Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

856E.00/6–1846: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Nanking, June 18, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received June 18—8:05 a.m.]

1007. Dept’s 301, June 13.⁸⁶ During call on FonMin Wang Shihchieh June 17, I mentioned summoning to Nanking Chinese Consul General Chiang from Netherlands East Indies. Dr. Wang said he had been intending to invite me to FonOff to express his views on general situation in NEI; he then discussed the situation at length.

Dr. Wang said that information brought back by Chinese Consul General from NEI might be summarized as follows:

1. There is no possibility of reasonable settlement by negotiation between Dutch and Indonesian Nationalists under present conditions.

2. Dutch were inclined to be somewhat liberal some months ago, but their attitude is now much more intransigent, possibly because of arrival of additional Dutch troops.

3. There is little possibility of Dutch being able to impose a settlement by force. Dutch now have some 30,000 troops. Nationalists have around 200,000, mostly trained and armed by Japanese during period when Japanese realized defeat was inevitable; there are also three to four thousand Jap with Nationalists. Furthermore, the 70 million Indonesians would in large part support Nationalists against the Dutch.

4. Chinese in NEI were requested by Chinese Consular officials, and also by leading Chinese merchants, etc., to observe strict neutrality between Dutch and Nationalists. There are about one and one-half million Chinese in Indonesia, mostly in cities where they constitute in many cases a majority of population. Chinese are chiefly merchants and industrialists. When there was no pressure on Nationalist controlled cities, Chinese were not molested except for payment of taxes, contributions, etc. However, when Nationalist cities were attacked (by British or Dutch) the extreme elements among Nationalists had in a number of cases, prior to leaving the cities, killed Chinese and looted their property. This was chiefly because Chinese were wealthiest persons, and only to a small degree because of anti-Chinese spirit. In some cities Dutch had compelled Chinese to serve in police forces, thereby perhaps antagonizing Nationalists. (Chinese, if born in NEI, are considered Dutch subjects, but persons of Chinese parentage if not born in NEI are apparently Dutch in NEI and Chinese in China.) Responsible Nationalists had deplored excesses of their radical elements against Chinese. About 3,000 Chinese killed before British took Batavia, and about 1,000 in recent massacre at Tangerang, others in smaller cities.

Dr. Wang said Chinese Govt was seriously concerned over danger to large Chinese population in NEI, if Dutch should attempt to impose a settlement by force. He said that although Chinese had been massacred by Nationalists and it might therefore be supposed Chinese would support Dutch, the Chinese Govt took a long view of situation and desired a settlement which would be satisfactory and permanent; he referred to the interest of President Roosevelt in dependent peoples. He remarked that efforts were being made to restrain criticism of Indonesian Nationalists (this is evident from recent playing down of Indonesian massacres in Chinese press).

Dr. Wang expressed the view that there was no change [chance] of peaceful, reasonable settlement being reached unless pressure were brought to bear on Dutch. He wondered whether it might not be advisible for powers interested in that area, including United States, China, Australia, Britain (he did not mention France), either jointly or by separate, parallel action to urge Dutch to effect reasonable, peaceful settlement by negotiation. If these direct negotiations should fail, Dr. Wang felt that Powers should then urge Dutch to invite outside mediation. He felt that nothing would be accomplished, however, unless pressure were brought to bear on Dutch and at an early date. Dr. Wang said he would appreciate receiving views of State Dept on this matter as soon as possible as he felt situation was rapidly deteriorating. Dr. Wang said Chinese Govt had been considering question of referring NEI situation to United Nations, but no decision had yet been reached on matter.⁸⁷

Dr. Wang said there was no truth in Dutch Agency Aneta report mentioned in second paragraph of Dept’s 301, June 13.⁸⁸

Smyth

86. Not printed; the first portion of this telegram inquired about the main causes of the Chinese massacre in Java (856E.00/6–1346).
87. In telegram 342, June 21, 8 p.m., to Nanking, the Department asked that Dr. Wang be advised that it was closely following Indonesian developments, recognized the difficulties, but was still hopeful that negotiations could lead to a mutually agreeable peaceful settlement. The Embassy was informed that the deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian relations was regarded seriously; however, joint or parallel action with China was not believed to be desirable or effective. (856E.00/6–1846)
88. The report indicated that the Chinese National Government had ordered cooperation by Chinese in the East Indies with the Netherlands authorities there.