Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to General Marshall

As instructed by you I conferred with General Chou En-lai this date and showed him a copy of 17, a message from Mr. Robertson and Col. Byroade which indicated that there seemed to be some reluctance, and lack of cooperation, on the part of General Yeh in the Executive Headquarters.

Before handing the message to General Chou En-lai for his perusal I stated that you did not propose to take this matter up with the National Government; that at this point it was for General Chou En-lai’s information only. After General Chou En-lai read Dove 17 he stated that the Communist personnel was short because their people had to be gathered from so many different areas and that he hoped that Col. Byroade could make appropriate arrangements to get these people to Peiping.

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With reference to a team at Kalgan, General Chou En-lai stated that possibly there was a misunderstanding in General Yeh’s mind after his departure from Chungking. General Chou En-lai said that General Yeh left with the understanding that one team (later he stated “one group”) would go to Jehol and Chahar as agreed to by the Committee of Three. General Chou En-lai stated that General Yeh’s reluctance to send a team to Kalgan (Chahar) was probably due to the fact that a team was already set up for Chihfeng (Jehol). A discussion ensued during which General Chou En-lai differentiated between a “team” and a “group” wherein he stated that a team was to report to specific areas for the immediate purpose of causing hostilities to cease, whereas a group, as agreed to by the Committee of Three for Chahar and Jehol, was to study overall conditions in broader areas, including opening of railways and repatriation of Japanese. He stated that he would forward a radio to General Yeh through U. S. Army facilities to this effect in the hope that it would obviate subsequent misunderstandings. I stated that I saw no objection to informing General Yeh of this differentiation providing that the basic principles were also established whereby specific teams would report to critical areas regardless of the number of teams required or their destinations. General Chou En-lai saw no objection to this providing the Communists had the privilege of designating critical areas to which teams would report if agreed by the commissioners.

New Subject: I showed General Chou En-lai the Generalissimo’s letter dated 16 January 194689 which suggested that you be requested to serve as advisor on the Military Sub-Committee. General Chou En-lai, after reading the memorandum in Chinese, nodded and said, “That is fine.” He then, reading the memorandum in Chinese, said, “This will make us come to agreement.”90

New Subject: I then asked General Chou En-lai when he would be ready to approve the minutes of the Conference of Three. He stated, “Two days.”

J. H[art] C[aughey]
  1. Ante, p. 191.
  2. General Chou did not communicate formally with General Marshall on this matter until January 23 (see telegram No. 98, January 23, p. 193); for further correspondence on the subject of military reorganization, see pp. 177 ff.