Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

856D.00/11–2746

Memorandum Prepared for the Acting Secretary of State³¹

secret

[Washington,] November 27, 1946.

Subject: Forthcoming Meeting with the Netherlands Ambassador Concerning the Dutch-Indonesian Draft Agreement.

The main features of the political structure envisaged in the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement are the following:

1. Immediate recognition by the Netherlands of the Republic of Indonesia as having de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. Gradual inclusion of Allied-held enclaves in territory of Republic.

2. Agreement to cooperate in the formation (before January 1, 1949) of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis, the United States of Indonesia, comprising the territory of the Republic, Borneo, and the Great East. However, a provision is made for the peoples of territories other than those of the Republic to opt for a “special relationship” if they so desire.

3. The constitution of the United States of Indonesia shall be determined by democratically elected representatives of the states involved, with due consideration of the rights of minority groups.

4. Agreement by the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cooperate in the establishment (before January 1, 1949) of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, comprising the Netherlands Kingdom (metropolitan Netherlands, Curacao, and Surinam), on the one hand, and the United States of Indonesia, on the other hand. The Union shall set up its own organs to act in matters of foreign relations, defense, finance, and economic and cultural matters.

5. The King (Queen) of the Netherlands shall be at the head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. High Commissioners shall be appointed by both parties to the Union, each to the other.

6. Immediately after the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, the Netherlands shall sponsor the USI for admission to UN.

We believe that the Netherlands Ambassador should be told that the Department welcomed the news that an agreement had been reached between the Dutch Commission General and the Indonesian negotiators, even before the terms of the agreement were known. From the outset, this Government had been concerned lest the continued political disturbances hi the Netherlands East Indies should develop into a full-scale war, and had on several occasions urged upon the Netherlands Government the necessity for a prompt and peaceful solution. When the question was brought before the Security Council last February, our position was based on the belief that the Netherlands Government would be able to work out a statesmanlike formula which would be acceptable to both parties, meeting, on the one hand, the justifiable Indonesian desire for self-determination and preserving, on the other hand, the Netherlands’ ties with the Indies.

After a study of the text of the agreement, we think that the persevering efforts of the Netherlands Government to reach a stable and equitable settlement are close to fulfillment. While certain sections of the agreement (e.g., Article XV) are admittedly vague, the general tenor of the text gives grounds for the belief that those points which are as yet unsettled will be worked out with mutual good will and to the satisfaction of both parties.

Regarding the question of ratification, we feel that two points should be kept in mind. The first concerns the terms of the agreement itself. We think that the agreement represents an equitable and workable compromise, and that the negotiators on both sides deserve the backing of their respective governments. The second point concerns the alternative to ratification. In the opinion of this Government, a failure on either side to ratify this agreement, or a protracted delay in ratification, will lead to a deterioration in good will so severe as to render impossible the resumption of negotiations. In this latter event, it seems likely that open warfare will break out and that in any case the most radical elements in Indonesia will seize power. Such a situation would provide the most favorable conditions for Communist infiltration.

J[ohn] C[arter] V[incent]
J[ohn] D. H[ickerson]

31. Submitted to Mr. Acheson by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) and the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson).