Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Meeting at Chining (Tsining), March 1, 1946
Col. Craig: “This is the present situation.
“Fighting, except for small corn raids, has been stopped since January 18.
“Restoration of the rail lines within the Communist area up to the breaks, but not including the breaks, is going forward. The means available are very limited.
“No steps have been taken to restore any other form of communication.
“Repatriation is not a problem in this area. There are no Japs.
“Liaison ordered has been accomplished, but no additional liaison beyond that directed has been had.
“The team arrived January 18 and held a meeting that day. Other meetings were held on the 20th and 21st. These were largely devoted to hearing the Communist story. The Communists then and now maintain that the cessation of hostilities order has not been faithfully observed by the Nationalists. On January 25, the team visited Kuei Sui and met to hear the Nationalist story.
“Alleged by the Communists and verified by the Nationalist Chief of Staff 12th War Area was the fact that a general nationalist offensive had taken place commencing on January 11. This ran through January 14 in several cases and continued as a defensive at Chi’Ning until the 18th.
“The Communists charged the Nationalists with failing to observe [Page 465] the ‘immediately,’ part of the cessation of hostilities order and electing to take advantage of the ‘2400 hours January 13’ clause.
“The Nationalist position is that the 2400 hours on the 13th is the effective part. They claimed difficulties in communication as being responsible for some troops continuing the offensive through the 14th.
“The city of Ho Lin Ko Erh was captured by the Nationalists on the 12th and Tao Lin on the 13th. These two places the Communists consider to be unjustly in the hands of the Nationalists.
“The Nationalists claimed to have entered the city of Chi’Ning before dark on the 13th. This is stoutly denied by the Communists. The American member does not consider evidence of the townspeople trustworthy as long as the city is garrisoned by Communist or other troops.
“After the meeting in Kuei Sui, and with facts as sketched briefly above, the Nationalist and American team members thought that both sides should be required to withdraw from Chi’Ning and the Nationalists from Tao Lin. This was under the terms of Directive HO–2. The Communist member would not agree and would not sign a directive to this effect drawn up by the other members. Nothing was done and nothing was changed.
“Subsequently the team was advised that any action had to be unanimous. The whole matter was laid before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 13, the team proceeding to Peiping for this purpose.
“At Kuei Sui on the 25th, both sides had agreed to exchange liaison locally. At a meeting in Chi’Ning on February 5, the restoration of communications as directed by HO–2 was discussed. At this time, the Communist member was not prepared to discuss this subject in detail because the principles of restoration had not been announced. He stated that he feared Nationalist attacks along restored roads and railways. He agreed to ascertain the amount of rail, telephone and telegraph equipment available in Communist hands. This was done subsequently and the data forwarded to Peiping.
“On February 12, Special Directive Number 1 and 261 were received by radio. Liaison at two specific places, one of which subsequently proved to be not in Communist area, was directed. This was shortly accomplished at Ta’Tung, the one place we were responsible for.
“On February 12, Team Six passed through here enroute to Kuei Sui to investigate Nationalist charges that large, dangerous Communist concentrations were being built up in that vicinity. The Communist member here denied this and Team Six verified this later, [Page 466] I believe. Team Six had been placed under this team except for the accomplishment of its primary mission.
“By February 12, General Directive 4–A62 had been received. A meeting was held with the Nationalist member absent sick. The American member considered this directive to be sufficient enunciation of the principles governing the restoration of communications. The Communist member did not consider that it was sufficiently explicit as to details of payment, control, etc.
“On February 15 the team received a report from Team Six to the effect that Communists had been destroying the railroad west of Fu Shen Chuan. The Communist member said that this had been so before the cessation of hostilities order had been received. This information was forwarded to Team Six.
“On February 17 the team received allegations of Nationalist raids and attacks from General Yao Chi, Communist commander of the Sui Yuan–Mongolia area. Two additional like allegations have been received since. These raids and attacks are all alleged to have occurred since the cessation of hostilities. The first two such accusations were sent to Team Six for Nationalist comment or rebuttal. To date no reply has been received.
“Team Six has been withdrawn due to urgent necessity elsewhere. On the 25th of February, Team Six radioed that no railway destruction had occurred since February 13. Inquiry as to the correctness of the date was at once radioed to them as the effective date of the cessation of hostilities order was January 13 and the Communist member had previously asserted that destruction ceased with the cessation of hostilities. To date no reply has been received.
“Both sides have recently been urged to establish interim postal service of some sort, to the west with Kuei Sui and to the south with Ta’Tung. The Nationalist member refuses unless all mail is handled by National Government personnel under the Ministry of Communications. The Communist member is willing to exchange mail pouches at the points of contact but is unwilling to permit the entry of central government postal personnel until higher headquarters so directs.
“Both sides remain definitely suspicious of the other. This is improving slowly.
“Neither side will compromise in the least degree, and this has been carried to the point where team members will not agree to refer an issue to Executive Headquarters as team measures if proposed by the other side.
“This team meets, holds its temper, and talks amicably, but is unable to take action. Personal relationships remain of a high order.
[Page 467]“I will be glad to answer such questions as I am able.”
Gen. Marshall: “I have no questions.”
Gen. Chang Chih Chung: “If there is any issue that cannot be settled here, it should be forwarded to Executive Headquarters and the members of the team, both Nationalist and Communist, should observe and carry out the directives and issues sent to you from the Headquarters.
“In the event that you have any difficulty in reaching agreements here in the implementation of the Directives from Executive Headquarters, you should use your judgment and report issues as you see them here to the Executive Headquarters.”
Gen. Chou En-Lai: “I have two points to bring out to you for the benefit of the team. First, you must have a clear understanding as to the interpretation of the Directives sent to you from the Executive Headquarters. You should make a thorough study, and secondly, you must carry them out effectively and immediately. Second, if you see the necessity of establishing mutual confidence between the members of your field team. The cessation of hostilities has been carried out by both sides and the developing of mutual confidence between the Central Government and the Communist members in your team is very essential, particularly in view of the fact that pretty soon we will have another work added to our team; that is, the reorganization of the Chinese army. That spirit of mutual confidence should also be extended to the local army commanders as well. If we can observe those two points, then I see that your work in the future will be very smooth. I have full confidence in your future work here and that you will be able to carry it out very successfully and very smoothly. What has been done in the past may be difficult to settle, but for your future work, if you have any difficulties, you should report immediately to Executive Headquarters.”
Gen. Marshall: “That is a personal report to the Commissioners, and not to the American officers.
“I am very much gratified to hear the comments of General Chang and General Chou En-Lai to these various ways to agree. I imagine that, after what they have said, that they will have time to talk to their own people, that a great deal of the difficulty will be washed away.
“I think the important thing here is that we are not interested in the past now, but we are interested in the future, and until conditions have been restored to normal, personal feelings will have to be buried. The general objective we are working for is far too great and far too important to be stopped by small disagreements, no matter how large they appear on the ground.
[Page 468]“I trust very much the Commissioners who have heard this meeting and have heard General Chang Chih Chung and General Chou En-Lai will wipe out among themselves these small issues and get down to larger business. If we are going to do something for the good of China, we cannot stop with small items in the field.
“I suggest to General Byroade that we find an opportunity here for these gentlemen to confer with their own people.”
Gen. Byroade: “For safety’s sake, we have to take off in about 15 minutes.”