Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at General Marshall’s House, May 11, 1946, 9:45 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong |
General Marshall handed General Yu Ta-wei a memorandum for the Generalissimo51 concerning the conditions for a peaceful settlement in Manchuria. General Yu suggested to General Marshall, if [Page 831] it were possible, to allow a National army to occupy Changchun with symbolic forces sent out along the railroad to Manchouli. To this General Marshall replied that symbolism matters little if the area is dominated by the Communists. It is a matter of weighing the symbolic gesture against the actual power. Gen. Marshall stated that Gen. Byroade believed the situation in North China is even more serious than he had thought. As far as the time element is concerned, the situation is becoming more advantageous to the Communists.
General Marshall continued by saying the entire situation may wind up in the partial withdrawal of the National forces from Manchuria and probably an outbreak of civil war in North China. The big question is, how is the National Government going to meet the situation. With the Communist radicals and militarists in power, General Chou has lost a great deal of his power to negotiate thus making it problematical whether we can restore the balance we had on 1 March. There are still two major irritations in North China: one is the railroad fortifications, and the second is the failure of the National Government to report its routine movement of troops. It seems that both sides are maneuvering against one another and such maneuvering must be stopped now or else it can’t be stopped at all. The situation in North China is entirely dominated by the outcome in Manchuria. Failure to solve this situation will render Executive Headquarters ineffective. General Yu then said he was merely trying to pave the way for a discussion between the Generalissimo and General Marshall although he himself was of the strong opinion that symbolic occupation was necessary. General Marshall said that while in Chungking, the Generalissimo had repeatedly stated that he would not sign or agree to anything that did not provide evacuation of Changchun and National troop occupation. General Marshall outlined his proposal of an advanced echelon of Executive Headquarters in Changchun to supervise the Communist evacuation and avoid the necessity of occupation immediately by Government troops.
General Yu then stated that the Generalissimo’s feeling is shared by many other Chinese. He further stated that we must not be confused between the resumption of negotiations and the period after the negotiations. He proposed that the area north of Changchun not be discussed until later and that provisions be made for occupation of towns along the railroad from Changchun to Manchouli as a symbolic gesture. General Yu continued: the National Government is authorized five armies in Manchuria which should be deployed as follows—two between Changchun and Hulutao; another in Changchun; another in Harbin and the fifth stationed along the railroad toward [Page 832] Manchouli as a symbolic gesture. This presupposes that the symbolic forces will be arranged for after the agreement has been reached through negotiation to have the Communists evacuate Changchun. General Marshall then made it clear that he would not be a party to the negotiations as chairman, knowing that there was no basis for agreement by the Communists. He further stated that he thought the symbolic force would not be accepted by the Communists and that General Yu’s proposal for such a symbolic force would not demonstrate the power of the National Government. General Marshall said he was certain that it would invite trouble later.
General Yu reiterated that his suggestion was to work out a solution for Changchun first and then to have a National army in Changchun and a symbolic force along the railroad. General Marshall then said that if such a symbolic force would be accepted by the Communists, it would be fine, but he did not want to enter into negotiations feeling certain that the terms stipulated by the Generalissimo would not be acceptable. General Marshall felt that he would be blocked before he could get it started since the Generalissimo has repeatedly stated that he would not take anything less than complete sovereignty in Manchuria. General Marshall stated that he was not objecting to the symbolic detachments but he was objecting to being placed in a position where he would have no power to avoid an almost certain stalemate.
General Marshall continued by stating that if the situation in Manchuria is not resolved, then there inevitably soon would be civil war in North China; that there would be no coalition government; and that all previous agreements would be vitiated.
General Yu summarized the points made in General Marshall’s letter and asked that they be written down for his use in discussing this matter with the Generalissimo. (See attached.)52
General Marshall said he was considering asking General Chou to go to Manchuria alone so he would become intimately familiar with his leaders there and have an opportunity to familiarize them with the danger of the situation. General Marshall also suggested the possibility of sending General Chou first to Yenan and then to Manchuria with Chairman Mao for the same purpose. By this means it might be possible to convince the Communists—who are too keenly aware of their favorable military situation in Manchuria—that their immediate gains may well lead to their eventual loss.