Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Notes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, April 27, 1946, 10:30 a.m.

Also present: Col. Caughey
Mr. Chang Wen Chin28

General Chou stated that the proposals submitted by the representatives of the Democratic League29 seemed superficial; that the main problem had to do with control of the railroads. General Chou stated that his idea with respect to this was:

(1)
Either to depend on some sort of a local civilian garrison,
(2)
Full military control, or,
(3)
Establishment of a commission.

General Marshall stated he had spoken to the Generalissimo about the Democratic League proposal and that the Generalissimo had prepared a new proposal30 to stabilize the Manchurian situation:

(1)
Carry out the cease fire order.
(2)
Fix strengths in accordance with the reorganization plan.
(3)
Reestablish sovereignty by control of the railroads mentioned in the Sino-Soviet treaty together with the strip 30 li on each side.
(4)
Further discussion of the political matters.

General Marshall pointed out that there was confusion at the moment between military and political questions; that when the political [Page 798] situation is resolved the military confusion would subside and the situation become entirely different. General Marshall said the Democratic League proposed that the military commander, presently chairman of the Political Council, be relieved and three non-partisan representatives be placed on that committee; that this committee provide government representatives at key points, such as Harbin, Changchun and Tsitsihar, and along the railroads. At the same time no National troops would move along the railroads and Communists would withdraw 30 li beyond. General Marshall continued by stating that during the entire negotiations he had been searching for a quick solution for the Manchurian problem, a solution which would provide necessary control and authority to the National Government and one that was also satisfactory to the Communist Party. The difficulty thus far had been that he was trying to work out a solution amid mistrust and differences in fundamentals.

General Chou stated that throughout the negotiations he, too, had been working for a satisfactory solution; however, the situation was continually getting worse and that, therefore, the solution had to take into account existing circumstances. General Chou pointed out that it appeared the National Government wanted to fight and then talk, whereas the Communist view was to cease fighting and to discuss the over-all problem. General Chou reiterated that he was willing to discuss the general situation, but that he could not accept the Generalissimo’s view to fight and then discuss. General Chou stated that he had wired the various Democratic League proposals and General Marshall’s proposal to Yenan and although he had no desire to stall the matter, he must await the reply. General Chou stated that after receiving the reply from Yenan he would exchange views and hoped that within one or two days, a solution could be worked out. General Chou added that he did not want to burden the field commanders and therefore felt it necessary to talk directly to Yenan.

General Marshall said he proposed going to Nanking Monday31 and that he was concerned over General Chou’s movement to Nanking. General Marshall offered to assist in moving 50 people and asked General Chou if he had heard anything with reference to the housing. General Chou stated that he had sent three representatives to discuss the situation with the mayor of Nanking and hoped appropriate arrangements would be made soon.

General Marshall stated that he had hoped to get definite proposals from General Chou for the purposes of discussion with the Generalissimo that evening; that his difficulty was a disagreement in basic terms, both sides remaining adamant. General Marshall asked General Chou if he had any comment on the Democratic League proposal with reference to the reorganization of the Political Council.

[Page 799]

General Chou stated that he believed separating the military commander from that Council would be a great assistance in furthering negotiations.

General Marshall asked General Chou if he believed this should be mentioned to the Generalissimo; that is, is the reorganization of the Political Council important to any cease fire agreement. If not, he would not discuss it with the Generalissimo at this time. General Chou stated he would leave that to General Marshall’s discretion as his discussion with the Generalissimo developed.

General Marshall then sought General Chou’s comment regarding troop dispositions in case some agreement was reached. General Chou outlined the following four points:

(1)
Separate the two armies from close contact.
(2)
No troop movements on either side.
(3)
Solve the communications problem.
(4)
Dispatch teams to points of close contact and along the main railroad lines.

General Chou continued by stating these four points needed immediate action and that after this had been done the following four points could be discussed:

(1)
Review the military situation in Manchuria.
(2)
Put into effect the demobilization plan.
(3)
Redispose the forces.
(4)
Readjust army strengths.

General Marshall stressed the importance of providing adequate instructions for the teams. General Marshall illustrated by saying, suppose we specify that the various units be separated by 60 li. He then pointed out that this would immediately create difficulty if National Government troops were within that distance of Changchun, which circumstances would necessitate withdrawal of Communist forces from Changchun. General Marshall continued by stating that the cessation of all movement would apply to all units in Manchuria and all the way to Shanghai. This would create a difficult situation and was the reason he had specifically provided for movement of the 60th and 93rd armies in order to avoid dispute. General Marshall stated that the situation with respect to Harbin, Changchun and Tsit-sihar might require different treatment suggesting that it may be appropriate for Communists to remain in Changchun, but not in the other two places during negotiations.

After lunch, General Marshall informed General Chou that his main difficulty was to present a proposal to the Generalissimo that would not deny him authority in Manchuria and at the same time make certain that the Communist Party receives certain appropriate rights. General Marshall continued by stating that the Communists presently [Page 800] hold the advantage due to military troop dispositions; this would make it difficult in his negotiations to place the National Government in a dignified position and at the same time not deny the Communists their right for political demands. General Marshall again stressed that any agreement must be sufficiently specific to avoid team debate such as expressed understandings regarding key points.

General Marshall told General Chou that if he, in turning over this discussion in his mind, could come to a definite proposal, another meeting could be held in the morning in order to come to a solution before the Generalissimo left Chungking.

General Chou stated that one of his main concerns with reference to the railroads were secret police organizations stationed along the railroads and referred to the movement of the 18th regiment into Manchuria under a recent Tai Li order. Since Chang Kai-Ming, present National commissioner at Executive Headquarters, has recently taken Tai Li’s place, General Chou expressed fear that Executive Headquarters would have difficulty in cooperating smoothly regarding the railroad problem.

General Marshall asked who General Chou considered would be an appropriate replacement as commissioner. General Chou replied that it should be General Lin Wei, Vice Minister of War.

General Marshall asked General Chou who he believed should be the National representative on the Committee of Three. General Chou replied that he had not considered this carefully, but there were two necessary qualifications:

(1)
Sufficient authority to adequately represent the Generalissimo.
(2)
Enthusiastic desire for rapid and peaceful settlement.

  1. Gen. Chou En-lai’s secretary.
  2. Not found in Department files.
  3. April 25, p. 795.
  4. April 29.