851G.00/12–346: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:37 p.m.]
5921. In conversation today with Baudet re situation in Indochina, he stated decisions of Interministerial Commission on Indochina (re which there has been so much speculation in press—mytel 5895, December 171) were necessarily of interim character in view of uncertain political situation in France. It was decided French policy in Indochina should continue to be based on agreement of March 6 and modus vivendi of October, and every effort should be made through negotiations with Vietnam leaders to apply provisions of these agreements. However, when too flagrant breaches of provisions occur on part of Vietnam, forceful measures would be used on local and restricted scale. Recent decisions to take over complete military control of Haiphong is example of how the policy will be applied.
Baudet emphatically denied there was any question of “reconquest” of Indochina such as is being talked of in certain circles and even in press. Not only would such military solution of difficulties be contrary to French colonial policy and repugnant to French public opinion but it is doubtful if France has military strength to accomplish it. Program for relief and replacement of French troops in Indochina, which has been underway for some time, will be continued and speeded up, but there will be no over-all increase in number of troops (approximately 50,000 metropolitan and 25,000 native) with exception of slight strengthening of gendarmerie, bringing total strength to perhaps 80,000.
Re persistent rumors that Admiral d’Argenlieu would not return to Indochina, Baudet said there was no question of his immediate replacement and that d’Argenlieu intended to return although his departure might be delayed until French political picture clears somewhat. Baudet admitted, however, that d’Argenlieu’s usefulness in Indochina had been considerably impaired by Admiral’s growing dislike of Vietnam officials with whom he has to deal and his failure to keep his opinions to himself. Thus d’Argenlieu’s replacement by civilian official might appear desirable in future.
Baudet said that information available to Foreign Office proved recent worsening of situation on [in?] Indochina was part of deliberate [Page 66] plan of Vietnam to try to obtain advantages and concessions during present confused political period in France, and Vietnam was making great efforts to obtain support of French Communist Party. French Communist leaders have been bombarded with telegrams from Indochina, and CGT has been asked to order dock workers to stop loading troop and supply ships for Indochina. This pressure has been of considerable embarrassment to French Communist Party coming, as it does, at time when party is trying to persuade French public that Communist government would be safe custodian of France’s international interests, and, more particularly, to persuade Radical Socialists to enter leftwing coalition government. Anti-Communist press in turn tends to exaggerate situation in Vietnam to encourage nationalist reaction of radicals. Naturally Foreign Office deplores seeing Indochina problem made into political football.
Sent Washington 5921. Repeated London 793.
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