Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–1046: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

confidential
urgent

Seoul, undated.
[Received December 10—12:40 p.m.]

142. Cite Tfgcg 548 [to Tokyo]. Subject is Dr. Syngman Rhee who was [as] stated in my telegram 140, December 4,⁸⁶ left that day by air too late for action to be taken as suggested in Deptel 152, December 3.⁸⁷

Intercepted telegraphic and other messages to and from Rhee indicate that early last month Rhee decided to fight and wreck US policy for Korea by building up in US and United Nations sentiment against such policy, against Moscow decision and Soviet occupation and in favor of the “The present Korean civil government”, viz., Koreans in military government. This correspondence follows in some detail so that his program and methods may be thoroughly understood.

On November 5 Rhee directed Ben Limb to ask United Nations to recognize the “Korean civilian govt which replaced military govt September 12 by Gen. Hodge’s order and Gen. Lerch’s declaration” relative to reducing American bureau chiefs to advisory capacity and elevating their Korean assistants to bureau headship. “We accepted it”, he went on, “as a happy arrangement and want many faithful American advisors and technicians to remain even under the permanent govt when formed. This interim govt will hold national elections to set up the permanent govt soon. …⁸⁸ During the interim period Gen. Hodge’s position will remain the same. United Nations recognition is most urgent for otherwise we have no way to protect the South against thousands of Red terrorist agitators and saboteurs continually infiltrating from North to terrorize us by burning, killing and kidnapping. … Unless we have our recognized govt immediately we cannot defend ourselves since Americans are neutral.”

Between November 10 and 16 he radioed Mrs. Roosevelt,⁸⁹ [Paul-] Henri Spaak,⁹⁰ Wellington Koo,⁹¹ Trygve Lie,⁹² Gen. Romulo,⁹³ Generalissimo Chiang,⁹⁴ Cardinal Spellman⁹⁵ (through local Catholic): “Grave situation developing rapidly. Due to thousands of Red terrorists constantly infiltrating from North we [who] are engaged in inhuman atrocities and arson in various parts of the country to force us into submission. Please request United Nations Conference to recognize separate govt of Korea. When recognized we will be in position to negotiate with United Nations directly. The Communist terrorists from North make situation critical. Neutral Americans cannot save situation. Our people are threatening with general uprisings for self-protection. Unless we have independent govt recognized now we cannot maintain peace and protect the South.” There were minor variations to suit each case, for instance statements to Chiang that “large Chinese Communist army is stationed along 38th parallel” and that “to save situation we ask United Nations Conference to jointly declare abrogation of Moscow decision and recognize Korean Govt immediately.” On November 10 he also radioed Arthur Sulzberger⁹⁶ that “US neutral attitude makes our problem impossible solution” and asked that Richard Johnson be sent back to Korea to represent New York Times adequately; also Gen. MacArthur begging him to visit Korea to investigate personally or else to invite him to a conference in Japan.

Concurrently he gave directions and views as follows:

To Limb on 13th: “American democratic administration still counting on Communist vote will continue appeasement policy. While State Department following that policy United Nations will not do anything for Korea. Military Govt being neutral cannot protect us from Red terrorists. … Our only hope to save situation and maintain peace is to get our govt recognized immediately by United Nations enabling us to prepare adequate protection.” To code address Jayjill (probably Staggers or Jerome [Williams?]) on 11th: “Your suspicion shared. How shall we prevent it? Americans still insist cooperation with Leftists which will result in communizing South Korea. We demand separate govt as first step toward ultimate union North and South. Abrogation of Moscow decision is our best solution;” to Donjihoi Society, Honolulu, 25: “$10,000 immediately needed for campaign Washington and New York United Nations Conference. Wire Limb any amount you can;” to James Shinn, 13th: “If financially possible go to London by representing me as a goodwill envoy at large. Cable reply and will airmail credentials;” to Limb, 24th: “Please make formal request to reveal Yalta text then ask Congress to demand same.” On 21st he also sent long message to Korean Commission to following effect: Yalta and Moscow favor Communism and enslavement, and Cairo and Potsdam [favor] democracy and independence. We demand United Nations now decide which they stand for. If they want the former, then Americans should withdraw, leaving us with North Korea free or slave. If not they must save South Korea from [under?] Cairo and Potsdam. Leaving North Korea under Communists and working for coalition in South Korea will force entire nation to accept Communism. In despair our people may resort to general uprisings for self-defense. Americans following appeasement policy have gotten [sic] now here within a year because Communists are either for rule or ruin. We ask United Nations to declare trusteeship cancelled and recognize immediately the Korean civil govt in South Korea. We will cooperate with General Hodge and will solve our problems peacefully in cooperation with United Nations. Secretary Byrnes has declared that the US is opposed to a Communist minority control in South Korea and Gen. Lerch has proclaimed repeatedly that the Koreans are ready for self-govt. We deserve and demand our inalienable right of self-determination.

Incoming messages indicated how the campaign was going on. On November 14 Limb radioed: “Louise Yim doing wonderful work. Received cable from Philippines President⁹⁷ assuring support Korean plea and instructions to get on agenda United Nations … All papers friendly and eager for news … These (disorders) clearly demonstrate absolute necessity of affording Koreans own govt in South Korea, the means of self-protection and its recognition by United Nations. Please mail credentials Staggers as legal counsel Korea: Commission representing Representative Democratic Council telegraph invitation to Ray Richard directly Times Herald Bldg then he can come immediately. Please telegraph Louise credentials as Govt Korean representative United Nations General Assembly.” On November 16 Louise Yim radioed: “Received cable from Philippines President assuring support Korea. Hope to get on agenda before end November. Visited all the big and small newspapers’ presidents and managers thanking and greeting them from our people and you know how much they have done and are doing for our country. Every paper in New York and all over the country papers are eager to help us. They are like wild fires. All the papers are ready to help us but we are holding them until we get yes or no from United Nations. Either say we are ready to fight until we get our independence and justice and truth for whole world.[”]

When Louise Yim and Limb heard of Rhee’s decision to proceed to US they both radioed to dissuade him on pretext that he was much more useful to the cause if he stayed in Korea and directed it from there. Informants close to Rhee state that he intends on this trip to report unfavorably to Gen. MacArthur and to high quarters in Washington on Gen. Hodge and his administration, also that he plans to return to Korea via London and Nanking.

Although Rhee may be acting from patriotic motives, there is possibility that this may be an attempt to steal the show at home. Quite possibly the coalition compact of Right and Left last October and Gen. Hodge’s support of the Coalition Committee’s efforts, as well as Rhee’s final realization that we mean to go ahead with the Moscow decision which in the nature of things ruins his chances of being first president, crystallized his decision to fight Moscow decision.

The Dept will readily appreciate the irresponsibility of Rhee’s campaign, which resembles the Korean revolutionary efforts at Versailles in 1919 when Korea’s independence was not even thought of let alone assured at [as] it is now. From our standpoint his deception and disregard of reality is unfortunate because his large and nationally useful following here is inclined to swallow them and go along with him and thereby exclude itself from participation in the formation of the provisional govt under Moscow decision (see Gen. Hodge’s proposed reply to Gen. Chistiakov letter of November 26 in his Tfgcg 547, 7 December to CinCafpac pass to you⁹⁸). Perhaps the only way to save this important political element from excommunication by the Joint Commission may be statement by the Secretary, the moment Rhee steps out with his extravagances, completely exposing the hopelessness of his objective as far as the US is concerned. In this connection, the Korean representative council, from which credentials are being sought by Rhee’s associates, will lose its official status upon convening of the Legislative Assembly December 12.

[

Langdon

]

86. Not printed.
87. Not printed; it suggested avoiding complications by delaying Dr. Rhee’s arrival until after adjournment of the UNO General Assembly about mid-December (740.00119 Control(Korea)/11–2746).
88. Omissions in this document indicated in the original.
89. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was a member of the American delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
90. Head of the Belgian delegation and President of the General Assembly.
91. Head of the Chinese delegation to the Assembly.
92. Norwegian Secretary-General of UNO.
93. Head of the Philippine delegation to the Assembly.
94. President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China.
95. Of New York.
96. Publisher of the New York Times.
97. Manuel A. Roxas.
98. Telegram Tfgcg 547, December 7, not printed; for text of General Chistiakov’s reply of November 26, see Department of State publication 2933, Far Eastern Series 18: Korea’s Independence, p. 28. For exchange of previous correspondence, see ibid., pp. 20 ff.; for subsequent correspondence, see ibid., pp. 30 ff. See also Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1947, pp. 168 ff.