856E.00/1–1046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)14
Subject: Status of Proposed Discussions Between Netherlands Government and Indonesian Leaders
| Participants: | Dr. Alexander Loudon, Ambassador of the Netherlands |
| Dr. H. N. Boon, First Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs | |
| Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs |
Yesterday Dr. Loudon telephoned me and said that he had been instructed to make a very important communication to the State Department. The Acting Secretary15 and Mr. Matthews16 being otherwise engaged, it was arranged that Dr. Loudon should call on Mr. Hickerson this morning. At Dr. Loudon’s request I was present during the conversation.
Dr. Loudon opened the conversation by saying that he was calling on a very disagreeable matter resulting from exceedingly disquieting information which his Government had received from Java.
He said that before going further, however, he wished to hand Mr. Hickerson, for the top secret information of the Department, a copy [Page 793] of the statement of Dutch policy with respect to the East Indies which had been discussed at the recent meeting at Chequers between the British Prime Minister17 and Dutch representatives. This document is attached hereto, marked “A”.18 In handing this document to Mr. Hickerson, Dr. Loudon also handed him a document attached hereto and marked “B” 18 which he said was to be considered as a record of an “oral communication”.
Dr. Loudon then said that not only had Lord Mountbatten taken no steps to implement the decisions which had been reached in meetings in Singapore during December between British and Dutch officials with respect to the restoration of order in a limited area of western Java, but other incidents had taken place which deeply disturbed the Netherlands Government. For example, the British had given as a reason for delaying implementation of the Singapore decisions the desirability of allowing Shajrir19 to take an extensive tour through Java to discuss matters with local leaders; the British had provided an RAF plane for the purpose of bringing the Indonesian Governor of Sumatra to Java for a discussion of the situation with Shajrir; and another incident when the British allowed only 800 Dutch Marines to land in Batavia and returned the remaining 1,200 to Singapore solely because Shajrir’s consent could not be obtained.
Dr. Loudon said that the foregoing incidents were serious enough in that they could not help but lead the Dutch Government to the conclusion that day by day the British were strengthening the hands of the Indonesian leaders to the detriment of the Netherlands Government’s position: in addition to these incidents the British officials in Java were constantly discussing matters with the Indonesian leaders, but rarely informed the Dutch representatives of the nature or the outcome of these discussions.
Dr. Loudon with obvious feeling remarked that these circumstances, together with another which he would release in a moment, could not help but be taken seriously by his Government who felt that despite British recognition of the Netherlands as a territorial sovereign in the East Indies, the British were constantly putting his Government on the sideline and in a place second to the Indonesian leaders. He then said that on January 6 the British Ambassador at the Hague20 had called on Dr. van Kleffens (the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs) and had given him the text of a telegram which the British Foreign Office had received from Lord Mountbatten. Lord Mountbatten’s telegram quoted a telegram which he had sent to Admiral Helfrich severely castigating Helfrich over the burning of two kampongs by [Page 794] Dutch native troops in retaliation for alleged acts committed by natives of those kampongs against the Dutch troops. Lord Mount-batten had characterized this and other acts of the Dutch troops as “brutal reprisals contrary to my orders” and had demanded that Admiral Helfrich publicly disavow these acts by men under his command. Despite the tone of Lord Mountbatten’s communication, Admiral Helfrich, as a loyal subordinate, had responded by making public an order to his troops a copy of which is attached hereto marked “C”.21 Dr. Loudon went on to say that in addition to reading to Dr. van Kleffens the text of Lord Mountbatten’s telegram, the British Ambassador had gone on to read a telegram from the British Foreign Office in which he was instructed to say that the British Government was in entire agreement with and underwrote Lord Mountbatten’s instructions to Admiral Helfrich and expected the Netherlands Government to do its utmost towards seeing that Admiral Helfrich’s action would be in accord with the tenor of Lord Mountbatten’s message.
Dr. van Kleffens, according to Dr. Loudon, told the British Ambassador that he was rather surprised at the tone and content of the communications that had just been read to him and said that he would have understood the British position better if the British had uttered a single word of disapproval of the barbarities committed by the Indonesian Extremists such as the murder, mistreatment and mutilation of Dutch men, women and children in the Indies. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Prime Minister22 had immediately sent a telegram to Admiral Helfrich instructing him to comply with Lord Mountbatten’s request while at the same time assuring the troops under his command that he thoroughly understood that they had been aggravated by months of cruelties committed by Extremists against their families.
After the interview between Sir Neville Bland and Dr. van Kleffens, the Dutch Cabinet had met and decided that the British actions had thoroughly undermined van Mook’s position as a negotiator and that accordingly, it seemed doubtful whether he should return to Batavia at this time to undertake negotiations with the Indonesian leaders on the basis approved at the Chequers meeting.
Dr. Loudon asked that the foregoing be kept strictly confidential. He said that his Government wished the State Department to know that if the negotiations, which the State Department, in its public statement of December 19, had commended to both the Indonesian and Netherlands Government, were to break down, it would be as a result of the background which he had just outlined. He said that the Netherlands Government is ready and willing to start conversations [Page 795] with the Indonesian leaders at once, but, on the other hand, wondered if it could fruitfully negotiate with Shajrir so long as he and his associates were “pampered” by the British. He said that he was at a loss, as was his Government, to understand what was motivating British action: whether it was the outcome of some subtle and undisclosed policy of the British Government or whether it was simply the result of poor liaison between the British Government and Lord Mountbatten’s headquarters.
Dr. Loudon then referred to a recent article in the London Times charging that there was a difference of opinion between van Mook and the Netherlands Government, and that the people of the Netherlands were not fully informed as to events in the East Indies. Dr. Loudon said that he could deny the statements made in this article; that the Dutch Cabinet had kept the Parliament fully informed; that there was no difference of opinion between van Mook and his Government; and that discussions had continued in the Indies during van Mook’s absence in the Hague and in London.
Mr. Hickerson asked who was participating in the discussions in the Indies. Dr. Loudon said that he had not been strictly accurate in saying that discussions were continuing—what he meant to say was that contact was being maintained by the Indonesian leaders and Dr. van Mook’s representatives. He added that his Government was up against a serious situation, a situation not caused by it or van Mook—and felt completely frustrated.
Dr. Loudon having concluded his narrative, Mr. Hickerson expressed the Acting Secretary’s regret that illness had prevented his seeing Dr. Loudon and assured Dr. Loudon that he would take note of and communicate to Mr. Acheson all that Dr. Loudon had said. Mr. Hickerson said that he could not, of course, comment on the contents of the Dutch statement of future policy with respect to the Netherlands East Indies, nor could he comment on what Dr. Loudon had said, but that he did wish to read aloud the following sentence from the Department’s public statement of December 19: “Extremist or irresponsible action—or failure to present or consider specific proposals can lead only to a disastrous situation.” He said that with this statement in mind he felt that he could say in his personal capacity, but with full assurance that the Acting Secretary would approve, that the Department would regard a failure by the Dutch to present their proposals and proceed with negotiations with the Indonesian leaders as “disastrous”.
Both Dr. Loudon and Dr. Boon seemed to be pleased with Mr. Hickerson’s reply and intimated that they shared Mr. Hickerson’s views.
Note 1: On the evening of January 15, after dinner at the Netherlands Embassy, the Acting Secretary, Mr. Acheson, in my presence, told Dr. Loudon that he most emphatically approved of the reply Mr. Hickerson had made to Dr. Loudon’s representations on January 10. Dr. Loudon said that he was glad to hear this and that he had already reported Mr. Hickerson’s comment to his Government.
Note 2: It will be noted that Dr. Loudon’s conversation on January 10 follows very closely Ambassador Hornbeck’s report of his conversation with Dr. van Roijen transmitted in the Hague’s telegram no. 42, January 12.23
- In telegram 41, January 17, 3 p.m., to The Hague, the Department reported this conversation and added: “During conversation with Loudon, care was taken not to be drawn directly or inferentially into area of apparent British-Dutch differences.” (856E.00/1–1246)↩
- Dean G. Acheson, Under Secretary of State.↩
- H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs.↩
- Clement R. Attlee.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Soetan Sjahrir, Indonesian “Prime Minister”.↩
- Sir Nevile Bland.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Willem Schermerhorn.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 13, p. 792.↩