892.014/4–1046: Telegram

The Chargé in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

secret

373. Remytel 353, April 8. Prime Minister asked me to call today to hear proposals Siam Mission is presenting to French. Siam Govt ready to recognize acquisition disputed territories null and void under whatever formula will satisfy French. Mission instructed not to become involved in historical or juridical arguments. In return, however, Siamese will ask French to accept one of two following alternative proposals.

1.
French to retrocede all disputed territories to Siam in exchange for Siamese commitment that all surplus rice in area (estimated between one and two hundred thousand tons yearly) will be exported [Page 988] via Indochina, that French will be given first opportunity to purchase this rice and that 20,000 tons will be delivered free to French annually for 10 years. Pradit hopes that urgent French need for rice to pacify Indochina population may induce French to accept this proposition.
2.
French to sell to Siam all Laos province above 16 degrees. Price undetermined but might be $50,000,000. Pradit hopes US firms could be induced to exploit mineral resources of Laos (he mentioned coal and tin) and concession royalties would help pay price of province.

Pradit describes these proposals as calculated to satisfy French prestige by formal restoration disputed territories and to meet French interest and save Siamese face thru one of above alternative arrangements. He lays great stress on difficulty his internal situation resulting from intense public feeling on this question, fact that Pibul32 obtained wide public support thru acquisition territories, and unfounded report allegedly circulated by Khuang supporters that he was about to reach agreement with French for Siamese retention large part of area. Pradit inquired whether US would be willing to give Siam any support on this question.

I replied we would transmit his inquiry to Dept and took occasion to reiterate US policy on question (re Deptel 202, March 2933). I expressed belief Dept might be willing to counsel moderation and generosity to French but thought it improbable Dept would wish to advocate any particular mode of settlement. I stated personal view that most unlikely French would accept either proposal outlined above. He replied in that case there would be no alternative to submitting case to UN. He repeated, however, he would greatly appreciate receiving any advice Dept might care to give. He said he hoped Mission would be back from Saigon within a week and he would inform me results their negotiations.

Our view is that French unprepared to make any substantial concession … and that Siamese likely to be forced with choice (1) of abandoning territories without any satisfactory face saving arrangement or (2) submitting case to UN. It seems probable moreover favorable UN action might be dependent on Anglo-US support of fair hearing for Siam. Would Dept be willing in view of Siam agreement to restore territories (1) to urge French to make substantial concessions or (2) to inform Siam we will assist them to obtain fair hearing by UN. If Dept unwilling to take either these steps we believe Siamese should be promptly informed in order that they suffer no illusions and reconcile themselves to return to status quo ante.

Yost
  1. Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram, Siamese Prime Minister at the time of Siam’s acquisition of Laotian and Cambodian territories on May 9, 1941.
  2. See footnote 25, p. 986.