892.014/8–2846
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
| Participants: | Prince Wan Waithayakon, Chief of Siamese Delegation to present Siamese dispute to UN; |
| Mr. Luang Dithakar Bhakdi, Chargé d’Affaires, Siamese Legation; | |
| The Acting Secretary of State; | |
| Mr. Woodruff Wallner, WE; | |
| Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA; | |
| Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA. |
Prince Wan called by appointment at his request. He stated that he had had several conversations with M. Georges-Picot and that it was apparent that it would not be possible for the French and Siamese to settle their differences by direct negotiation; that his instructions permitted a settlement with the French involving a return of all the territories to France but in exchange the French should by voluntary act of good will return a portion of the territories to Siam; that the French position was that the Siamese must return all the territories and that later they would be willing to consider minor border adjustments.
The Parliamentary authority, he pointed out, was for a presentation of the dispute to the Security Council and Siam was willing to accept whatever decision an appropriate international body should render. Accordingly the Siamese Government had been glad to accept French proposals for submission of the issue to the Court but the French, citing the Siem Reap incident as a reason and because of the delay a Court decision would entail, had now withdrawn the proposals. He thought the Siem Reap incident should be treated as a separate question and he would welcome an inquiry into that incident. He inquired whether he might invoke the good offices of the United States in proposing the Court procedure to the French on behalf of Siam. Mr. Acheson replied that in view of the fact the French themselves had made the proposal, had now withdrawn it and made such withdrawal public, they obviously would not accept the proposal and presentation of such proposal on behalf of Siam could clearly serve no useful purpose. Prince Wan then stated he had suggested to M. Georges-Picot the possibility of arbitration but that M. Georges-Picot had made no comment.
Mr. Acheson then expressed his concern with the explosive nature of problems everywhere throughout the world and the serious danger that unless maximum efforts were exerted on both sides trouble would ensue. He thought that a presentation of the case of the Siamese dispute to the Security Council would raise many serious difficulties with the strong possibility that because of French opposition no action might be taken by the Council and both the Security Council position and the position of Siam might therefore be worse off. He expressed the view that, as he understood the Siamese Government recognized the necessity of declaring the 1941 treaty invalid and that the Security Council would doubtless, if it acted, make a similar recommendation, the Siamese Government should accept its responsibilities and not utilize the Security Council as a means of avoiding its responsibilities. Prince Wan stated that while his Government might recognize this situation, the public and Parliament in Siam entertained the opposite view and although willing to accept any decision of the Security Council held the definite illusion that at least part of the territories would [Page 1074] be restored to Siam. Mr. Acheson emphasized that he thought it of great importance that the Siamese make at least another attempt at a direct settlement before resorting to the Security Council and suggested that as the issues between France and Siam were really not too great the problem was not insoluble if both sides would moderate their demands in the interest of a settlement and that we would be willing to use our influence to press for such moderation.
Prince Wan then stated that he had no authority to negotiate a direct settlement with the French but would report Mr. Acheson’s conversation and telegraph his Government requesting such authority.