Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

501.BC/12–2645

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State²

secret
USGA/Gen/29

[Washington, December 26, 1945.]

(28) Disputes or Situations—The Netherlands East Indies

i. statement of the problem

What position should the United States adopt with respect to problems in the Netherlands East Indies, in light of the decision of the Combined Chief of Staff for that area, Indonesian movements for self-government and continued U.S. recognition of Netherlands sovereignty, if these problems should be raised in the General Assembly or the Security Council.

ii. proposed united states position

Should the question of the Netherlands East Indies be raised in the General Assembly or the Security Council, the U.S. Delegate should advocate that a settlement be effected between the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesian leaders by direct negotiation. In the meantime the military measures incident to the surrender of Japan should be brought to a conclusion as expeditiously as possible.

Should the Netherlands Government assert that the problem of the Netherlands East Indies is essentially within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands and therefore not a question for the United Nations by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the U.S. Delegate should state that even though primary responsibility for arriving at an agreement lies with the Netherlands authorities, the United Nations cannot fail to be deeply interested in the solution of problems that are of vital importance to the entire world, and that any problem relating to the maintenance of international peace and security would clearly be within the competence of the United Nations. The solution of the conflict in the Netherlands East Indies should be in harmony with the principles and ideals of the United Nations Declaration.

Due to the fluidity of the situation in the Netherlands East Indies and changing conditions from day to day no further statement concerning the position of the United States should be made without prior consultation with the Department.

iii. discussion

In bringing to a conclusion the war against Japan there was assigned to the South East Asia Command, on behalf of the Allies, the responsibility of accepting the Japanese surrender in the Netherlands East Indies, of disarming and removing the Japanese forces, of securing the surrender of Japanese equipment, of liberating or repatriating Allied prisoners of war, and of assuring the safety of more than 100,000 civilians, the majority of them women and children, who had been interned by the Japanese.

The carrying out of this mandate has been complicated by the differences between Indonesians and the Netherlands authorities and Indonesian nationalists, principally in Java, who have resisted the restoration of Netherlands Administration and proclaimed an Indonesian Republic. It has been necessary in connection with the Allied objectives for the troops under the South East Asia Command to assure such order as is necessary for their execution. In some of the Islands of the Netherlands East Indies, other than Java, Netherlands Administration has apparently been restored.

In connection with the responsibilities relating to the surrender of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies there was no thought so far as the United States was concerned of extending the Allied mandate beyond these specific responsibilities.

British military authorities had previously indicated that their task in the Netherlands East Indies was confined solely to carrying out the military measures stemming from the Japanese surrender. However, the local British Commander³ has indicated that he believed that the United Kingdom had a “moral obligation” to bring about conditions of law and order under which further discussions between the Indonesians and the Dutch could take place. Responsible members of the Government in London have indicated a certain sympathy for the predicament of the Dutch. There has been evidence that a large section of the British public is concerned about the military measures necessary in the Netherlands East Indies.

The U.S. Government has stated publicly that it views with increasing concern the recent developments in the Netherlands East Indies. The United States has recognized that the primary responsibility for arriving at an agreement lies with the Netherlands authorities, as representatives of the territorial sovereign, and the Indonesian leaders (Department of State Press Release, No. 945, December 19, 1945⁴).

The seriousness of the problems which may be encountered will be affected by (a) the degree of success of the efforts of the South East Asia Command in accomplishing its objectives, (b) the degree of success in Dutch efforts to regain control in the Netherlands East Indies, (c) the strength and extent of the Indonesian self-government movement, (d) the applicability of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, (e) the prospect of open warfare and its concurrent effect upon international peace and security.

Up until the present time the policy of the Netherlands Government, as originally set forth in a speech of Queen Wilhelmina on December 6, 1942, has been that which proposed that the relation of the four parts (the Netherlands in Europe, Curasao, Surinam and the Netherlands East Indies) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to one another should be the subject of an Imperial Conference to make recommendations to be submitted for approval by the legislative bodies of the Kingdom. This policy has been restated in a recent proclamation by Hubertus Van Mook, the Acting Governor General of the Indies,⁵ but has not been accepted by the Indonesian leaders. On September 27 the Indonesian Government offered to negotiate with the Dutch if the Allies participated, or to accept the return of the Dutch acting in an advisory capacity to an Indonesian Government if the “management” were approved by the United Nations. When the Dutch refused to negotiate with Soekarno⁶ whom they had imprisoned as a leader of the movement before the war and whom they accused of being a Japanese collaborator, the Indonesians acquired more moderate leaders to represent them. Conflicting information indicates that these leaders, however, either have not been able or have not seriously attempted to control extreme insurrectionary factions. It may be assumed that conciliatory negotiations would change this situation, but there is no guarantee that such would be the case.

2. Paper prepared for the U. S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in London. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was U.S. Representative at the United Nations.
3. Lt. Gen. Philip Christisen.
4. Department of State Bulletin, December 23, 1945, p. 1021.
5. The text was transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Batavia (Foote) in his despatch 8, February 1; received February 25. The despatch stated that the text “made little or no impression on the Indonesians at that time”, because British military and American press sympathy “caused the declaration of policy to fall flat.” (856E.00/2–146)
6. On August 17, 1945. Soekarno was proclaimed “President of the Republic of Indonesia”.