741.92/1–1546: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Siam (Yost)
33. Urtel 39, Jan 15. For your information Dept informed Brit Embassy Jan 19 that it anxious help reach amicable settlement difficulties arising non-publication Annex in order avoid any political situation which might adversely affect negotiation rice agreement or flow of rice. Dept expressed willingness if desired [to make] joint diplomatic approach to persuade Siamese Govt to carry out without further agreement intent clauses proposed Military Agreement Number 23 other than provision placing Siamese shipping under Allied military which US cannot approve. Dept willing if desired to join in urging Siamese Govt to place shipping under UMA as agreed by US and UK, but expressed view proposal academic in view approaching termination UMA. Dept suggested also desirability compromise issue currency for Brit military force. Amount relatively small and minor importance compared possible adverse effect on major US and UK interest in rice situation.4
- Temporary Military Agreement No. 1 had been signed at Kandy on September 8, 1945, by Allied and Siamese military officers; see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 1307, footnote 43.↩
- In telegram 60, January 23, 1946, 1 p.m., Mr. Yost requested the Department to exclude Clause 6 of the Military Annex from any joint approach to the Siamese Government. The clause, he noted, was the only one in regard to which difficulties had arisen but it appeared to have been designed wholly for the benefit of British occupation troops and was not a matter of direct concern to the United States. (741.92/1–2346)↩