Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

200300Z. Recent writing of agreement regarding entry of field teams is as follows:

“Field teams, with carefully selected personnel, will be sent into Manchuria immediately under the following instructions.

The teams will carry out their mission in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Headquarters.
The teams should be established within the areas of the Government troops as well as the Communist troops, keeping clear of places still under Russian occupation.
Teams should proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and Communist troops to bring about a cessation of fighting and to make the necessary readjustments.
While reestablishing Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria the Government is authorized to move troops into localities now being evacuated by the Soviet troops, via: The railway line between Mukden and Changchun, with a strip of 30 miles on both sides of that railway section.
If it becomes necessary for the Government troops to occupy those localities now held by Communist troops, it should be effected through [Page 585] discussion among the field teams and if an agreement cannot be reached, it will be settled by higher authority.
The future disposition in Manchuria of all armies will be fixed according to the reorganization.
The Government assures that it will immediately discuss the political matters pertaining to Manchuria with the Chinese Communist Party in line with the decisions of the Political Consultative Council. As an interim measure the Government will maintain the present status of the popularly-elected local governments without any obstruction or interference, pending settlement of the political matters.”

Difficulty hinges on word “now” in instruction 4. As written this instruction permits Communist forces to move into places not now being but later possible to be evacuated such as Harbin. Hence we are again in heated debate and deadlock. In connection with this point and with the rest of the instructions, I have impressed upon Chou the fact that political and economic problems that are envisaged by the Communists can be settled later. Chou counters with the statement that he has referred the matter to Yenan, and cannot assume responsibility of deleting the word “now”. On Monday night after an 11 p.m. conference, Chou and Chang promised they would work out the problem and give me this decision on Thursday. I feel quite optimistically that their decision will be acceptable all the way around. The first team in will go to Mukden immediately after decision is reached.

I flew to Nanking Tuesday morning for conference with Theater Headquarters, Peiping Headquarters Group, Shanghai Port Command and Nanking Liaison Group pertaining to over-all personnel problems after Theater inactivation. I shall return to Chungking Thursday evening.

With reference to your 80978, I have talked over with Byroade my visit to Mukden. We both agree that it would be unwise and nonproductive to go in before the teams get in since the presence of teams on the ground is necessary in order to locate commanders and to make necessary arrangements for contacting the mob Anders [commanders?]. We feel strongly also that the Committee of Three would lose prestige by such a move not only because of possible non-productiveness but because the arrival of the Committee of 3 would in effect appear as though that Committee had arrived to do the work of a lesser agency. Subsequent corrective efforts on the part of both Executive Headquarters and the Committee of 3 probably would suffer thereby. I likewise recommend not going in without a national representative for both Chang and Chou have expressed desire to accompany [Page 586] me but neither wishes to precede field teams. I therefore recommend that you reconsider my going in ahead of the teams.