Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, May 21, 1946, 10:40 a.m.
| Also present: | Col. Hutchin |
| Mr. Chang Wen-Chin | |
| Capt. Soong |
General Marshall asked General Chou what happened about the plane for his people from Peiping and when would they get in. General Chou replied that he understood Colonel Caughey had sent off a message to General Byroade. General Marshall inquired when they were coming down and General Chou stated it was being arranged at the other end and the time is not set. General Marshall asked if General Chou expected them in today. General Chou stated he hoped they could come today or tomorrow, but that the decision for that is left at the other end. Colonel Hutchin informed General Marshall that the message had been dispatched to Peiping, but that no reply had been received.
General Chou stated he had read over the press release issued yesterday by General Marshall and he agreed with that and had wired it to Yenan. He remarked that the propaganda campaign was getting worse.
General Marshall stated that it had gotten so bad he determined that he had to do something. He stated that frankly he was undecided as to whether it might not be harmful for him to be making a very drastic statement as to how the Chinese should run their own affair. General Marshall thought it quite possible that he would be critically attacked for having the effrontery to endeavor to instruct the agencies of the two parties as to how they should conduct their affairs. Nevertheless, he decided that something had to be done and apparently he was the only person that was free to do it; therefore, the statement. The new Minister of Information called on General Marshall evening of 20 May to meet him for the first time, but especially to assure General Marshall of his cooperation and to ask him what he thought the Minister of Information should do. General Marshall told him [Page 869] that he didn’t feel free to advise him as to just what to do because there were two sides to this affair—the Government side and the Communist side and therefore General Marshall could not very well advise the Government as to what to do without specific knowledge of what the Communist action would be. General Marshall stated that he did say that he was certain that the effect of the propaganda procedure was exceedingly harmful to both parties outside of China. It undoubtedly was convincing, certainly the American people, that this was a free for all fight with little regard for the actual facts in the reports to the world. Of course such a reaction discredits both sides. What its effect was here in China, General Marshall would not have the temerity to interpret as they should know that much better than he could, but he did know that it made negotiations almost impossible and all must concede that negotiations were of the greatest possible importance to China at the present time. Now if General Chou has any specific ideas that he would like to reach with the Central Government News Agency, General Marshall stated he would be very glad to try to help in the matter, but that he did not feel as free to propose as he did in Chungking when there was a period of agreement.
Regarding this matter, General Chou said that he would like to call on the new Minister of Publicity and see what he can learn about his views. He thinks that it would be a good time and it would be a good thing if at least the news that does not correspond to facts could be eliminated. That would help a great deal to avoid stimulating the feelings. General Chou originally proposed in Chungking in February that all the reports would be confined to reports of facts. Only regarding military reports, it would be confined to the official press release of Executive Headquarters. At that time the Kuomintang would not agree to that. They said that the political and military matters were inseparable. Therefore, they could not agree to the proposal. In addition to that, we have now another difficulty. The Executive Headquarters press release is confined to what is going on in China Proper while Manchuria is not under the control of the Headquarters and therefore General Chou wanted to see the new Minister and find out if he has some idea to decrease the paper attack, or even to cease it completely. Because the Minister has just assumed his position, plus the statement General Marshall made, General Chou thought it would be a good opportunity to make efforts to work toward this direction. General Chou admitted that now the situation is more difficult than when he made the proposal in February. In addition, General Chou stated, the Kuomintang itself is not unified within itself. Even if the Ministry of Information can agree on something, still there are other Kuomintang papers which are not under the control [Page 870] of the Ministry of Information. They may not be able to hold them to an agreement, but anyhow General Chou stated that he will spare no efforts.
General Marshall stated that he appreciated General Chou’s statement and that he would much prefer that General Chou and the Minister of Information confer together rather than that he be drawn into the picture. He stated that he would make one observation, that when a statement is made that they are to confine themselves to facts, the question is, who determines the facts. If military reports were left to Executive Headquarters there would be decided differences of opinions as to facts. General Marshall stated that that would mean less said in the press—the disagreement would mean silence which he said would not be a bad thing.
General Marshall stated that he had three letters that had come in from General Chou, and were brought to his attention that morning. He stated he would try to pass on them here.
The first is dated May 19th74 and is regarding a report on Japanese prisoners Colonel Culley of Team 28 recounted. General Marshall stated he would do as General Chou requests, calling Colonel Culley’s attention to what General Chou says and see if a more complete investigation can be made.
The second letter is dated May 19th and quoted a report from General Yeh of Executive Headquarters on the subject of three fights at Yangtsun, Kwangtsn, and Lienshan [Lianghsiang]. General Marshall stated he would take the matter up immediately with Mr. Robertson and General Byroade. He stated he supposed they had already seen General Yeh’s statement. The best he could do is to call on them immediately as to what they thought the situation was and what could be done to remedy it.
The third letter, General Marshall stated, is a lengthy statement by General Chou of May 19th again reporting from General Yeh regarding the situation in Kiangsu and Anwhei. Before discussing that in detail, General Marshall stated he would give General Chou a report that just came in from Colonel Drake of Team 17.75 (General Marshall handed General Chou the report.)
After allowing General Chou time to read the report, General Marshall stated that he had General Chou’s letter on the same subject quoting General Yeh in which General Chou recommended that teams be sent to Tingyuan and Nantung without delay. General Marshall stated that it seemed to him that with a team apparently at Nantung, what is needed is another team at Tingyuan or maybe send it first to [Page 871] Nantung to confer with the first team and determine where it should go. General Marshall stated it would hardly seem that two teams were needed. If agreeable to General Chou, he would make a recommendation that another team be sent down there and be, he would assume, subordinated to the first team so that they will not be entirely independent and that Executive Headquarters be allowed to determine, after communication with Team 17, as to where the new team should be sent. Whether or not the time has arrived to send a special committee there and to what place, General Marshall did not know. General Marshall asked General Chou’s comments.
General Chou stated that the Team 17 has made a very great effort and therefore no team seems needed for Nantung. It seemed to him better to await until the team had returned to Huai-an and then the special committee go down to Huai-an to learn about the situation. After the return of the team is known this can be done. Regarding Tingyuan, General Chou stated fighting is still going on and he hoped that the team would be sent. If there is no airfield there the team can go to Pangpu where there is an airfield and then go down to Tingyuan.
General Marshall told General Chou he had made a mistake, thinking of Nantung and he had confused Tingyuan with Huai-an. He saw what General Chou meant and he agreed to the two teams.
General Chou commented on the report by stating there had been a lot of discussion regarding the line of separation. He thought that when the special committee is sent to hear the briefing, they would know that in certain places there are only Communist militia but no regular troops. The Government troops, upon seeing that there are no regular Communist troops, would go to that place and since the militia is not strong enough to resist they would be pushed back. Then the Communist regular troops would come in and fight back the Government regular troops. The only reason that the Government troops gave is that there are no regular troops in those places, however, General Chou wanted to point out that the cease fire included militia, and irregulars, so actually the lines of separation have not been determined. According to the truce agreement, no troop movements should be made, but these reports show that Government troops did move after the truce and this is one illustration of an example of some cases which lead to conflict. General Chou thought that the explanation from the team would yield more information about that.
General Marshall stated he understood and that he agreed to send an additional team to the Nantung-Huai-an area and a team to the Tingyuan area.
General Marshall stated he had another communication which he [Page 872] would like to read to General Chou. The communication was a personal report from the American member of the team at Chihfeng, Colonel Pressely on the 16th.76 He (Col. Pressely) states that the airfield at Chihfeng was destroyed by the Communists. Many holes were dug in the runway, but are now repaired so that a plane can land, but only on the south end. He requests a plane be sent as quickly as possible for supplies for repair of generator with other supplies that are needed. He states, “I was not permitted to leave the compound on the 11th of May and stopped by an armed sentry at the exit to the compound. Lt. Boyle (that is his assistant) was ordered back to the compound from the street of this city on the 14th of May.” They were not permitted to visit the local people on the 14th of May. The local papers claimed the National Government was going to attack the city. He therefore requested a conference with the local commander, the mayor or anyone in authority—but this was denied.
General Marshall said he had a somewhat similar report which lie would not burden the record with. He stated that he wished to say to General Chou that this seemed to him to greatly embarrass the entire Communist position in North China. The action of the Communists in the Chihfeng region, the absence of team members in Chengte, not only the complete lack of cooperation, but the definite antagonistic action—the very definite hostility to various American team members due to the propaganda against the United States and against me, leaves a situation there which defies the representations of General Chou regarding other parts of North China and gives the Government contenders an argument against good faith in other matters where certainly, in some instances, I think, the Government is at fault. One of the team captains—not Colonel Pressely—is a good friend of General Marshall’s. His report is to be accepted by General Marshall, as he knows the man well—knows his character. General Marshall regards the continued action in that region as unfortunate and might easily prove fatal. Certainly if the reports of the Communist actions in that general region ever reach the American press, it would do the Communist position serious harm. General Marshall thought, therefore, that General Chou should take some positive action to get his people in that region under control.
General Marshall said he wanted to speak about another incident—he had forgotten the place. General Chou would undoubtedly know what it was. However, 10 trucks of UNRRA supplies intended for starving people in a city, including medical supplies, were seized by the Communist authorities. Mr. Robertson told General Marshall orally that his understanding of the incident was that the CNRRA [Page 873] official in charge of the train was found to be carrying, along with the UNRRA supplies, pay for the puppet troops and some other things for them, and that was the basis for the seizure. General Marshall said he did not know now what happened finally to those supplies, but he wanted to say to General Chou the following. However foolish and stupid the action of the Government official was in endeavoring to utilize a neutral person to effect some measure of supply to puppet troops, however indefensible that action was, General Marshall thought the Communists should be very careful regarding what they do with UNRRA supplies. People of the United States are contributing more than 80% of the cost of the UNRRA expenses and China is getting the largest proportion. Now whatever the minor factors are, if the people of the United States, who are now endeavoring to save out of their general diet in wheat and in rice for China and are making a tremendous contribution in money and food and medical supplies and general sustenance to China, find that its delivery is being interfered with for whatever reason, it can have but one effect, which General Marshall thought would be totally to the disadvantage of the Communist Party. General Marshall repeated that he did not know what became of the supplies—they may have been finally sent into the city—he did not know. General Marshall accepted the fact that the Communists had justification in seizing the train, but when it comes to the complete diversion of those supplies, if they were diverted finally, then General Marshall thought that would [be] making a great mistake. General Marshall stated he was told that the Government stopped a supply train going to Kalgan in retaliation for this stoppage. Mr. Robertson saw the Government official involved and told him that action placed the Government in an impossible position by retaliating by blocking supplies contributed by the American people for starving people. If there was to be retaliation it must be in some other manner—so that supply train was released. General Marshall repeated again that he did not know what became of the original ten trucks, but he merely wanted to give point to the possibilities involved in blocking the distribution of UNRRA supplies.
General Chou stated that he was informed regarding these two incidents.
Regarding the matter in Jehol, he has sent wires to cease such actions. That one place alone is involved, actually[,] General Chou stated, he is dealing with several matters during the last few days. That was also the reason why he brought up in the proposal regarding the operation of the field teams, the second point, that the personal freedom and safety of the teams should be respected by the local military and civil authorities because General Chou and [at?] that [Page 874] time noticed the possibilities that eventually might come out. He stated that with reference to the actions General Marshall just stated in regard to Jehol, they may be able to give very good reasons, but still he thought that such actions should be corrected because they are not compatible with the relationship within the field teams. The argument they gave is that they had a signed agreement at Chengte in which it was agreed that the Communist troops would evacuate the town of Chengte while on the Government side, the 5th Division should return to Hopeh. While the Communist troops did evacuate that town, the Government 5th Division instead of going to Hopeh departed for Manchuria to participate in the fighting. In addition to that the Government 195th Division was also moved to Manchuria, despite protest of the Communist team member. The 85th Division also departed for Manchuria. On account of the fact that the Government has entered into the agreement, the Communist team member was blamed by the local military authorities, for the reason that all the agreements seem to be of no use—that the Government would not abide by these agreements. Then, of course, the present case has been referred to the three commissioners of the Executive Headquarters. This indicates that the military authorities are not satisfied with the work of the field teams, which places the Communist team member in an embarrassed position. A conference had been proposed to be convened in Chengte for the commander of both parties to meet, however, that conference was not able to take place. Another point is that the local commanders do not understand fully the position of the American representatives. In certain things they do not quite agree with the American representative. For example, the fighting [which] started at Peipei along the railway in Jehol, which the papers now report to be occupied by the Communists, was started for the reason that despite all the work of the field team, the movement of the Government troops cannot be stopped, so they moved to block the movement of the troops and destroyed the railroads. Of course this matter has to be taken care of and General Chou has already wired General Yeh in Peiping and requested him to send messages to Jehol and Chihfeng saying that despite the fact that the Government has initially been wrong, the method[s] that the Communist Party has adopted to stop them are also not appropriate. General Chou wanted you77 to know he has taken up this matter.
General Marshall expressed his thanks.
Regarding the other incident, which General Chou stated happened at Liachun—west Shantung, he has also received information. General Chou was informed that the whole matter is said to be settled [Page 875] with the participation of UNRRA and CNRRA representatives. They have agreed that the supplies will be distributed both within the town and partly within the immediate vicinity of the town for the populace—for the civilians. It is reported that an agreement has been signed to that effect. General Chou had received this report, but he will now investigate further in this matter to see if anything goes wrong in that region.
General Marshall stated he was also awaiting to find out exactly what happened, because he wanted to take it up with the Central Government. He thought that both sides had to be very careful in the handling of UNRRA supplies, which the Chinese people need so badly.
General Chou asked if Mr. Ray and Mr. Todd78 had told General Marshall the result of their conference with him. General Marshall stated they had not. General Chou said their conference was very satisfactory. General Chou stated, however that if the contact between UNRRA and himself had been two months ago, that would have been much better. That would save the delay that has occurred when the whole thing was referred to Nanking. Now time is pressing. In their conversation, General Chou and Mr. Ray reached a six-point agreement. There is one point that needs discussion with Dr. T. F. Tsiang. Regarding that point, General Chou has suggested that the three parties (the Communist local government, the Central Government and CNRRA & UNRRA) will make surveys and to work out the relief areas. Railroads are being built across the Yellow River and the decision of the opening of the channel to the old bed will be deferred until 15 June, after the work of the repairing the old dykes has been started so they will see how the project is progressing. If the first step of the dyke can be completed within 40 days then the part of the water can be diverted into the old course. In case it cannot be completed, there is no way but to wait until the flood is over. Now the work will be started and the Communist Party provides all the necessary labor. UNRRA and Yellow River organization will send men down to inspect the progress of work and General Chou has told them that in case they can reach an agreement in the 15 June conference that would be the best thing, but in case they could not reach an agreement they would immediately proceed to Nanking to have a discussion here.
General Marshall stated that Mr. Todd had been interested in getting Mr. Chang Wen-chin to work with him.
General Chou stated there was one thing that he (Todd) may have erred on. In the inspection tour he say [saw] only half of the dykes [Page 876] which were in rather good shape and he did not notice the other part and therefore his plan is optimistic. He predicted that the work could be completed in two months which seems too optimistic.
General Chou stated he would like to discuss on the Manchurian problem, but that he had an appointment with Mr. Shao Li-tze79 for luncheon and would have to limit his presentation to an outline. General Chou stated that if General Marshall did not mind, he would like to listen to his comments at the next meeting.
General Chou stated that regarding General Marshall’s comments of May 17th he has referred it to Yenan and Yenan also has certain hesitations regarding the withdrawal from Changchun. They have to ask the Communist leaders in Manchuria on this question. It seems to them that they have to consider the following two points:
- 1.
- In case the Government feels that they can take Changchun within a very short time, they are afraid that the Government would not enter into such an agreement.
- 2.
- In case they would capture Changchun, they may raise again other points like Harbin[,] and Yenan doubts whether the Government would still consider such a proposal.
Regarding the political aspect, the points for consideration are that the political and economical council will be reorganized into a provincial administrative council according to the 3–3–3 ratio; that the Changchun mayor should be neutral, and the magistrate council be participated in by both the Kuomintang and Communist parties.
In regard to the reorganization of the various provincial governments there has to be some arrangement worked out which is acceptable to both parties. Yenan likes to know whether General Marshall has any comments. General Chou will also discuss with the other parties to get their views. According to this proposal Changchun will be made a city of peace. The police of that city should also be organized by the mayor who is a neutral person, and that the secret police should not be allowed to infiltrate in that police. However the present regulations of the Central Government is different from that. According to present regulations the Central Government has the police directly under them. That is the Japanese system and is not the democratic way.
In the military aspect, General Marshall asked whether after the truce the demobilization will be carried out. General Chou desired to assure General Marshall that the demobilization will be carried out according to the reorganization plan which has to be worked out. We will also work out procedures to distinguish the National Army from the local forces and what way they should be divided.
[Page 877]Regarding the Communist troops, it is suggested that the Communists would like to claim 5 divisions under the army reorganization. It is acceptable to Yenan to push the time of army reorganization in Manchuria so that we do not need to await the reorganization’s completion after 18 months. Regarding the disposition of troops, of course, the Communist troops and the National troops will garrison different areas. The Communist troops will be garrisoned along the major cities now under Communist control. They would not go through Government troop areas because it is natural that the Government troops would not agree to that.
Now coming to the political arrangement, once the army reorganization plan can be fixed and implemented and the disposition of troops has been determined then we will separate the military matters from the civil administrative matters and the military reorganization will come under the control of the Executive Headquarters while the civil affairs will all go under the provincial administrative council. With the separation of the political from the military affairs, General Chou thought that everybody may feel reassured.
General Marshall said he would like to make one comment regarding the Government’s suspected attitude regarding Changchun, or once it has been taken. General Marshall stated that it was his point of view that in order to avoid such possibilities, for a successful action or agreement, it has to be reached quickly, for that reason and also because of the precarious situation in North China. Regarding Yenan’s second comment regarding Changchun, General Marshall said his attitude toward the Central Government would be the same as it is now toward the Communist Party. General Marshall said he would not permit himself to become involved in the negotiations unless he thought there was a fair prospect of reaching an agreement. Once he had a pretty definite idea of the Communist side of the picture, he could do some investigating to find out what the possibilities of the Government’s considerations of his views would be. General Marshall would follow the same procedure he had in the past. He would start with the side that was in the strong position at the moment. General Marshall stated he would be prepared to comment tomorrow in detail regarding the various points General Chou had brought up. General Marshall stated that he would say now that the proposition of 5 divisions is an increase of 5 times the previous agreement and he would assume would inevitably involve a demand on the part of the Central Government for a somewhat corresponding increase on the original proposal. General Marshall thought it would be better to hold down the total strengths than to increase it in such a manner. For example, suppose the ratio of 14 to 1—the present agreement—be changed to 1 to 5. That would be one Communist [Page 878] army and 5 Government armies. That would seem a better approach than 5 Communist divisions which would inevitably mean the insistence on the part of the Government to a corresponding increase in their final strength. General Marshall thought the critical factor here was the method and the rapidity with which the readjustment of the strengths could be made and the decision as to the disposition of troops. He stated he was assuming that the Communist interest, in view of its present deployment, is to the north of Changchun, particularly as the Government has not entered that area except by little detachments. Therefore, General Marshall was assuming that on the Communist side they would wish the deployment of their troops to be the strongest possible in that region and would request that the Government troops would be confined largely to the region in which they are now disposed. General Marshall was also turning over in his mind some such disposition with the Communists to the north and the Government troops to the south, that Changchun could not be continued indefinitely in the special status proposed and that there would be a Government insistence at some later date for the actual occupation of Changchun if the Government deployment was to be confined to the southward. General Marshall stated that he would undertake tomorrow to comment in more detail, but that he was speaking off-hand here having just heard General Chou’s comments. General Marshall stated he was fearful of what some leader on either side might do, which would react right here in Nanking, and would be to the loss of China.
General Marshall stated he was troubled about the political part because he did not know the leaders. He may have met Shao Li-Tze, but he was just a name, also Chen Li Foo. He didn’t know General Chou’s people. That is the problem he would be most fearful of leaving completely to a future negotiation.
General Marshall stated that General Chou had asked him for his suggestions about the provincial governments and he said he merely starts with a knowledge that there are nine Central Government appointees and 8 Communist appointees. He stated that he believed the province to the NE of Tsitsihar is the only one the Communists have not appointed a governor for.
General Chou stated he was not sure of the direction.
General Marshall said it is very hard for him to propose a compromise. He would try to do so, but that would be largely a guess on his part. However, he was not guessing when he stated that the reorganized political council would probably never be able to reach [Page 879] an agreement regarding such a vital question of the political reorganization of provincial governments. It would have to be known pretty well in advance what the demands would be. He stated he would try to reply more definitely tomorrow.