856E.00/10–446: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State19
us urgent
[Received October 4—10:40 a.m.]
795. ReDeptel 540, September 20.20 Comprehensive canvassing and consideration of Dutch appraisal of realities of situation enables us report as follows:
Dutch feel course pursued by British has created obstacles to prompt and satisfactory settlement through British failure to urge upon Nationalists acceptance proposals which Dutch have made, has created in Indonesian minds impression that British not support Dutch but conversely sympathize with Nationalists, which, in consequence, has strengthened Indonesian intransigence (reEmbtel 662, August 16; 676, August 24; 687, August 2921). Note: But see concluding sentences of next paragraph.
[Page 848]They feel British policy of avoiding involvement and preventing Dutch from embarking upon certain essentially defensive military operations has resulted in developments unfortunate for all concerned, some of which easily-to-have-been-prevented—such as cutting off water supplies at Soerabaya and massacre of Chinese at Bangka; that much of past and present revolutionary and chaotic disturbances due to Japanese and Soviet influence and still reinforced by both (estimate 1,000 Japanese officers assisting Republican armed forces); that armed forces of republic (estimated variously at from 75,000 to 200,000 of whom about 25,000 really well “armed”) are only in part loyal thereto; that only area effectively controlled by Republican government is in central Java; that cleavages among Indonesians are many and obvious; that there exists substantial moderate element equal in calibre to Republican leaders which is now inarticulate and powerless but which is loyal to Dutch and will express itself in influential ways as soon as given security; that the Dutch, as soon as responsibility is turned over to them, having more at stake and better understanding the Indonesians and their problems, will find less difficult than the British, the task of extending areas of security and convincing the Indonesians that there is need, in interest all concerned, for cooperation and common effort to proceed in accordance with principles and proposals which Netherlands Government has advanced beginning with Queen’s address of December 1942; that presence of substantial Dutch military and naval forces (they expect to have by end this year total approximately 80,000 army and marines, and to add early next year 20,000) will be effective ipso facto in considerable measure and large scale combat operations not be necessary; that some guerilla forces will be troublesome for a good while; that the food situation in the Indies other than in central Java is far from satisfactory; that famine prevails Madoera and republican government doing nothing to relieve it; that situation in Sumatra is more or less obscure and future there problematical; that areas other than Java and Sumatra do not present difficult problems; that one of the most effective instrumentalities which might be brought to bear toward facilitating restoration and maintenance of order in the areas where disorder prevails would be introduction of substantial amounts of consumer goods; that a whispered firm intimation by British and American governments to Soekarno and Sjahrir that those governments are favorably disposed toward and willing to support the Dutch proposals would go far—some say the whole way—toward causing the republican government promptly and reasonably to enter upon and get forward with potentially fruitful negotiation. They volunteer, almost without exception, expressions of appreciation of the services British have rendered, of regret that these have been attended by certain limitations, and of [Page 849] perplexity re reasoning underlying some features thereof. They deplore and resent Australia’s attitude.
Embassy has just received War Dept’s intelligence review No. 32, 19 September 1946 and concurs in most of contents article Indonesian independence movement, pages 39–45.