Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting at Hsuchow, March 2, 1946
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “General Marshall, distinguished guests, on behalf of the Hsuchow Field Team we wish to welcome all the distinguished guests to Hsuchow and I hope your stay here will be enjoyable. I will spend no more time on thoughts of welcome.
“Going to the railroad problem, this line (East section of Lunghai) is in repair and operating and this line is in repair and operating. From Hsuchow to this point, the railroad is in repair. That is a distance of about 20 miles. At this point there is a blockade across the railroad guarded by Communist sentinels. From this point to the Grand Canal, intermittent breaks amount in all to about 2 miles.”
Gen. Byroade: “What does that blockhouse consist of?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “The blockhouse consists of a little sand heap, and the other, a sand bag blockade with two or three sentinels. Since you mentioned that, I will say that I visited that about three or four days ago. I asked the officer in charge of that place why the obstacles [Page 474] had not been removed and he said he had not received the orders from higher headquarters. He said he knew about the order to repair the railroads however. I personally presented those orders to General Chen Yiat Lin Yi on the 13th of February. As I say, this road is not in a bad state of repair. There are about two kilometers to two miles intermittently, but traffic cannot go over it. The bridge over the Grand Canal is in.
“From the Grand Canal to Pai Tu Pu the railroad has been repaired and the Communist Party running trains and having a passenger service over that portion. From Pai Tu Pu for about three kilometers there is a break and then in here it is about a 50-yard break which occurred according to reports, about the 9th or 10th of February. From this point to the Coast the railroad is in operation.”
Gen. Byroade: “Who operates that section?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “It is under the Railroad Administration. This information was obtained as we flew over this railroad and we have been down the railroad in scooter cars and we even had a hand car and pumped part of the way down to the breaks. The latest information we have, the Chief Engineer of the Hsuchow railroad area sent a junior engineer, who walked all the way to Haichow and has given a very detailed report. The chief engineer estimates that if the way is clear, this railroad can be put into shape in the next couple of weeks. The situation on the Tsin-Pu railroad is not as good as it is on the other one. The bridge over the Grand Canal near Hanchuan has been out.
“The National Government troops have been along the south bank and the Communist Party troops on the north bank. However, after several personal visits there and visits by the field team, the railroad has been permitted to work on that bridge—for some reason though, only in the day time.
“No repair work has been permitted north of there. From this point to this point here, a distance of about 20 kilometers the railroad is about half gone. The roadbed has been cut up, about half the track has been taken away, and most of the sleepers. From this point to Lincheng, the track is in existence and could be operated.
“From this point to the next town up here, it is a distance of about 60 kilometers. The Chief Engineer reports in that distance, there are 900 rails left. The roadbed has been cut up, dug up, and there are no sleepers. From this section on up, the situation is even worse. He estimates that a minimum of two or three months to get that section in repair. The other railroads that we are interested in are what I call the ‘coal mine railroads’.
“I can dismiss this section here with the simple statement that it does not exist any more. The rails have been removed, the sleepers [Page 475] have been removed, and the roadbed has either been dug up or leveled off. This section can be repaired.
“For about 5 kilometers out of Lincheng, the road is in existence. To about this point, there are rails alongside, sleepers and the roadbed is in a fair state of repair about halfway. From this point to Tsaochuang there isn’t much left of the railroad. For some reason, along the railroad, they would cut down about 3 or 4 feet out of the road and this has happened along here to a great degree. I asked the military reason for it, and they said that they had armored cars and that would prevent armored cars from running over that section.
“As I mentioned before, this section of line which goes to Nanking is in daily operation and heavily guarded and this section here is also going in operation. Before I go into the problem of the coal mine, are there any comments or questions?”
Gen. Marshall: “That northern strip you said that nothing is being done about to repair that end. Are they permitted to do it?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “I’ll answer it this way. I presented passes for railroad workers and also a memorandum which I prepared to troop commanders along these areas not to interfere with railroad workers, and I was not able to get a unanimous agreement of the team.”
Gen. Marshall: “What was the objection?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “The Communist member would not sign the passes and memorandum because he stated that there were National Government blockhouses and fortifications along the south portion of the Tientsin–Pukow railroad. He stated that the fortifications along here divided the two portions of his liberation areas and that the people from over here could not communicate with these people over here.”
Gen. Marshall: “Did you report that to the Commissioners?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “Yes, Sir.”
Gen. Marshall: “What was their reply?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “The answer was to follow Directive 4–A.64 The Railroad Control Section said that the Communist member would issue the passes and that the National Government would cease building fortifications and would destroy such fortifications along the lines.”
Gen. Marshall: “What was the result of that?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “I just got that yesterday, Sir.”
Gen. Marshall: “As I understand it, meanwhile, there is no repair work going on the north.”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “There is repair work at the bridge. I asked the Communist Commander in this side what he would do if the railroad [Page 476] sent repairmen to start working on this section. He said that he would prevent any work. As I see it, I got that radio yesterday and I asked the Communist member this morning if he would sign those passes and memorandum, and he said he would consider it.”
Gen. Marshall: “Was there any statement made that he would not consider the instructions of Executive Headquarters as authoritative?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “He made no such statement, but he did not sign the passes.
“Are there any other comments or questions on the railroads?”
Gen. Chou En-Lai: “The Executive Headquarters has also issued directives to destroy all the blockhouses along lines of communications. Has the Central Government representative in your unit been able to carry out his instructions?”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “As I say, I just got that radio yesterday, and I referred it to the National Government member yesterday and so far he has made no comment one way or the other on the fortifications. There has been a question on those fortifications, whether it meant fortifications along lines to be repaired or fortifications along lines that had been operating even before the cease-fire. That question has not been settled. My interpretation, of course, is that it means all fortifications. However, I would consider that the primary consideration was to get the railroads that were broken repaired.”
Mr. Robertson: “Why was that directive subject to interpretation? It said that all fortifications along lines of communications would be removed.”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “I can’t answer that question. As I said, my interpretation meant fortifications along all lines.”
Col. Ely: “In connection with the second paragraph of that directive number 4–A, it states very clearly that all fortifications on and along lines of communications which interfere with communications will be destroyed. The question is on the word ‘interfere.’ One side maintains that only fortifications physically obstructing the track must be destroyed. The other side claims that any blockhouse or fortification that commands a line of communication by fire interferes with communications and should be destroyed.”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “That has been the difficulty as Colonel Ely mentioned. The one side said that if it does not impede the running of trains, although there are blockhouses along railways, that does not come under paragraph 2. The Communist member says that fortifications along here are a threat to peace since his people cannot communicate with each other. If we could have a clear decision on that, it would clarify the situation as far as this team is concerned.”
Gen. Byroade: “What is meant by the expression, ‘to communicate [Page 477] with each other’? Does that mean the passage of troops or individuals?”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “Inasmuch as all troops are supposed to be frozen in place, it is assumed that it means staff officers to come from one place to their Headquarters. One of the objections to that is that the troops in this area are generally armed civilians and carry their weapons under their gowns and any great number of them coming across could not be noticed.
“Does that answer your question? Are there any other comments or questions about railroads?”
Gen. Marshall: “Go ahead.”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “Our other sore point is the coal mine at Tsao Chuang. I have this chart here. We have three main pits—the south, north and the east mine. These are the main mines in the area. There are about seven smaller mines, four of which are shown on this map. This is what we might call the main mine and contains all the works—the electric plant, mechanical plant, and the power plant. This is held by the Government troops. The Government troops are commanded by General Wang Gong who is vice-commander of the 97th Army. His troops are composed of Government troops, militia, and troops formerly under the command of General Wang Shu Ma. The Communist Party members claim that Wang Shu Ma is a former puppet who was stationed at a little town out here[,] did much destruction and caused much unhappiness in the area. In this area are those troops plus about 30,000 civilians. We surveyed this area and 30,000 was my estimate. The Government estimated 50,000 and the Communist estimate is over 20,000. There are also Government troops in the flour mill in this location here.”
Gen. Byroade: “Will you give us an indication of the scale of that map please? How large is the yellow area?”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “I think that is about a mile across there.”
Col. Ely: “General Sung, Plans and Operations Officer of the Communist Branch at Executive Headquarters states that that is one and one-half li across there.”
Col. Harris, D. Q.: “It is more than that. It takes about 10 or 15 minutes to walk the length of it. This is the east mine here which is occupied by Communist troops. The north mine is also occupied by Communist troops. Along this line here, Communist troops and National Government troops are facing each other at not more than 200 feet. Underground the National Government reports that it is held by National Government troops. The Communist representative states there are no troops there. In our next investigation we will determine the truth of this. The National Government reports [Page 478] that the people in this inclosure are very short of food, water, and medical supplies. They have asked to obtain a permit to send food, water and medical supplies to this encircled garrison. The Communist representative has countered with the proposal to permit certain parties go out and buy food in the vicinity. He states that the feeling is so high against the puppet troops that food cannot be brought in without being seized by the local population. That question has been discussed for some days and has not been settled.
“The other question with the mine is saving the north mine and therefore saving the whole mine. The pit in the north mine is deeper than the pits in the other two mines and the north mine has started to flood. If the north mine is allowed to flood, the level will come up and will overflow in the south and east mines. The water pump in the north mine is under water and cannot pump the water out itself. The Government troops and the mine officials in this area do not wish to turn on the power to operate the hoist in the north mine. This hoist could be used to get out the water. The reason for that is, if the hoist is put into operation, the Communist troops could get into the lower level and come up into the south mine. The Government member proposed that temporarily the Communist troops evacuate these mines to permit the removal of water from the north mine. The Communist member said he saw no reason to remove his troops. The Government member then proposed that the Communist member stay in place and promise not to go down into the pits. The Communist member would not make this promise since they occupied it above ground and they had the right to go below the ground. I made a mention that the proposal, since this is a city with both troops within the city, to evacuate the troops from 60 li was presented. Any troops in the area include troops within 5 or 6 li of this area could not be removed since they were not encircling troops. This is a very dangerous situation, first, because of the number of people inclosed in this area without proper food, and second, because of great danger of ruining this mine, which is one of the largest in China. Third, because of the close proximity of the troops.
“Before I go on, are there any comments of [or?] questions on the mine situation?
“This information I have given has been obtained by personal visits by airplane to these various places, conferring with General Chen Yi at least 3 or 4 times, the field team has visited the places and conferred with the local commanders. We have flown over various sections of the railroad and we have driven by jeep through here and we have been by rail and motor car along these various railroads. We are in close touch with the Railroad Administration Headquarters in Hsuchow.
[Page 479]“That is all I have, Sir.”
Gen. Marshall: “Is there any righting going on now?”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “The only fighting I have any reports of are along the Yangtze River. The Communist reported small scale fighting down there with the Nationalist Troops on the offensive and the National Government countered with reports of Communist offensive. I have not investigated down there because of the distance and lack of transportation, but my observation is that before the cease-fire, this section was seized by the National Government troops. Any action that might be going on there is to get choice villages. When I first came here there was a report from National Government sources of a large scale attack on Haichow. The Communist forces repudiated any attacks on this area and there were no more reports of attack. The town of Pikeapu was taken on January 20 by Communist troops.
“I might mention that this portion of the railroad was occupied by Communists after the cease-fire order. The Communist troops who stated that they were in this general vicinity and that they were attacked by puppet troops and Japanese troops. They stated that they drove them out and occupied this railroad. Since that time about 150 unarmed Japanese have come down and were taken over by the National Government troops at Haichow. I have not investigated the fighting along the River because of the reports [they] were small scale skirmishes of 20 or 30 people. I found out when I investigated the fights, you could see nothing because they generally come up at night and then the people disappear.
“Are there any other comments?”
Col. Ely: “Colonel Harris, did you ever get any directive from Executive Headquarters concerning the withdrawal of the lines or the food to the National Government garrison in Tsao Chuang?”
Col. Harris, D. Q: “We got such a directive65 and that has been called to the attention of the Chinese members of the field team. So far as the withdrawal of the troops, we have been working at that and attempting to get a solution. Unfortunately, both sides seem to pay more attention to present military advantage than the solution of the problem. So far as the food, the National Government proposed to send food to Lincheng. I might add that, although this road is in Communist hands, that passage of food is permitted from here to the garrison encircled. In spite of the Directive, the Communist member would not permit free passage of food from Lincheng to Tsao Chuang. His contention was that because of the feeling of the population in this area, the trucks would be seized and the food [Page 480] stuffs taken away. Various methods of guarding such truck convoys were proposed; guarding them with Communist troops; guarding with 50 percent Communist and 50 percent National troops, or guarding them with all National troops were all proposed. Food has still not been permitted to be carried to the garrison. I might also add that the radio of the National Government troops at Tsao Chuang has been out of operation for about the last week. We have no up-to-the-minute information on the situation. The Communist member has consented to send a radio to Lin Yi and ask for information from the Nationalist troops so this Headquarters can get the information.
“Compliance with Special Directives Number 1 and 2, the National Government has a liaison officer ready to send to Tsao Chuang. So far, we have not been able to get safe conduct for that liaison officer. When the field team makes a visit there in the near future, we will take him along with us.
“Are there any more comments?”
Gen. Marshall: “I would suggest that, if it is agreeable to General Chang and General Chou that before dinner they have an opportunity to talk with their people here, and then the Committee of Three have a meeting.
“Then we will adjourn.”