Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow, May 10, 1946, 1 p.m.

Hankow, May 10, 1946, 1 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Gen. Hsu Yung-Chang
    • Col. Peter Pee
  • Communist Party:
    • Gen. Chou En-lai
    • Mr. Chang
  • United States:
    • Gen. Henry A. Byroade
    • Capt. Jack T. Young

The meeting was called to order and General Hsu made the following statement.

Gen. Hsu (NG): “With regard to point ‘a’ of the agreement, the ideal thing is to delete this altogether, because the primary job of the Committee in this area is to ascertain the facts concerning alleged concentration of Government troops in this area. If we publish something like this, issuing orders to stop fighting, that means that the Government agreed that there will be [is?] fighting and the accusation of intended annihilation may be true. In order not to jeopardize both sides, we should not publish anything. As to the Chinese translation, General Chou wants it to read ‘orders to be given to stop fighting.’ That would jeopardize the Government side.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I want to make a brief comment. I want to point out that this particular document gives no answer to the question whether there has been an attack or any contemplation of attack. What is included in this document is only a temporary measure which will be adopted to solve the emergency problem. It is not necessary for us to go into details about the plan which is alleged to be under contemplation. The press statement issued by General Ho Ying-Chin²⁶ yesterday is evidence that the Communist stand has some foundation. General Ho Ying-Chin said that the Communists are planning to move toward the East; therefore, he has disposed troops to garrison the sector and prevent any eventual movement of the Communist forces. The evidence he gave all applies to locations which are actually within the Communist area. There is no point to show that the Communists have moved out of their own area. That proves, therefore, that’ while General Li (CP) has not sent his troops outside the Communist area, the National Government forces have been sent there as garrison. No mention is made here about this incident. When we sign this agreement, we should not have this particular incident in mind as a basis.

“Regarding the fear that General Hsu may have that it may be misinterpreted in connection with the present incident, I want to point [out]that in this paper we have particularly emphasized the words ‘both parties’. That means that not one party only is made responsible, but both parties. That has been agreed upon by General Wong (NG), General Hsu’s representative at Hsuan Hwa Tien. I am concerned here only with solving the whole matter, not particularly with the present incident. As a matter of fact, this present paper has no direct bearing on that incident. For example, the field team has already reported that north of Macheng some hostilities have taken place. This shows that some hostilities exist. In connection with this, according to General Li’s (CP) report, three Communist places were occupied by Government troops. At this moment, I do not want to raise this question again. I would like to point out that, on this situation, both parties should issue such orders. I do not want to be narrow-minded about phraseology. We can use the present English text and then use the Chinese translation as General Hsu (NG) and Colonel Pee would like to suggest.”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “I would like to quote my conversation with the Generalissimo on the afternoon of the 4th of May. He asked what was General Chou’s opinion of any intended break out of General Li’s (CP) troops. I replied very frankly that General Chou was very sincere in stating that if Communist troops broke out that it would be a breach of faith. The Generalissimo said that was fine and that also it would be a breach of faith on the Government side. The Generalissimo is very sincere about keeping good faith with regard to the Agreement. It is the desire of everyone to have peace, to stop fighting. The statement on stopping hostilities may apply to some hostilities in the future. I am very cautious regarding this point and about the impression given in the press release.

Gen. Byroade: “Do I understand that the English text is agreed upon?”

Col. Pee (NG): “Yes, there is no change in the English text at all.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like to definitely determine whether this English text is agreed upon now. Is General Chou agreeable to the English text as it is now written?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Yes.”

Gen. Byroade: “As I understand it, General Hsu has agreed to the English text.”

Col. Pee (NG): “Yes, it is agreed upon.”

Gen. Byroade: “The English text is therefore agreed upon.

“Has there been an agreement reached as to the Chinese text in its entirety?”

(General Hsu and General Chou both expressed their approval of the Chinese text.)

Gen. Byroade: “It is then agreed. Are there any further comments before signing this document?”

Gen. Hsu (CP): “The intention of the three parties that have come here is to accomplish the peaceful settlement of differences. That is a fine spirit. I expect that this spirit will be enlarged to cover those other areas which have the same disputes. It is hoped that the present skirmishes and troop movements in the areas in Northern and Central China, where the cease-fire order has already been put into effect, will cease in a similar manner as in the Hankow area. Liaison officers should be exchanged in confronting areas.

“The Communists should solve the following problems in the Communist-besieged areas, along the same line as provided in the Hankow agreement, viz:

1. The supply of food stuff in the said areas.

2. The evacuation of Government sick and wounded personnel.

3. The safe conduct of the Government demobilized personnel.

4. The release of prisoners of war and political prisoners.

Gen. Chou (CP): “The views expressed by General Hsu seem acceptable to me because everyone wants to establish peace. I concur with the idea presented by General Hsu. We also have to take care of procedural matters. Regarding the solution we have reached for this particular area, there are points that are peculiar to this area. We should inform Executive Headquarters about certain matters here, and the agreement reached here. In all places where these same problems exist they should be solved in a similar manner. For example, with regard to the blockhouses, we stressed the importance of no erection of new blockhouses, because we have in mind that these Communist troops may be evacuated; but in other areas, blockhouses in general seem to be a matter of great concern to the Communist forces. We can advise the Executive Headquarters that they should follow the policy we have adopted here. General Hsu has expressed that he agrees to use that as a guide. I, myself, will be willing to go to all places, whenever conflict is reported, for example, in Nantung; but, seeing that General Hsu may not be available, maybe we should give instructions to Executive Headquarters to solve such problems in a similar vein.”

Gen. Byroade: “Copies of these minutes will be supplied the Executive Headquarters as well as the Committee of Three.

“Does General Hsu have any further comments?”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “No.”

Gen. Byroade: “Does General Chou have any further comments?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I want to further remark that, though the field teams have done very good work, I express the hope that Executive Headquarters will issue orders to field teams that they will go to the scene of conflict whenever reported so that they can solve the problems on the spot. They should follow the example of General Byroade who has taken the trouble to make the trip to Hsuan Hwa Tien.”

Gen. Byroade: “I can assure General Chou that Executive Headquarters will do all it can to insure that field teams will be active and will investigate all situations possible that are brought to their attention. I would like to suggest that the agreement be formally signed in four copies.”

(The agreement was signed by General Hsu, General Chou and General Byroade.)^*

Gen. Byroade: “I would now like to ask in what manner the press waiting downstairs should be handled.”

(It was agreed that the three members of the Committee would go down and present a Chinese copy of the Agreement to the press.)

Gen. Byroade: “I would like to express my appreciation for the courtesies extended this junior representative of the Committee of Three on this trip.

“I suggest that, since it is getting late and we have a trip ahead of us, we adjourn the meeting and go down to see the press very briefly.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I would like to thank General Byroade for all the trouble he has taken.”

Gen. Byroade: “It was a pleasure.”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “I feel that I do not deserve any thanks from General Byroade, because General Byroade is doing everything to help us.”

Gen. Byroade: “Thank you very much.”

The meeting adjourned at 1500 hours[,] 10 May 1946.

26. Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army.
27. For text of agreement see Appendix A of these minutes. [Footnote in the original; see memorandum by the Acting Committee of Three, May 10, infra.]