Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Presentation by Colonel Briggs to the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow, May 5, 1946, 4 p.m.
| The following were present: | Members of Team #9 |
| Gen. Hsu Yung-Chang (NG) | |
| Col. Pee (NG) | |
| Gen. Chou En-lai (CP) | |
| Mr. Chang (CP) | |
| Gen. Henry A. Byroade (U. S. A.) | |
| Capt. J. T. Young (U. S. A.) |
Gen. Byroade: “Gentlemen, I have asked Colonel Briggs to make us a presentation of the situation here in this area. I find after my arrival that the message I sent that we were coming has still not arrived, so he has had very little time to prepare this presentation. Colonel Briggs has been at this station since March 15 which is shortly after the last visit of the Committee of Three here. He will present the situation from that date forward.”
Col. Briggs: “Gentlemen, I will deal only with the time, as the General said, that I have been chairman of the team.
“On the 19th of March, Colonel Graves and I went to Peiping at the request of the Executive Headquarters to make a report there of the progress of the team until that date. The details of that trip are not important at the moment. We made our report and we were told to proceed, immediately upon our return, to Ying Shan where severe fighting was reported to be in progress. We were given all the information relative to the alleged conflict at that time and returned at once to Hankow. However, upon our return to Hankow, we were told that we should contact both Chinese members of the team to find out whether or not conflicts that were reported in Ho Kow Shien area were more important to be investigated than the fighting in Ying Shan. On the morning of 23 March, the team had a meeting, at which time this information was presented to them, together with what information we had on the fighting in the Ho Kow Shien area—that is, from An-Yang to Huang Pei. The team unanimously agreed that the Ying Shan area should be given top priority, so we proceeded there as originally planned and suggested by the Executive Headquarters.
“On the afternoon of the 24th of March, we left by plane from Hankow, and arrived about an hour later at Ying Shan. Shortly after we got there, the weather got so bad that travel south of Ying Shan was almost impossible—even by horseback. So we sent a message to the Communist Party leaders south of Shan Yang Tien to ask whether [Page 655] or not it was possible for them to meet us at Ying Shan. That message was sent, and they arrived on the morning of the 27th. We had an open meeting on the 27th and a team meeting on the 28th. At the meeting on the 27th all the evidence relative to the alleged violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement was taken.
“As a result of that evidence and at the team meeting on the following day, an agreement was reached by the team and signed by all members of the team and distributed to the principal commanders concerned. The agreement was substantially this, if you are not already familiar with it. That the Government troops should withdraw to a line north of but including Shan Yan Tien. The Communist Party troops should withdraw to a line south of but including Tai Ping Shen—a distance of about 20 li, and the area in between was to be a neutral zone.
“This agreement was to become effective at noon on the first of April. All movement in that area was to be completed by that time. One provision of the agreement was that the team should be notified when the movement was completed. The team received notification from both parties in due time that the movement had been completed on the first of April. On the 30th of April, we returned and drafted a radio—a team report—which we sent to Executive Headquarters, and with which you are probably all familiar.
“Realizing when we returned that the area in the vicinity of Ho Kow Shien could bear investigation, we left for that area on the 2nd of April, travelling by jeep. We arrived at 6 o’clock p.m. that day and had a meeting the following morning. General Jen Chu Ping was, I believe, the high-ranking officer there from the Communist troops. We ran into a little difficulty however. We had a disagreement, not only among the team, but among the officers we had invited to help us in gathering evidence, to such an extent that we had to discontinue the meeting that day and continue it the following morning. In spite of all efforts on the part of the team chairman, that attitude still prevailed on the following morning, but we had the meeting just the same.
“While the team is not in a position to say that a definite settlement was made at that time, we collected sufficient data that we can use in applying and clearing up Directive Number 6 as it pertains to that area.”
Gen. Byroade: “I would like to ask Colonel Briggs to explain very briefly to these gentlemen what this difficulty was.”
Col. Briggs: “The argument started over the alleged misrepresentation of facts in one of the memorandums that was presented to the team bearing on this subject, and a quarrel started within the team itself and spread to everyone else that was there, too. It seemed to be contagious. Since that time, I would like to mention the fact that our [Page 656] difficulties have been forgotten and everything has been patched up. I merely explained that to let you know why we did not reach an agreement at that time. The temper of everyone there was such that there was no possibility of reaching an amicable agreement.
“After our return from Ho Kow Shien we received approval from the Executive Headquarters authorizing the movement of 1,000 troops who were sick and wounded to An Yang. That movement was to be made by rail. We have spent the intervening period in clearing up the multitude of details necessary to make such a movement. The details are now complete. It was originally intended that this movement was to be implemented and completed in the first week of May. However, to do that we had to get additional rolling stock from the northern division of the railroad down to Hankow to augment what we have here to complete the movement in one trip. We have received a memorandum yesterday however stating that it will be impossible to complete this movement before the first of June due to the fact that both the northern and southern division of the railroad are utilizing the entire amount of rolling stock they have in the program of repatriating the Japanese.
“Last Wednesday night, the first of May, about 10:30 o’clock, we were informed by the Communist Party member of the Peace Team that there was a concentration of National Government troops in the Macheng–Shen–An Yang area. The Communist Party member had none of this information in writing other than the notes he had taken over the radio, which were in Chinese. I asked him to translate them the first thing in the morning and I further asked the National Government member to get all the information he could on this alleged movement. It was not until the afternoon of the following day that we received a radio stating substantially the same information from our own Headquarters in Peiping.
“We had a long meeting yesterday morning based on this information, and it was the intention of the American member to take a small group and go into that area the first thing this coming week based on the information we had at the moment. I realized of course that it would take 3 days travel to get up into this area south of Hsuan Hwa Tien and north of Macheng.
“This brings my report up to date. During all this time, it has been the constant thought of the chairman of the team to be as impartial and fair as he possibly could be. If the team has had any success, it is due to the cooperation I have received from both representatives of the team and their staff officers.”
Gen. Byroade: “I would like to ask General Hsu if he has any questions or comments on the presentations.”
Gen. Hsu (NG): “I want to know when the Communists brought up the question about the alleged movement of National Government [Page 657] troops in this area. What was the reaction of the National Government team member?”
Col. Briggs: “He was very much surprised. He knew nothing at all about it.”
Gen. Chou (CP): “I want to express my thanks for this report. I would like first to have some time to make a study of the situation here, and also to receive reports about the present circumstances as well as the outstanding problems which have not yet been resolved. I hope I will first have time to discuss it with my own people so that I can get a preliminary understanding of the situation and then have a discussion.”
Gen. Byroade: “I remember that when the Committee of Three was here in March they were all gratified as to the working relationship of the members of this team. I have been here about 3 or 4 hours, and I feel that that relation still exists. I believe that we have already agreed to re-convene this evening at 6:30. I would like to ask General Hsu and General Chou if they would want the team present or prefer to have the team stand by in another room or not to have the team at all.”
Gen. Chou (CP): “We should follow the usual procedure. We will have the team and General Ho in readiness.”
Gen. Byroade: “I will see that you are notified of the meeting place. I think this is the dining room. I will check up.”
Gen. Chou (CP): “How about meeting in your own room at 6:00 o’clock?”
Gen. Byroade: “I would be delighted to have you. Are we adjourned?”