Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Hsu Yung-chang at WASC49 Auditorium, June 11, 1946, 10 a.m.

General Hsu referred to General Marshall’s memorandum concerning operations of the advance section of Executive Headquarters (see inclosure No. 150). General Hsu said that the Generalissimo preferred to wait until the fifteen days were over before permitting it to operate since he (The Generalissimo) was seriously concerned about the Communist attack of [on?] Lafa and also in other parts of China. In this connection General Hsu stated that he had already sent orders to General Tu Li-ming ordering him to remain strictly on the defensive.

General Marshall pointed out that the terms of the 27 March agreement for operation of field teams in Manchuria fit the present situation perfectly, and he again stated that his sole concern was, in the interest of administrative efficiency, to permit the advance section to operate the field teams rather than Executive Headquarters operate the teams from Peiping. General Marshall pointed out that the advance section could maintain more effective control and would be in a better position to issue instructions to field teams. General Hsu hung onto the Generalissimo’s decision and stated that the operation of the advance section might be ineffective judging from past experiences. He made particular reference to the situation near Yinchow which was recently captured by the Communists; the incident occurring on the 9th where Communists destroyed a bridge over the grand canal; Communist activity in Shantung Province along the Pukow railroad; Communist activity in south Hopei Province. General Hsu reiterated that the Generalissimo did not wish the advance section to operate during these fifteen days. General Marshall stated that the reason he brought up [Page 1023] this matter was in the interest of the New Sixth Army commander, who had appealed to General Byroade to take action with respect to the Lafa incident. However, now in view of the Generalissimo’s attitude, he was placed in the embarrassing position of having to tell General Byroade that he could do nothing.

General Marshall continued by stating that he had been anticipating for some time, possibly ten days, Communist attacks against National troops in retaliation for continued National Government advances in Manchuria north of Changchun.

General Marshall summed up by asking General Hsu to make clear to the Generalissimo the following points:

Operation of teams in Manchuria under the terms of the 27 March agreement would be more effective than operating these teams from Peiping as is now authorized.
The question came up as a result of the urgent appeal of a National Commander.
General Byroade had tried to help.
He (General Marshall) felt it necessary to take the matter up with the Generalissimo in view of the Generalissimo’s injunction in his 6 June letter.
The 27 March agreement fits the present situation.
If the Generalissimo cannot approve, he (General Marshall) would have to inform General Byroade not to take any action but instead Peiping Headquarters would be left to take long range action.

  1. National Military Council.
  2. OSE 144, June 10, not printed.