Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall

Peiping, 8 April 1946.

1629. Reur 83548.⁸² The Committee of Three has been completely deadlocked on basic Manchurian questions ever since your departure. No agreement of any kind has been reached with the exception of the March 27 Directive ordering out the teams in wording so general and vague as to be entirely meaningless for practical implementation. Although above Directive was issued 12 days ago, the Committee of Three is still unable to agree upon clarifying instructions. In the meantime our teams in Manchuria are completely immobilized insofar as effective action is concerned because of the impossibility of obtaining team agreements. We had hoped to clarify the situation for the teams by an early visit of the Committee of Three. However, the Committee is still stalled in Chungking because of inability to agree upon what instructions to give teams once it arrived on the ground.

Apparently something happened which changed the Communists’ former position favoring sending teams into Manchuria, and in Gillem’s opinion Chou has been deliberately employing delaying tactics. My own opinion is that the Communists feel prepared, by arrangement with the Russians or otherwise, to take over large parts of Manchuria upon evacuation by the Russians, and that early arrival of our teams would by freezing their troop movements limit the territory which they would be able to occupy. In any event agreement in Chungking was held up by Chou’s strong contention that the movement of Government troops within Manchuria to restore Chinese sovereignty should be limited to those locations then if evacuated by the Russians (which at the time he was making the contention would have meant only Mukden). He now contends that, as the National Government already has Armies in Manchuria, the transportation of additional troops there would be a violation of the Army reorganization agreement, which allocated the Government only 5 Armies for Manchuria. This position, evidently directed from Yenan, is being stoutly maintained by Communist representatives here, by the senior Communist representative in Mukden. Chou recently addressed a letter to Gillem⁸³ charging a change in U. S. policy as evidenced by U. S. concurrence in the movement of additional Nationalist troops beyond the 5 Armies. Similarly in a memorandum⁸⁴ last week Commissioner Yeh charged that 700 American troops had been landed at Chinwang-tao and had pushed on into Manchuria, that Americans were building an airfield northwest of Tangku from which Americans were transporting huge amounts of ammunition into Manchuria, and expressed the hope that American authorities would not continue to transport additional Central Government forces into the northeastern provinces. Further, the Communist news agency English language release, Peiping, April 3, carries the following statement: “In every settlement discussed in the 3-man committee the Government Representative and the American Representative confirmed that National troops which would enter the northeast would not be over the number of 5 Armies.” I cite these details as indicating concerted propaganda effort to place the American side in the light of a supporter of Central Government violation of the Army Reorganization Plan. Ariyoshi,⁸⁵ recently returned from Yenan, reports the Communists are now saying that America wishes to set up a Kuomintang State in Manchuria as a buffer state against Russia. Yenan broadcasts have been increasingly bitter against the Kuomintang and recently included a statement attributed to Owen Lattimore⁸⁶ headlined “U. S. Errors Lead to War”, one charging that America wished to dislodge the Russians in Manchuria so that they could take over.

The following disturbing statement was received from Byroade after a few days in Mukden:

“Circumstantial evidence leads me to believe that direct contact and coordinated strategy exist between the Communists in Manchuria and the Russians. Recognition and protection of a Russian-sponsored force in Manchuria and Communist obstructionism in prevention of⁸⁷ Manchuria virtually dominated by Russians we would thus ironically be aiding to violate our own foreign policy. I say the above knowing the full import of such statements. There is only one solution of this problem. The Communists at Yenan must be informed that they now have and are now further attempting to violate both the letter and the spirit of the basic January 10 agreements as regards Manchuria.”

He strongly concurred in opinion stated in letter to him of March 30⁸⁸ written immediately upon my return from all day conference with Gillem in Chungking that the situation demanded your immediate return from America.

Other indications of deterioration in the general situation are:

(1) The failure of the Central Executive Committee to approve all the resolutions passed by the Political Consultative Conference and the strong attacks on the PCC by the CC clique and other diehards among the Kuomintang leaders.

(2) Reported criticism of General Chou En-lai by Yenan authorities for what were considered as too great concessions by him at the time of modification of some of the PCC resolutions.

(3) The refusal of the Communists to participate in the recent People’s Political Council meetings.

(4) Sharp criticism of the Communist Party and their action in Manchuria by the Generalissimo in his speech to the PPC.

(5) Recent raid by Peiping police on Communist newspaper headquarters and the arrest of approximately 50 Communists on charges of failure to register with police authorities.

(6) The action of National Government troops in Mukden in detaining for several hours Communist personnel arriving there for duty as team members and released only after strong personal protests from Byroade.

The National Government has been unrepresented by a Commissioner at Executive Headquarters for more than 2 weeks (General Cheng departing for Chungking immediately following Tai Li’s⁸⁹ death) and the Communist Commissioner has been absent from his office here for over a week, making it virtually impossible to reach decision on any controversial problems. Both Byroade and I greatly fear that unless an agreement can soon be reached regarding Manchuria our entire operation is likely to break down.

82. Not found in Department files; apparently General Marshall had requested an appraisal of the situation referred to by Mr. Robertson in his telegram No. 1576, April 6, p. 735.
83. March 31, p. 719.
84. Not found in Department files.
85. Lt. Keiji Ariyoshi, U. S. Army language specialist detailed to the Army Observer Group at Yenan.
86. Professor at Johns Hopkins University and former political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
87. Part of sentence omitted, as follows: “National Government movements would place the Executive Headquarters in a position of aiding the establishment of a”. See telegram from General Byroade to General Gillem, April 3, p. 726, fifth paragraph.
88. Not found in Department files.
89. General Tai Li, member of the Kuomintang and National Government, in charge of secret service activities.