893.60 Manchuria/4–546
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to Colonel James C. Davis79
Dear Jim: As I told you yesterday, there are some phases of the situation discussed in 409, March 30, which trouble me.
As you know, prior to V–J Day Communist troops in China were variously estimated as between 500,000 and 800,000. Now we are told [Page 731] that there are 300,000 Communist troops in Manchuria. I cannot get away from the feeling that the major portion of the so-called Communist troops is comprised of old northeastern or Manchurian army contingents which want to get back into the picture now that the Japanese are out of the way and prevent the introduction of National Government troops largely from south China. The fact of their opposition to the National Government occupation places them in the dissident camp of the Communists.
I realize that the seriousness of the problem from the standpoint of Chinese unity is not altered even if my deductions are correct, but if they are correct I believe that a somewhat different approach to the problem might bring results. For instance if Chiang Kai-shek could see his way toward making some favorable gesture toward the old northeastern crowd without impairing the objective of unity, I have a feeling that much of what is called a Communist army in Manchuria might dissolve into thin air.
Mind you, I see serious difficulties in solving the problem in Manchuria even though a large portion of the troops there could be weaned away from the Communists because I think that what there are of bona fide Communist troops will try to concentrate in the area north of Changchun, particularly around Harbin, in an endeavor, probably with Russian support, to have political predominance in northern Manchuria. As General Marshall said yesterday, the struggle in Manchuria is primarily one for political preferment; jobs, as we would say; or rice bowls, as the Chinese would say. But I do think that an attempt to treat the northeastern group separately from the Communists might prove helpful.
With regard to reported numbers of troops, it is well to remember that the Chinese Government had around 200,000 Communists opposing them outside of Shanhaikwan last autumn and yet when the showdown came a relatively small contingent of Chinese Government troops moved forward with very little fighting. The same was true with regard to recent reports at Mukden when a reported Communist army of 300,000 put up practically no fight to keep National Government troops out of Mukden. It is an old Chinese game (or perhaps just a human game) to report an overwhelming opposition so that you have a good excuse if you lose and glory if you win. My purpose in saying this is to caution against taking too seriously Chinese Government reports on the formidable opposition they are meeting in Manchuria.
If you think it would be helpful to do so, will you please discuss this matter with General Marshall.
- General Marshall’s liaison officer in the Department of State.↩