741.92/2–1946
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
Mr. Everson called to state that the British Government was very disturbed at the attitude adopted by the Siamese Government in relation to the Heads of Agreement and Military Annex which had been accepted by an exchange of letters at Singapore on January 1 a few hours before the signing of the formal British-Siamese Agreement. Although the Military Annex provided that the Siamese would sign an agreement or agreements covering any or all of the points set forth in the Military Annex, they now maintain that they are no longer bound thereby as the formal Agreement replaced the Heads of Agreement and Annex.
I remarked that I knew that this was the Siamese position, that I considered it indefensible, and I pointed out, with which view Mr. Everson heartily agreed, that this situation would not have arisen had the Heads of Agreement and Military Annex been published as we had requested at the time the formal Agreement was published.
The British Government is now requesting the Siamese Government to postpone discussion in the Assembly of the British-Siamese Agreement until the question of the Military Annex has been satisfactorily worked out, which it hopes can be done in a mutually satisfactory manner. [Page 949] Any agreements embodying the provisions in the Military Annex should, it believes, be available for discussion by the Assembly at the same time as the British-Siamese Agreement. It believes that the Tripartite Rice Agreement should also be submitted to the Assembly for discussion at the same time. Bird, the British Chargé at Bangkok, has been instructed to present the foregoing views to the Siamese Government.
While the British Government does not request us to do so, Mr. Everson was instructed to say that it would welcome any help on our part to break down the position taken by the Siamese regarding the commitments embodied in the Military Annex and in persuading the Siamese Government to postpone discussion of the Agreement in the Assembly while the provisions of the Military Annex are under discussion.
Mr. Everson stated that his Government had considered carefully the suggestion which I had made that the points included in the Military Annex be covered by an informal agreement with the Siamese Government but that it felt that such arrangement would not be satisfactory because it would be certain to become public knowledge. The British Government would prefer therefore to make, as originally planned, a formal military agreement. They were considering, however, the comments which I had offered with regard to Clause 6 b of the Military Annex and Clause 7 and would communicate with us as soon as they had reached conclusions with regard to those two Clauses.
I explained that I did not contemplate that any agreement reached informally with the Siamese Government on the points covered by the Military Annex should be secret, but I had thought it would be wise to secure the ends sought by an exchange of notes without reference to the Military Annex rather than by a formal military agreement. I thought also that possibly no agreement would be needed in connection with clauses which might already have been put into effect, such as Clause 2 for the desequestration of Allied banking and commercial concerns and for permission for them to resume business; that inasmuch as we would in effect be a party to the proposed Military Agreement Number Two, to be signed by SACSEA, (except for Clause 7 in its present form) the non-publication of the Military Annex and its formal implementation as a Military Agreement at this time might prove embarrassing to this Government. I pointed out that the British themselves had proposed a joint diplomatic approach for an exchange of notes regarding the substance of Clause 3 (holding Japanese property at the disposal of the Allies); that I understood also that the British had proposed an exchange of letters, which I was not sure had been effected, with regard to Clause 1 (payment of compensation for all Allied losses); and that I still hoped a similar approach would be possible with regard to the remaining clauses of the Military [Page 950] Annex. Mr. Everson said that he thought his Government would still wish to have an Allied Military Agreement Number Two but would communicate with me further.14
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In a memorandum of conversation of February 28, Mr. Moffat wrote: “In the course of conversation I informed Mr. Everson that because of the Holidays there had been a delay in our sending a telegram requesting Yost in his discretion to inform the Siamese Government that we considered that they were bound by the Military Annex and suggesting, in his discretion, that he support the British request that Assembly discussion of the Singapore Agreement be postponed. I stated that I wanted him to know that we intended to cooperate but that, fortunately, before the telegram was dispatched we had received a telegram from Yost that an agreement between the British and Siamese on the whole subject had been reached subject to approval from London.” (741.92/2–2846) The telegram referred to was No. 162, February 26, midnight, from Bangkok, which stated: “Only substantial issue is provision of free currency for British troops. As compromise Khuang has offered to include fixed sum for this purpose in budget which would be presented to and approved by Assembly. Argument as to validity of remainder of Heads of Agreement and Annex would be dropped on understanding that Siamese agree to carry out intent. This proposal has been submitted to London for approval.” (741.92/2–2646) Khuang Aphaiwong was the Siamese Prime Minister.
Telegram 186, March 5, 11 a.m., from Bangkok reported a delay in the submission of the Singapore agreement to the Assembly to afford time to clear up Anglo-Siamese differences, “Khuang insisting that if he makes concession in provision free currency British agree to recognize lapse Heads of Agreement and Annex.” (741.92/3–546)
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