893.00/4–1146: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 11—7:10 a.m.]
21. Against background of report USSR is withdrawing forces from Manchuria before April 30, I offer on basis, far from completed, the following tentative estimates situation.
Opposition in Manchuria to Kmt regime apparently comprises, with some overlapping, four main groups, namely: Communist Eighth Route, Chang Hsueh-shih7 autonomists, New Fourth Army and group closest of all to USSR. It is true none of four was present in force at time Jap surrender but they are here now with 8 months’ growth behind them. Eighth Route represented here by Lin Piao and [Page 756] Peng Chen undoubtedly believe their continued existence depends on their skill in power politics rather than on bona fides Kmt but their base and strength being south of Wall and their education having been along nationalistic lines for past decade, there is good probability they would be relatively conciliatory re Manchuria. Chang’s autonomists, adhering loosely to Communism for convenience’ sake, have for their part elements of Manchurian forces who fought and lost to Japs 1931–32. Group supports seemingly lost cause of effecting return Chang Hsueh-liang and are important chiefly because of use to which they may be put by others. New Fourth on other hand, with different background from Eighth Route, reputedly has diverged from Yenan line and come closer to Soviets in Manchuria. Present Communist representative here on field teams, Yao Nei-shih, who has already shown much intransigency, is New Fourth man. That army, like Eighth (Route Army), has some arms from Japs and trustworthy British source Shanghai told me without my yet having been able confirm it locally that New Fourth forces have been augmented by turnover to them of General Amakasu of Kwantung army with 200,000 troops. USSR supported Communists in north and east Manchuria include such figures as Li Chu-lin (recently assassinated at Harbin) and “Huang”, Kirin provincial chairman who is alleged by Chinese officials to be, as was Li, a lieutenant colonel in Soviet Army.
Generalissimo Chiang’s recent speech demonstrated that, 1, there is no Kmt–CCP agreement re Manchuria and, 2, Kmt has been lulled into false feeling strength at results American aid to date. Removal Soviet troops will be major shift in balance [of] forces. When final reconciliation Kmt and CCP is yet to be effected, and dispute over procedure in Manchuria is yet to be resolved, Soviet action brings matters [to] open issue. That action accords to Chinese desire and (latest) schedule but even as Sov[iet] withdrawals in Sinkiang [in] 1943 [in face?] of Kmt Govt, with situation too unwieldy to handle, the projected move here will confront Kmt authority with difficult problems, primary is that of logistics; without transport and moving on foot Govt. forces in 3 weeks have covered 100 miles from Mukden northwards to where they are stuck near Szupingkai. Even if Govt. forces were truly fighting only bandits, they would be facing difficulties. In fact there is probably more opposition strength in countryside than Govt. armies, limited probings have thus far uncovered. Not secondary in importance is political problem: Chiang states one local Kmt official tells him that matter is simply one of regaining sovereignty and not one of recognition of “illegal organizations”. On basis outlined by Chiang, Communists have little choice but to fight [Page 757] if they desire influence in Manchuria. Open conduct would probably show hitherto unsuspected Com[munist] strength in Manchuria.
Please repeat Chungking, Peiping, Moscow.
Dept. will of course note that Com victory or forced compromise in Manchuria would more or less vitiate Chinese charges of Sov looting and change nature negotiations for joint Sino-Sov operation economic undertakings Manchuria.
- Younger brother of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who controlled Manchuria prior to the Japanese occupation of 1931.↩