 15-day armistice was not publicized in a joint statement. Individual statements made it look as though the Government side had given an ultimatum to the Communists. Both before and after this announcement, General Hsiung Shih Hui87 and particularly General Tu Li Ming repeatedly expressed their intentions to continue the war. The Kuomintang feels that no substantial agreement can be reached within such a short time as 15 days.
Secondly, a 15-day armistice is only temporary interim arrangement. It is far different from a long term truce. Since there are many subjects to be discussed during the period, it is doubtful that their problems can be settled. Instead of trying to solve problems, the opposite party is only trying to gain time in preparation for large hostilities.
Third, from past experience, the March 27 agreement has not been carried out by the Government side in spite of Government signature on the document. For this reason, the field teams had been reduced to impotency in several areas.
[Page 1049]General Marshall agreed that this situation is serious. It is not so simple as the one confronting negotiators in January. For that reason, procedure cannot be as simple as we adopted in January. It is much more complicated and hence needs more tolerance and patience in working out arrangements so that confidence and trust can develop step by step.
General Chou stated he fully approves the draft88 prepared by General Byroade and also agrees to the suggestion of incorporating the March 27. directive into this document. He also concurred in the Generalissimo’s point in this particular reference to have a new agreement before June 22. The present draft document incorporates the views of four different people. It will serve as a basis for the operation of Executive Headquarters in Changchun. This means it may not be easy to reach a compromise in the beginning, but we certainly have to reach a compromise by all means.
Talking about establishing contact with Peiping, and particularly with Manchuria, General Chou told General Byroade a short while ago that he hoped after his arrival in Changchun, he would proceed to Harbin in 2 or 3 days to establish contact with Communist officials there. He could then discuss with them the dispatch of field teams to Communist areas in Manchuria and other matters. General Chou planned to send two people with General Byroade. One is Mr. Lee [Li], who recently came down from Mukden to Yenan and then made the trip with me to Nanking. Mr. Lee knows the background. Upon his return to Changchun and Harbin, he can tell our people what is going on here. The other one is General Wang, who came with General Byroade. Through these two people, General Chou hoped to influence Communist people in Peiping, Mukden and Changchun so that they will understand our best efforts toward establishing peace in Manchuria. These two people now understand the spirit in which the Committee of Three is working. Could he introduce them to General Marshall and would General Marshall say a few words of encouragement to them.
General Marshall said he would be very glad to see them. When did General Chou think would be a convenient time.
General Chou planned to send them with General Byroade and hence the time would depend on when General Byroade was leaving. Before they departed, however, General Chou would bring them along to see General Marshall.
General Marshall asked if there was any other point General Chou wished to speak about before he talked.
General Chou wished to talk on communications—to have that [Page 1050] settled first. He said Colonel Hill had prepared two drafts. One concerned reopening communications and was generally acceptable to General Chou. Of course, a few minor points may need amendment, but in general it is a good draft. The second draft concerned administration and operation of railways. There are certain points in that draft which need reconsideration, but in principle it also looks quite right. General Chou said that later he had discussed it with General Yu Ta Wei who brought up the point that we should first start the repair work on three railways—Lunghai, Tientsin-Pukou, Tsinan-Tsingtao railways. General Yu hoped we could begin reconstruction immediately so that work can be started before June 22. General Chou fully agreed with this. Once a decision is reached on the reopening of communications, then he could immediately send men to the Communist Headquarters at Lini to make detailed decisions on work to be started. Thus General Chou had accepted General Marshall’s suggestions that we should tackle the communications problem at the start, but now trouble arises in that General Yu Ta Wei has suggested some revisions to that draft. The main point[s] of his amendment are:
First, he wants the first paragraph to be deleted. The first paragraph is a general statement on the reopening of communications. Then he made a complete revision of paragraph 6 regarding train guards, etc. General Yu Ta Wei insisted on having an armed railroad police. Paragraph 6 is revised in a way that armed railway police will be organized, a way which was not contained in the original draft.
General Marshall asked that the main points of General Yu Ta Wei’s revision be repeated.
General Chou had told Colonel Hill that the revisions were unacceptable because they were not in accord with the previous agreement. Because General Yu Ta Wei had insisted, Colonel Hill put it into the revised draft. Up to this time, General Chou had not brought up any contemplated proposal because he was eager to reach an early solution. As General Yu Ta Wei made so many counter proposals, he was being forced to make a counter proposal too. For this reason, he is concerned.
Second, regarding administrative operation, General Yu Ta Wei declined to accept the draft proposal. General Chou said he would rather not discuss the draft at this time. He did not know clearly what he had in mind. When the Communications Agreement was discussed, General Chou suggested the matter be referred to Executive Headquarters. The result was unhappy because Executive Headquarters never reached any agreement. Then when he first asked General Marshall his views on this matter it was suggested that he [Page 1051] should directly approach General Yu Ta Wei. General Chou tried to meet all General Marshall’s suggestions, but General Yu Ta Wei did not approve Colonel Hill’s draft. In absence of any new suggestions, he only wanted to reach a compromise in 15 days so no complications will occur. If the Government makes too many demands, the outcome will be in doubt.
General Marshall said he could see that there need be no complication about paragraph a. General Yu Ta Wei had another general document reciting the general principles in which General Chou’s points were covered but it had not yet been cleared with the Generalissimo. General Marshall had seen it and had revised it. He did not know that General Chou had not yet been involved in that discussion. Unless the Generalissimo introduces some objection that we do not anticipate, the other document should clear away any doubts.
Turning to the second point, there is evidently a definite difference which relates to the character of guards along the railroad. General Marshall had asked General Yu Ta Wei this morning on what he based his contention to which General Chou objected. General Yu stated that there never had been troops used in guarding various specific installations along the railroads. The right-of-way was broad and had been the exclusive responsibility of railroad police. Now he is asked to make a change in the system which had always governed the railroads in China since before the war.
General Marshall raised the point that General Chou’s stipulation would have no application to Communist areas because so far as Colonel Hill knew at present, there were no fortifications along the railroad. General Yu Ta Wei had said that was true but the stations always had guards even though there were no fortifications. After a conversation with Colonel Hill, General Marshall had told General Yu Ta Wei that General Chou’s opposition was possibly based on the fact that railroad police had been under control of Tai Li and hence had been employed for other purposes than policing the railroad. General Yu Ta Wei did not discuss this point. General Marshall left the matter there and came into this conference with General Chou.
Colonel Hill was asked if there is anything he wanted to add to what was just said—any suggestions?
Colonel Hill said the original agreement provided for the protection of the railroad line by the local commander of the troops in the area through which the line ran. It was his understanding that General Chou’s idea is, that the introduction of railroad guards into Communist Party territory would involve another type of protective guard which had not previously been agreed upon.
[Page 1052]General Chou asked Colonel Hill what General Yu Ta Wei had in mind about the administrative operation of railroads in the draft.
Colonel Hill said that General Yu Ta Wei’s idea in not discussing the draft for administration of railroads at the present time was that this 15-day truce period was too short to permit decisions to be made on subjects for which a decision was not immediately essential. His idea was not that the plan for administrative control should not be started but that discussion on the plan could be postponed until there is more time available for discussions and decisions.
General Marshall asked if that were acceptable to General Chou.
General Chou said that because he did not know the clear idea of General Yu Ta Wei, there were three questions upon which an understanding would have to be reached.
- 1.
- The present agencies should be preserved pending the reaching of a new agreement on administration and operation, and that the status quo will be preserved.
- 2.
- It is understood by both sides that an arrangement will have to be reached before the through traffic is established.
- 3.
- When we come to discuss the administration and operation, we will still use Colonel Hill’s draft as a basis.
General Chou wanted to know General Yu Ta Wei’s comment on these points before he made any decision.
General Chou asked General Marshall to make an evaluation of the possibility that an agreement can be reached in face of the present differences of opinion. If there is to be difficulty in ironing out differences, then he will have to go ahead with preliminary preparations because he does not want to delay the matter when the time comes for agreement.
General Marshall said that so far as he had been able to determine, the one difficult point was the character of the railway and railroad guards in Communist areas. There the difficulty was entirely one of suspicion. He was hopeful that General Yu Ta Wei could remove the suspicion. Whether or not he could, he did not know; he is a very forthright person. Except for that one point, other details seem readily adjustable. General Yu Ta Wei thought the whole thing could be quickly settled, but General Marshall heard more difficulties here at the table than he was aware of before. Some of those were like paragraph a, and were the result of avoidable misunderstandings.
General Chou would like to make one concrete proposal which has not been under discussion before. According to General Yu Ta Wei’s present proposal, General Chou feels pretty sure that the old way railway troops will be brought back into the picture. General Chou had talked about that with General Chang Chih Chung.89 General [Page 1053] Yu Ta Wei’s present proposal is that during the period when the railroad is still under construction, each party will still adhere to the system that agencies created by the party will make arrangements within that section. According to that principle, each railway station will organize its own railroad police for guard and administrative purposes. Then railroad teams will make inspections of the police that are organized. The system of railroad policing will be according to regulations of the Government. Suppose that the police as organized do not meet the standards required by the field teams, then the Communist railroad authority will have to change its personnel. Later, railroads would be unified and railroad police would be brought up to standards required. That would also meet requirements of the Government for unification of railroad police. On the other hand, it would remove the suspicion of the Communist side. That is his proposal. If, instead, the Government would send in railroad troops, that would only give rise to suspicions which can in no way be wiped out. General Chou pointed out that Communists had offered strong opposition to employment of Tai Li’s units, yet made no claims to alter employment of them.
General Marshall asked General Chou if he was ready to talk at all about the redistribution of troops in Manchuria.
General Chou replied he was. General Chou told General Marshall last time he thought that the redistribution was closely connected with the question of comparative strength. Hence, there must be a decision on how many divisions the Communist Army will have. General Chou had suggested five divisions and General Marshall had expressed his views on this matter. General Chou considered redistribution of troops would concentrate troops in large cities with one division in one city. Hence, places that are occupied will not be many. Of course, Government troops will occupy more such places. What final strength the Government would like to have is still not final. According to previous agreement,90 they will have five armies and later 14 divisions. Returning to the suggestion General Chou made and also to General Marshall’s views regarding the comparative strengths, General Chou did not know what is the reaction of the Government.
General Chou’s second point pertained to the redistribution of troops. Suppose the comparative strength is fixed, then Communist troops would like to be stationed in areas now occupied by them. They hoped the Government troops would stay in places now under their occupation. As the matter now stands, Government troops hold the most important and decidedly the most developed places, places where the population is more dense and there is more food [Page 1054] available. Naturally they can provide supplies for larger forces. The North Manchuria population is scattered and sparse; hence cannot supply too many troops. If we are contemplating this point, four factors should be taken into account—the number of troops, distribution of areas, transportation facilities, and supply facilities.
General Marshall said he had informed the Generalissimo some time ago of General Chou’s comment about five Communist divisions in the reconsideration of comparative strengths in Manchuria. While he had not received a definite statement from the Generalissimo, the character of the discussion led him to the belief that the Government would be willing to accept a ratio of 5 to 1 instead of the present agreed upon ratio of 14 to 1. This would be managed by increasing the strength of the forces in Manchuria to six armies of which three divisions would be Communist troops and 15 divisions would be Nationalist troops.
As to the eventual distribution of forces within Manchuria, General Marshall now is trying, through the Generalissimo and General Chou, to get some idea of their thoughts in order to prepare a concrete proposal. Up to the present time, he did not have any such basis. He gathered from what General Chou said this morning, that while lacking knowledge of the Government’s probable position regarding final strength of troops in Manchuria, he had in mind more or less a continuation of present situation as to distribution of troops. It would appear that that is not a practical proposition for more than a very brief period of time.
General Marshall felt he was also forced to comment that it seemed there is an unavoidable relationship between the political consideration and the military distribution. For example, if an agreement were reached that a certain province would have a Communist chairman under the provisional government, it would seem advisable to relate the disposition of troops to such an arrangement. What the provinces might be or how many, he didn’t know. It also appeared, though he was carefully avoiding all political complications, that the Communist decisions regarding distribution of troops would be related to whether or not there was any commitment as to the character of magistrate councils. General Marshall had been turning all these various factors over in his mind, but he had so little to go on that it was exceedingly difficult for him to get down on paper any definite proposal which he could discuss with both sides separately before proposing a joint meeting. What he was endeavoring to get from General Chou was some idea which he might be able to utilize in expediting negotiations to a successful conclusion. Each day of labor on this problem brought some new developments and complications.
[Page 1055]General Chou declined to comment on the Government part in the redistribution of troops and their comparative strengths. He only wanted to talk about the Communist side. He now had two figures between General Marshall and himself. He mentioned five and General Marshall said three. He said anyway we will reach a figure between that number 3, 4 or 5. Places that will be garrisoned by those troops will not be many—only a limited number. As previously explained, the Communists would choose a few limited places for the disposition of Communist troops. General Chou thought it would not be difficult to reach some sort of arrangement and mentioned that we will want to adopt the same principle as they did in China proper—that each division will be stationed or concentrated in one place. This will reassure the Government, Communists have one division to the south, one to the east, one in the west and two others in the north, so they have them scattered. The Government has reassured the Communists that they will not form a block at one place. Would the Government rather have the Communist divisions close to each other. General Chou was trying to get mutual confidence and would like to know which was more acceptable to the Government.
As to the distribution of Government troops, General Chou would rather the Government make its proposals. The Government now occupies the choice part of Manchuria, the part where industries are most developed and food is most abundant. The Government may like to have their troops concentrated. General Chou felt there was sufficient new considerations to revise the distribution of troops.
Coming to the political and administrative matters, General Chou had in mind four different kinds of formulas.
First, while discussing reorganization of the army, he would rather leave aside discussion of political matters. He wanted to preserve the status quo pending solution on the matter just as with communications. He wanted to talk only about repair work without discussing administration, leaving this matter as a second step.
The second formula he suggested in the past. It has been suggested that a provisional administrative council be formed in the North and East which will be charged with the political, economic and communications problems in the Northeast. General Marshall had concurred in these proposals though they were not accepted by the Generalissimo. However other parties, the Democratic League, the Young China Party, as well as the Communist Party, do endorse these ideas. Even a part of the Kuomintang have given their endorsement to this. General Chou thought the second formula could still be placed under consideration.
[Page 1056]Third, one proposal suggested by the Generalissimo was that to empower the Committee of Three to solve administrative problems. General Marshall seemed to be reluctant to accept this proposal, but General Chou thought it could still be considered. Since General Marshall did not want to get involved in political matters, it could be done in a rather round-about way. The Committee of Three need not directly take charge of political matters but would, of course, use a platform to be approved by the coalition government. The Committee of Three would make an inspection tour to Manchuria after the 15-days period is over.
Fourth, after the 15 days, they would immediately discuss reorganization of the Government. They would place the Government in Manchuria as a part of the overall solution to the reorganization of the Government. Pursuant to establishment of the coalition government, an inspection party would be sent out to Manchuria to make a survey. As to local governments of various magistrates, General Chou thought once the provisional government is reorganized, various magistrates would go ahead without reorganization through the medium of an election on behalf of the joint platform reached by the P. C. C. He thought this would not be difficult to carry out. Prior to reelection, they would maintain the status quo as suggested before by the first proposal on the Manchurian question. General Chou wanted to constantly exchange with General Marshall any new points of view.
General Marshall said he had only one comment at this time. The reason he injected the reference to the political considerations this morning was the fear that in endeavoring to arrange military distribution, we would be held back in the solution by reluctance to make military movements because of doubts about the political reorganization. Otherwise, he never would have mentioned the subject. He was merely trying to find a quick way to settle the military redistribution. From his past experience in China, he felt that he must penetrate the screen as it were and find out what fear dominated the action or unwillingness. He told General Chou he appreciated his discussions this morning and it would be helpful to him.