811.24596/11–2946
The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Chief of Staff15 has pointed out in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, copy attached,16 that the problems presented in connection with negotiations for a base agreement with the Philippine Government have resulted in a reconsideration of the strategic and political importance of Army bases in the Philippines. He proposes that all U.S. Army forces be withdrawn from the Philippines, with the alternative proposal that all except a small force be withdrawn in case the Philippine Government and the State Department desire to have some U.S. Army forces retained in the Philippines. I agree in his conclusions and in the action which he recommends.
You will note that General Eisenhower has recognized that the military importance of the Philippines is of lesser weight in our national interest than the future good relations of the two nations and that long term continuance of Army forces in the Philippines would be of little value unless their retention was the result of an expressed desire of the Philippine Government.
In addition to the considerations mentioned by the Chief of Staff I wish to point out that the insistence of the Philippine Government that all U.S. forces be removed from the Manila area, an insistence that is quite understandable in view of the independent status of the Philippines, will require the construction of expensive facilities elsewhere at great expense, if large U.S. forces are to be maintained in the Philippines. Such an expenditure would be one that the War Department could ill afford at this time or in the future.
I also point out that it is of prime importance that the War Department responsibilities should not be greater than our means in manpower and money. Our commitments in occupied areas, Japan and Germany, to say nothing of Korea, Austria and Italy, are of a character that will take practically all of our resources at present and for the foreseeable future. These commitments are of predominant importance. We cannot afford, in my opinion, to waste our strength by maintenance of a force of any considerable size in the Philippines.
As to Naval bases, Fleet Admiral Nimitz has written a memorandum, and a copy of it is enclosed.17
It is desirable that orderly and timely preparations be made to carry out whatever action is decided on. Hence it is requested that [Page 935] you inform the War Department, as early as practicable, whether we may plan upon the complete withdrawal of Army forces, or whether it is desired that a token Army force of the order indicated be retained in the Philippine Islands.
It is appreciated that the views set forth by the Chief of Staff have an important bearing on the consummation of the agreement for bases. The Chief of Staff and I will be glad to discuss this phase of the matter with you at your convenience.
Sincerely yours,
- General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.↩
- J.C.S. 1027/8, November 23, not printed.↩
- Not printed. In discussing the needs of the Navy for bases, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, noted that they had been so reduced as to eliminate any necessity for stationing Army troops in the Philippines to defend naval facilities.↩