856E.00/9–1746: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State

secret

370. Mytel 368, September 16,13 re negotiations. Gen. Mansergh is optimistic re military truce and others think final agreement will be negotiated near future but this not shared by me.14 Better classes Indos and masses of people want truce and final peace but Indo authorities like Sjahrir unable implement agreements since hundreds parties, bands led by fanatical or ambitious men wall not permit truce or peace unless suits them. Any goodwill shown by British or Dutch is regarded as sign of weakness and used as political capital. Evacuation agreements, for example, made by Indos cannot be executed if some Indo general prefers keep internees as hostages. Native press plays up Killearn visit to Djocja and present Dutch mission there as sign of weakness and de facto recognition. British appeasement has resulted in increased bloodshed but when Dutch given free hand law and order are established without serious fighting because of natives’ desire for peace. Many thousands of natives tried to enter Dutch perimeters such as Bandoeng, Batavia, Surabaya and other places. This merely proves natives as whole want peace while their leaders continue try to whip them up to frenzy. If British muddle present effort, outcome will be doubtful, if not dangerous, and peace certainly delayed. Mansergh is realistic, although perhaps too optimistic, and sees danger ahead but is trying help negotiators by creating better atmosphere. If British interfere in Dutch-Indo negotiations and go beyond quality of intermediary, no one can foresee what future holds.

Foote
  1. See footnote 12, above.
  2. The truce talks began September 20 but broke down September 28; upon receipt of fresh demands by the Indonesians.