892.014/6–1146
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
Konthi called at my office and inquired whether the United States would support Siam if it brought its dispute with the French over the territories acquired by Siam in 1941 before the Security Council under Article 35 (2). I replied, as his Government had already been informed, that this Government would support a fair discussion of any dispute brought by any nation before the Security Council, but that obviously I could not state what action in the Security Council this Government or the Security Council itself would take. I pointed out that there was the further complication which undoubtedly would be raised by the French Government that France and Siam were at war and that while I believed that that argument would not alter the American position that there should be fair discussion, other countries on the Security Council might, of course, give weight to the argument.
Konthi then raised the question whether it was necessary to return the territories to France before bringing a dispute. I stated that obviously there was no such legal requirement, but I thought that their position would be stronger if they had done so because the Security Council might take the position that they would not as a matter of policy wish to pass on the merits of the claims of a country which was holding territory as a result of aggression because to do so might be construed as putting a premium on aggression. The situation, I [Page 1019] explained, might be similar to equity procedures where the plaintiff is expected to come into court “with clean hands”.
Konthi then stated that he did not consider that the territories had been acquired by aggression; that negotiations were in progress with the French when border incidents took place; that after these had been smoothed over negotiations were resumed and the French Government ceded part of the territories which Siam considered properly theirs. I inquired if it was not a fact that Siamese troops in fact had occupied these territories. He stated that Siamese troops had occupied part of the territories in order to put a stop to these border incidents. I reiterated the reasons why the American, British and French Governments did not recognize the transfer of the territories to Siam.
Konthi then raised the matter of the payment made by Siam to the French under the agreement with the French Government. The treaty called for a payment by Siam of six million piastres in installments and Konthi stated that already one-half had been paid. He inquired whether such payment by Siam did not prove that the Siamese had not acquired the territories by aggression. I replied that such payment did not, in my opinion, change the nature of the acquisition any more than the payment by the United States to Mexico altered the fact that we had actually acquired California, New Mexico and Arizona by a war of aggression. I commented that in my view the payments made by Siam should, of course, be refunded by the French in connection with a return of the territories.
Konthi then stated that although the Siamese do not consider that there had been acts of aggression by them, they did recognize the British and American viewpoints that they had secured these territories with the aid of Japan and that no country should benefit by Japanese action. Admitting therefore that they had no right to the territories they wanted to have decided by the United Nations to whom the territories properly should belong because they did not believe that the territories properly belonged to France. I replied that before the war we recognized French sovereignty over all the territories of French Indochina and that by not recognizing the transfer to Siam we still considered France de jure the sovereign of the disputed territories. Konthi explained that the Siamese Government did not feel for either internal reasons or because of its relations with the Laos and Cambodians who were struggling for freedom from the French that Siam could voluntarily on its own initiative return the territories to France. They were therefore, he implied, seriously considering putting the entire issue as to the disposition of the territories to the United Nations so that the request to return the territories to France would be a collective one which the Siamese Government and people would accept and not a unilateral demand by France.
[Page 1020]Speaking purely personally and emphasizing that I was speaking only personally, I stated that my interest is in arriving at a frontier which would really be acceptable to the peoples concerned in the area taking into consideration all appropriate factors such as economic geography; that I thought any attempt to settle the dispute on purely legal or historic claims would not in fact necessarily produce conditions of peace; that on an adjudication of the legal claims I thought the French view would be upheld; that I thought their respective historic claims relatively immaterial as I was concerned with peace in the future and not happenings in the past. I would like to see, I explained, an international commission, probably appointed by countries having no interest in Southeast Asia such as Switzerland and Sweden, work out realistically a sound border; that I had no idea, however, what policy our Government or the United Nations or the French would pursue.