Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at House 28, Chungking, April 22, 1946, 2 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong |
General Yu: I am not an official spokesman although I shall be glad to offer all assistance possible in any of your problems or considerations.
General Marshall: I am not ready to issue any comment yet. I talked to the Generalissimo yesterday on the political situation and I will talk to him tonight on the military situation. I have heard the Communist’s side this morning, and have also heard reports from Colonel Caughey, General Gillem, General Byroade and some American team members. I have read all the minutes of meetings up to date. The following comments are for your ears only. The situation is very serious and it is very difficult to find a solution which will be accepted by all, particularly from the view point of the Chinese people. A great part of these difficulties could have been avoided by the National Government but now the whole situation is reversed. The troubles seem to come from the feeling of distrust and lack of faith on both sides. It is always thought that there are evil motives behind all proposals. I have tried for seven weeks to send field teams to Manchuria, but this was delayed because the Generalissimo was afraid that the Russians may complicate the situation. Three weeks after I left, the situation was completely out of hand. Earlier, General Chou wanted to go to Mukden but I did not because the Russians were there. General Chou insisted also that Cease Fire Order applied to all China, but the Government said it did not. Meantime, Nationalist troops were moved into Manchuria. I do not know who the Generalissimo’s advisors are but whoever they may be, they are very poor ones. Instead of constructive action they got the Government into trouble. Many instances have occurred where the Government has offered opportunity to allow the Communists to make accusations. As an example National Troops moved toward Chifeng contrary to the original agreement. The Canton situation is another example of failure to abide by the agreement. In reorganizing the army I originally placed 9 armies in Manchuria but the Generalissimo wanted them reduced to 4 since it would be less offending to the Russians. I then suggested 6 and it was finally compromised by General Chang Chih Chung to 5. Now the Communists want to hold you to 5 armies.
Coming into the present situation no one has offered any alternative except a great war and you can not support a great war. It is not [Page 789] going to be supported by Americans or the Seventh Fleet or Executive Headquarters. The Communists have very strong positions in Manchuria and on this basis it has even been suggested that National forces abandon Manchuria. The question to my mind is what basis now can you do business with the Communists? They put fingers on all faults made by the Kuomintang. I had a loan already set up before I left the United States. Then the Generalissimo’s speeches came—one to PCC19 and one to United States.20 They murdered my effort. The Generalissimo accused the Communists of sabotaging the loan but it was what he said that ruined it. What should be suppressed in his speeches has been published. Things like that ruin the public opinion in the United States and it is a terrible price to pay. I am trying now to find a way out.
General Yu: (Spoke but does not want to be quoted—Gist of his speech was his desire for peaceful settlement.)
General Marshall: The Kuomintang had a good chance to have peace in Manchuria but it did not utilize this chance. The Communists are taking advantage of their positions and are becoming stronger every day. The Government has gotten into a bad spot and I have to figure a way out. Regarding the trip made by the Committee of Three in March, General Chou wanted to go most because he knew some of his commanders were not complying with orders. He wanted to talk to them personally and he did. But now the Communists may say that the situation has entirely changed. They wanted the Cease Fire Order to apply to Manchuria, and that field teams be sent there; the Kuomintang did not. All the world is watching and we cannot ignore the position of the United States. China cannot at present get along without United States assistance, physically and financially. For example, we had difficulty in sending a team to Hsuchow and the Communists demanded a team north of Hankow. The Communists did not want to send teams to Hsuchow and the Nationalists did not want to send teams north of Hankow. After I persuaded both parties to send team members to both places, they found identical conditions in reverse: North of Hankow Communists were surrounded, near Hsuchow National troops were surrounded.
The Central Government has gone through some bitter experiences with the Communists. I was here when the present situation got [Page 790] under way; that was when Borodin21 was eliminated in 1927. I have sat in the middle the past few months and watched the situation develop. I believe I know what I’m talking about.
- For reference to speech to the People’s Political Council on April 1, see memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, April 18, p. 169, fifth paragraph.↩
- For interview on April 8 with the United Press, see memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, April 10, p. 166.↩
- Communist adviser from Moscow to the Kuomintang regime at Hankow until after the break with General Chiang Kai-shek’s regime at Nanking in 1927. See despatch No. 1161, August 17, 1927, from the Chargé in China, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. ii, p. 19.↩