892.014/8–1246
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
| Participants: | Prince Wan Waithayakon, Head of Siamese Delegation to UN on Franco-Siamese Dispute; |
| Kuang Aphaiwong, Opposition Leader; | |
| Luang Visut, Chief of Section dealing with Western Powers, Foreign Office;62 | |
| Prince Kridakara, Secretary to Prince Wan; | |
| Konthi Suphamongkhon, Special Representative at UN; | |
| Luang Dithakar Bhakdi, Chargé d’Aiffaires, Siamese Legation; | |
| Mr. Woodruff Wallner, WE; | |
| Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA. |
Prince Wan and the other above named members of the twelve-man Siamese delegation to present the Siamese-French dispute to the Security Council called by appointment at their request.
Prince Wan stated that while the delegation was prepared to negotiate with the French in accordance with the French proposals that the 1941 treaty be submitted to the International Court, they would prefer if possible, because that would take a considerable period of time, to negotiate a direct settlement of all outstanding issues with the French and establish peace and restore really friendly relations with France just as soon as possible. We explained to him that the French understood that the delegation might so wish and had informed us that they were willing to enter into direct negotiations if the Siamese so preferred and that if such direct negotiations failed then to proceed to negotiate in accordance with the proposals which they had made and which the Siamese had accepted in principle.
In the course of conversation Prince Wan stated that the settlement he would like to make would include a complete restoration of the territories to France and then an agreement by France to return all or part of the territories to Siam.
In connection with such settlement Prince Wan and Kuang Aphaiwong pointed out that they recognized that an important problem involved in any restoration of territories to Siam was the matter of French prestige. I added that the French, of course, also maintained that they were obligated to protect Cambodia and Laos and that legally they might not transfer territories of those two countries without their consent. After a brief statement by the Siamese regarding the puppet nature of the governments of those countries Prince Wan, remarking that the French were always a logical people, stated that he was fully prepared with legal arguments on this point.
We asked Prince Wan if the delegation was empowered to conduct direct negotiations with the French. He stated that actually their written authorization at the moment authorized only negotiations with the United Nations, but that there had been an understanding prior to their leaving Bangkok that if they were able to negotiate with the French the delegation would inform the Government and such authorization would be forthcoming. He implied definitely that there would be no difficulties on the score of authority to negotiate with the French.
With reference to the French proposal that Siam withdraw its complaint from the Security Council, Prince Wan pointed out that the Siamese dispute had two points: (1) the border incidents which [Page 1060] had been stressed by the Government; and (2) the disputed territories which had been included rather incidentally. He explained his own view that the former was of relatively minor importance and the main issue was the disputed territories. He felt that great care, however, would have to be taken because of the Parliamentary situation not to lose sight of the border incidents phase of the complaint. He hoped that if the disputed territories went to the International Court, instead of withdrawing the complaint it could be kept alive but not acted upon by the Security Council, and brought up later if need be. There was then general discussion of the complaint, the Siamese making it clear that for domestic reasons it would be necessary that whatever agreement was reached with the French such agreement should be approved by the Security Council. We explained that the French recognized their internal situation and we were quite confident would be agreeable to working out a procedure that would meet their need. The essential problem was to reach agreement with the French and we were confident that the technical problems relating to the complaint could be followed easily. We suggested that quite possibly a joint communiqué might include a pledge by each side to use their maximum efforts to prevent further border incidents. We reiterated the view of this Government that the border incidents did not in themselves warrant Security Council action except possibly the recommendation by the Security Council to both sides to take all possible measures to prevent further incidents and that such a pledge in a joint communiqué might therefore meet the issue. Prince Wan indicated that that might prove acceptable.
With regard to the interim administration, Prince Wan stated that administration of the areas would be simple; that they hoped that all officials brought in would be American; and he believed there would be no trouble. The Siamese had noted that the French proposals included the suggestion that the Conservator might “possibly be assisted by Siamese, Cambodian (or Laotian) and French officials”. The Siamese, he explained, would not wish such an arrangement as they did not wish French officials nor did they consider that the introduction of such officials to assist a Conservator would be necessary. He stated that one important problem which such interim administration would raise involved the matter of rice. He pointed out that under the agreement concluded May 1,63 modifying the Singapore Agreement of January 1, the Siamese were committed to the British [Page 1061] to export 1,200,000 tons of rice before May 1, 1947. In agreeing to this figure the Siamese had counted on an exportable surplus of 200,000 tons of rice from the Battambang area. If an interim administration were established (apparently Prince Wan conceded that it would really be detached economically from Siam) he pointed out that it would be necessary to secure some modification of their agreement with the British so as to reduce their pledged figure by 200,000 tons, or make other arrangements to meet this problem.
We indicated our belief that negotiations with the French should be carried on in Washington and that it would be wise for the delegation not to go to New York until such time as the Government-to-Government conversations had been concluded or had failed and that, meanwhile, the less publicity regarding the delegation the better. Prince Wan and the delegation were in complete accord with this point of view.
We stated that the good offices of this Government were available to both the Siamese and French in whatever negotiations the two Governments agreed to carry on. We stated that we would inform the French that the delegation would prefer direct negotiations but that should those fail that the delegation was prepared to negotiate on the basis of the French proposals to submit the case to the International Court to which proposals they had agreed in principle. We explained that M. Lacoste would, we understood, carry on the negotiations for the French and we assumed that the French after we conveyed the foregoing information would shortly get in touch with the Siamese.
When the other members of the delegation had left the room, we advised Mr. Bhakdi that the French had some reservations about dealing with Prince Wan because of his negotiation of the 1941 treaty; how far the French were prepared to go in this regard we did not know but thought that the Siamese should be warned of this situation in advance.64
[Later as an easy means of permitting contact between the French and Siamese, the members of the delegation were invited and accepted an invitation to a cocktail party at Mr. Moffat’s and a similar invitation extended to Messrs. Lacoste, Berard and Wapler of the French Embassy with full understanding on both sides that the others would be present. M. Lacoste accepted the invitation the next day.]65
- Visutr Arthayukti, Director General, Eastern Political Affairs, Siamese Foreign Office.↩
- For documentation see pp. 956–969, passim.↩
- A memorandum by Mr. Wallner, August 12, indicated that the views of the Siamese delegation were given to Messrs. Bérard and Wapler the same day (892.014/8–1246).↩
- Brackets appear in the original memorandum.↩