Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.72
This message for Gillem and Robertson from Byroade: Robertson please forward his comments to Gillem.
Held long conference this afternoon with General Yao, head Communist team member, immediately after his arrival. I requested his frank views on situation so proper understanding could be reached before teams departed. His presentation and answers to my questions were illogical. He stated that, in principle, they would not prevent National Government forces from moving into and within Manchuria according to January 10 agreement. What followed however indicated quite the contrary. He stated that Generalissimo’s delay in sending teams to Manchuria, violations by National Government of cease fire agreements in Manchuria, and movement of more than 5 armies into Manchuria all combined to make the January 10 agreements not [Page 727] applicable to Manchuria. He was emphatic that the only instructions applicable to our teams were those contained in recent agreement of March 27.73 He believes teams must stop all movements of both sides. He admitted also that National Government forces could later move into area evacuated by the Russians under certain conditions. If this movement called for moving through Communist area (and in all cases it will) there must be agreement on a political basis (msg was garbled here) authorizing National Government troop movements into and with[in] Manchuria would include the 8th Route Army as they were part of the National Government forces.
Throughout this discussion I had him on completely unsound ground many times, but could not change his stand as he is obviously instructed and does not have the power of negotiation. In the end I told him categorically that unless and until further instructions were received by Executive Headquarters the Cease Fire Agreement of January 10 fully applied, that its provisions were clear, and that it must be enforced.
The statements of General Yao were not those of an uninformed team member. He had just returned from briefing on his duties as Head Communist Representative in Manchuria. It is obvious that no team agreements can be reached on any matter of importance.
Circumstantial evidence leads me to believe that direct contact and coordination [coordinated] strategy exists between the Communists in Manchuria and the Russians. Recognition and protection of a Russian-sponsored force in Manchuria and Communist obstructionism in the prevention of National Government movements would place the Executive Headquarters in a position of aiding the establishment of a Manchuria virtually dominated by Russia and we would thus ironically be aiding to violate our own foreign policy. I state the above knowing the full import of such statements.
There is only one solution to this problem. The Communists in Yenan must be informed that we now consider that they have and are now further attempting to violate both the letter and spirit of the basic January 10 agreements as regards Manchuria. I respectfully suggest that only General Marshall with position and prestige can handle this situation and recommend he be requested to return without delay due to its importance. His scheduled time of return is so near that immediate departure at this time should not cause any comment.74 This recommendation is based not only upon the comments of this message but as well upon the obvious fact that failure to arrive at a solution on Manchuria [Page 728] will put China North of the Yangtze back into its pre-January 10 condition.
Added: Am trying by phone tonight to get Nationalist team leaders from Chinchow here tomorrow, also am trying to push two teams out on Thursday but doubt if Nationalist team members will agree to accompany. I now know in strictest confidence where Communist General Lin Piao is located. Send me a C–47 tomorrow, Wednesday. I will see him Thursday. If at that time Committee of Three arrival is definitely scheduled at early date will bring him to Mukden.
Here is the question for you to consider. If Committee of Three does not have agreement on major issues before arrival here, will its visit do more harm than good? I don’t know the answers. Please consider.