Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.00/1–1846

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Sprouse)⁸⁵

January 16, 1946, 4 p.m.

Meeting of Executive Headquarters Wednesday, January 16, 1946, 4 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • Central Government:
    • Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
    • Lt. Gen. Tsai Wen-chih
    • Col. Tang Yen-sheng
  • Communist Party:
    • Gen. Yeh Chien-ying
    • Hwang Hwa
    • Li Ke-nung, Secretary General of the Communist Hq.
  • American:
    • Walter S. Robertson
    • Col. Henry A. Byroade
    • Col. E. B. Ely, G–3, Operations Section
    • Col. L. W. Haskell, Chief of Staff
    • Philip D. Sprouse
    • Capt. Jack Young

The meeting was originally scheduled for 2:00 p.m., but was postponed until 4:00 p.m. at the request of Gen. Yeh (CP), who stated that he needed more time to study the problems to be discussed.

Mr. Robertson opened the meeting and stated that the first question on the agenda was a matter of great urgency—the dispatching of three teams to the field on the morning of January 17. Col. Byroade had reported that all operational plans were completed for the flights, and Mr. Robertson wished to know whether Gen. Cheng (CG) and Gen. Yeh (CP) would have their representatives ready to take off at 10 a.m.

Col. Byroade said that he understood the points to be visited were Chihfeng, Kalgan and Tsinan. The representatives should leave the city at 9 a.m., in order to be at the field for the 10 o’clock take-off. Information had now been received that the plane could land at Chihfeng.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether there was any likelihood of a repetition of the previous incident at Chihfeng. (He referred to the internment of the first plane by the Russian forces.)

Col. Byroade said he would like to get the opinion of the Commissioners on that. The plane to be sent on the 17th would carry both Central Government and Communist representatives, and it seemed to him that would take care of the situation. Gen. Yeh asked whether the first plane had returned. Col. Byroade said it was still on the ground at Chihfeng. There was nobody aboard except an American pilot, who had no identification or orders to land there. It seemed to him that, since the leaflets had already been dropped, and since the next plane would carry the representatives of both parties, there would be no danger of the Russians’ interning the plane.

Col. Ely said that the Russians had given assurances that they would not intern it. When the second plane had flown over Chihfeng on the 16th, the Russians tried to wave it in, because they were expecting the delegates’ plane and thought that was it. The pilot of the first plane had reported that the Russians had no objection to the delegates’ coming.

Col. Byroade said that, since so much time had already been lost, he would like to suggest that the proposed stop at Chinchow on the way to Chihfeng be eliminated. Gen. Cheng (CG) said that he had no definite opinion to express on this; it seemed to him that, since leaflets had already been dropped, it might not be necessary to stop at Chinchow. Col. Byroade said that by eliminating this stop they could make sure that the pilot would arrive at Chihfeng on the 17th.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether the plane sent to Kalgan to pick up Communist personnel had reached its destination or not. Col. Ely replied that it had reached Kalgan and was expected back on the 16th, but he did not believe it was in yet. Gen. Yeh said that whether the teams left on the 17th or not depended on the arrival of the plane from Kalgan. Col. Byroade asked whether both sides agreed that, if the plane arrived from Kalgan, the three teams could go out on the 17th. Gen. Yeh replied that much depended on the number of people on the Kalgan plane. If the delegate selected for Chihfeng arrived, the team could go to Chihfeng, and the same with the other places. There was also the question as to whether the delegate would bring with him a radio set for Chihfeng; however, if he did not, the Communist Army set could be used in Chihfeng. He added that, since contact had been established with the Communists in Kalgan and the respective commanding officers at Chihfeng, he felt that it would be worth the few hours’ delay for the plane to stop at Chinchow to contact the Central Government troops there.

Mr. Robertson said that at a previous meeting Gen. Yeh had agreed to send a temporary representative from Peiping with the team for Chihfeng, with the expectation of exchanging him there for a member of the forces on the ground. Could he not still do this, so that the team could go on out on the 17th, whether the plane from Kalgan arrived or not? Col. Byroade concurred in this suggestion. Gen. Yeh said that there must have been a misunderstanding. He had never said that he would send a representative to Chihfeng whether or not the plane came from Kalgan. Mr. Hwang (CP) said that the man they had thought of as a “temporary” representative was one of those now in Kalgan. Gen. Yeh added that what he had said about Chihfeng previously was based on his understanding that additional Communist personnel was arriving immediately; when the people he had in mind came, they turned out to be technicians.

Gen. Yeh went on to say that, while he did not insist on the stop at Chinchow, he knew from experience that the only way to be certain of stopping fighting was to get orders from the commanders involved. If the stop could be made at Chinchow, the success of the mission would be assured. Col. Byroade said that he thought it was already agreed that this stop should be made. All concurred. Asked how long it would take for the plane to get to Chihfeng if a two-hour stop were made in Chinchow, Col. Ely replied that a C–46 could do it in something short of five hours, including the stop.

At this point Col. Byroade telephoned the air-field and reported that the plane from Kalgan had arrived five minutes before, with 16 or 17 Communists aboard. At this news, Gen. Yeh and Gen. Cheng agreed that they would have their representatives ready for a 10 o’clock take-off on the 17th for Chihfeng, with a stop at Chinchow.

There was some discussion of the proposed mission to Kalgan. Gen. Yeh (CP) asked that further discussion of other places be postponed for two hours, until he could find out which Communists were on the Kalgan plane. Col. Byroade said that he would get one of the newly arrived Communists on the telephone, so that Gen. Yeh could talk with him and get the necessary information. Capt. Young telephoned, and reported that the Communists had left the field and were on their way to town.

Mr. Robertson explained that he felt the dispatching of the teams to be a matter of the greatest urgency. It was the only thing the Executive Headquarters could do towards stopping the fighting, and they would be falling down on their job if there were any further delay. All he and Col. Byroade wanted at present was an agreement that the three teams should go out tomorrow; the representatives would have all night, if they needed it, to choose and brief their personnel.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that he fully agreed on the importance of getting the teams out immediately. However, he had just received his first reports from zones of conflict and desired an opportunity to read them. Hitherto all reports received had been from National Government sources; it might be that the Communist reports might reveal some situations which were more urgent than existed in the areas for which teams had been proposed. Col. Byroade said that, if so, more teams could be sent; it would be possible to get out only three teams on the 17th, but others could be sent the following day.

Gen. Yeh (CP) and Gen. Cheng (CG) discussed the situation around Tsinan and Shuchow. It was suggested that it might be preferable to send a team to Shuchow instead of Tsinan. Gen. Yeh felt that the sending of a team to Kalgan would not have much effect, because the fighting was some distance away. Gen. Tsai (CG) maintained that a team should be sent to Kalgan. Gen. Yeh (CP) suggested that the first three teams be sent to Chihfeng, Tsinan and Chining, leaving out Kalgan. After considerable discussion, all agreed.

Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether, in the event the Communists had insufficient personnel to send representatives with all the teams, it would be satisfactory for the teams to leave Peiping without Communist representatives; a Communist representative for each team could then be selected from Communist forces on the ground. Mr. Robertson said he had no objection, if the Central Government representatives agreed. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that such a plan might create difficulties, because a team arriving without a Communist representative in the plane would have trouble contacting the Communist forces. Gen. Cheng (CG) said it would be much better to send an impartial representative from Headquarters than to select somebody who had been engaged in the actual fighting in the area. Mr. Robertson agreed with Gen. Cheng. Gen. Yeh concurred.

Mr. Hwang (CP) said that he wished to make a statement on behalf of General Yeh. The General felt that, when the teams went out, equal facilities should be given to all parties. The Communists were handicapped because their facilities were limited. At Chihfeng, for example, they would not have their own radio equipment. The members of each team would wish to report back to their respective superiors, particularly in case of disagreement. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that there should be no cause for disagreement, but that, in any case, the Communists could use Central Government radio facilities, using their own code. Col. Byroade said that it would not be possible for anybody to take in radio equipment on the 17th; it would have to follow in another plane the next day. Mr. Robertson said that the Communists could use American equipment, with their own code, if they so desired. Mr. Hwang said that General Yeh had no desire to create difficulties for Gen. Tsai or Col. Byroade; they felt that they were always having to ask for some sort of assistance. He had brought this question up simply because it was an actual problem and had to be considered on a realistic basis. It was possible that some argument might arise among the representatives in the field and they would feel it necessary to ask for a decision on a higher level. In that case, the group which had no radio facilities would be at a disadvantage. Gen. Tsai (CG) repeated that there should be no reason for argument; all were agreed on the function of the teams—to stop the conflicts. But the Central Government representatives would be glad for the Communists to use their radio. Gen. Yeh (CP) said that, in that case, the problem was solved.

Col. Byroade said that it was agreed between Governor Chang Chun and Gen. Chou En-lai in Chungking that it was important to get a team into Kalgan. Would the Commissioners agree that a team should be sent to Kalgan on the 18th? Gen. Tsai (CG) agreed. Gen. Yeh (CP) said he would like to discuss this matter on the 17th. Col. Byroade said that changes of destination, such as the one made today, created considerable difficulties from an operational standpoint. He would go ahead and make plans for a mission to Kalgan on the 18th, recognizing that it might be changed.

Col. Ely asked how large the field was at Chining. Gen. Tsai (CG) said that he did not know the length of the runway, but he was sure a C–46 could land there.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that he now wished to read the telegrams he had received from Yenan concerning zones of conflict reported by his Communist sources. Mr. Hwang (CP) then read in English four messages, which may be summarized as follows:

1. A report signed by Gen. Nieh Jung-chen, commanding Communist forces, Kalgan, and dated January 16, stated that at 1 o’clock on the morning of January 14 over 700 Japanese troops moved southwest of Tatung and occupied Chichiachuang. They were now moving toward Huiyuan and Lingchow. He requested that Executive Headquarters send representatives to that area to supervise the disarming of the Japanese and punish these activities of the Japanese. He requested a reply.

2. A report from Gen. Ho Lung, dated January 16, reported that Government forces stationed east of Chining suddenly attacked the Chining garrison, and that fighting was also going on in Fengchen and surrounding area, and around Yangkow. He requested Executive Headquarters to send a mission to order Gen. Fu Tso-yi to stop such warlike activities. A reply was requested.

3. A report from Gen. Li So-yu, commanding Eastern China Military District, dated January 16, stated that three Central Government armies were attacking Communist forces in the central Kiangsu and Huai River area. He requested that measures be taken at once to cause these forces to obey the cease fire order, control their units, and return to their original positions.

4. A report from the Vice Commander of the Eastern Hopeh Military Area, dated January 16, stated that the cease fire order was received with hope and jubilation by the people of the Eastern Hopeh area. They felt that peace and unity were about to be established. The Communist forces were sincerely carrying out the order, but the Nationalist troops (95th Division of the 94th Army) were at present taking advantage of the Communists’ friendly attitude. At 1400 hours on the 12th they attacked and occupied Tungyun. On the 14th at 9 a.m. they occupied Yutien. The 42nd Division of the same army, which is replacing the 43rd Division, occupied Chentzechen. At the present time this Army was still making preparations for a drive northward. The Communists wished to protest against such activities of the Nationalists in violation of the cease fire order and hoped that the Executive Headquarters would immediately check the troop movements of the 94th Army and order them to evacuate the positions which they occupied since the cease fire order was issued. A reply was requested.

Gen. Yeh (CP) said that the reading of the above telegrams was for the purpose of enabling both sides to compare notes and reach an agreement as to where teams should be sent. New reports were coming in all the time, and it might be necessary to change the list of places to which teams were to be sent.

Mr. Li (CP) said that a message had just been received saying that there were still Russian forces at Chihfeng. He was concerned as to whether the plane carrying the team might not also be interned and about the safety of the delegates. Col. Byroade and Col. Ely explained the situation, as outlined earlier in the meeting, and said that the Russians had assured the pilot of the interned plane that they were willing for the delegates to come; their only concern was about the bringing in of Nationalist troops, not about the bringing in of individuals. Gen. Tsai (CG) said he thought the Soviet forces would welcome the coming of the team, since they too were in the position of neutral observers. Gen. Yeh (CP) asked whether the interned plane had yet returned; Col. Haskell suggested that the Russians were probably waiting until the team arrived before they released the plane. Gen. Yeh said that, from what he had just heard, he assumed the safety factor was taken care of.

Mr. Robertson recomended that, before each meeting of the Commissioners, their respective chiefs of staff confer together as to the matters they wished discussed and draw up an agenda, so that all parties would know beforehand what subjects would be brought up at a given meeting. Gen. Yeh had said that he had not received the agenda of today’s meeting; this was an error and would not occur again, since the Operations Sections were now moving into their offices and a workable system could be set up. All agreed.

Col. Tang (CG) asked how it had happened that the press release of January 14 (which the Commissioners had decided to hold up until Gen. Yeh was ready to appoint a representative for the Operations Section) had after all been released, and had appeared in the newspapers this afternoon. Out of 11 papers, 3 had carried that statement instead of the proper “first press release” which had been authorized; the name of the Communist representative was left blank. One of the papers carrying it was the Ta Kung Pao. Mr. Robertson said that he would find out immediately from Major Brittain, press relations officer, but it proved impossible to contact him before the end of the meeting.

It was agreed that the team members to be sent out on the 17th should meet in Mr. Robertson’s suite at 9:00 a.m. (January 17) for briefing and proceed from there to the air-field.

It was further agreed that the chiefs of staff should meet at 10:00 a.m., January 17, to prepare an agenda for a meeting of the Commissioners to be held the afternoon of the 17th.

The meeting adjourned.

85. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in China (Robertson) in his unnumbered despatch of January 18.