Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2346: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

secret

Seoul, 23 August 1946.
[Received August 26—1:41 p.m.]

Tfpol 23 [to Tokyo]. PolAd 86. Reference W 96485, August 6, question of approaching Soviets on governmental level regarding Korean negotiations.

1. It is noted that a new directive, based on political policy paper of June 6 by State Dept to OPD, is in process of approval by SWNCC⁴¹ and that it is hoped that energetic implementation of this directive will be so effective as to cause the Soviets to take the first steps towards a resumption of negotiations. In the meantime it is noted that nothing is to be done on higher level to bring about such resumption because such approach would be interpreted by the Soviets as an indication of weakness of our position. In this connection it is thought the Dept should be aware of the implications of this course as they are apparent to me.

2. The hypothesis on which our proposed course of action rests seems to be that:

(a) Increased liberality and constructiveness in Military Govt will so range Korean public opinion in support of US policies as opposed to Soviet policies that the Soviets will be forced to modify their stand.

(b) We are having no competition from the Soviets for Korean popularity and good will.

3. The general feeling of the small articulate element of the population is that the basic job of the US in Korea has been done. Practically all overseas Koreans have been repatriated and all Japanese in South Korea deported, all Japanese properties have been taken in trust for future disposition, a police force has been created, the framework of the administrative and judicial systems has been put together again, communications have been restored, the school system has been rebuilt, the currency has been saved, stark famine and distress have been overcome, and the change-over from the Japanese regime has been smoothly accomplished. For all these sundry achievements the Koreans are grateful, but their whole thoughts are now on the next step, the establishment of their own National Provisional Govt and the union of their country which will be coincident with it. In the face of this general attitude, innovations by MG are positively opposed by the Leftists and only apathetically received by the Rightists, so that the law of diminishing returns has set in so far as our program is concerned. Already a note of querulousness is asserting itself with respect to almost anything we undertake outside of straight basic administration. In the past 2 weeks, for example, both sides have attacked or carped on the following matters:

(a) The statement in CINCAFPAC’s May report that there was a growing desire among Koreans for the continuance of MG.

(b) Deficit financing and increasing note issuance.

(c) The $25,000,000.00 surplus equipment loan to MG because Koreans have not been consulted about it.

(d) The rice collection program for 1946–47.

(e) The reorganization of Seoul National (former Keijo Imperial) University because Korean higher education is none of our business.

(f) The five-year plan to increase Korean silk output for export to the US and for acquisition of dollar exchange because the Korean people want the silk for themselves.

(g) The breaking up of the former Oriental Development Co. for autonomous management of component enterprises because that is a job for the future National Government.

(h) The creation of a legislative assembly because such a body should be national in scope and be set up after the establishment of the Provisional Government.

4. The above administrative matters represent the kind of American action that is criticized by both sides. In addition, there is the standing dissatisfaction, most of it Soviet-inspired but some of it spontaneous, with American policies of a strong minority in the community composed of organized labor, farmers’ alliances and youth groups favoring Soviet policies in the North or inclined to Communism or susceptible to Communist propaganda. The abiding grudge of these elements is that the administration of people’s committees they had established after the Japanese surrender was first not recognized and later outlawed as MG came from the “Conservative” elements that fared reasonably well under the Japanese. The Leftist elements feel that they have been cheated out of a social revolution, with MG merely perpetuating a traditional social order that had been maintained by the Japanese. The Dept seems to think that the support of the Left may be gained by giving it a vested interest in MG. From the moment we landed on Korea we have tried to give the Leftists an important share in the govt and in recent months our political effort has been concentrated on winning them over and interesting them in full participation and responsibility in MG. But they seem to be completely committed to non-cooperation. This non-cooperation was epitomized on the 15th by their virtual boycott of the Joint American-Korean surrender anniversary ceremonies. They held a mass celebration of their own in another part of town where they passed 16 political resolutions including at the top of the list opposition to prolongation, expansion or strengthening of MG.

5. Overlooked perhaps in the Dept’s thinking in connection with benevolent measures for the Koreans in [is] Korean pride or stolid conceit in their own institutions and a strong sense of what constitutes their own natural jurisdiction in Korean affairs. MG under its directives is, or feels, under the necessity of effecting wide, fundamental, and long-range reforms immediately, whereas many Korean[s], like the Soviet Delegates on the Joint Commission, feel that such reforms, under the terms of the Moscow Decision, should be undertaken by the Provisional Govt with the aid of the Joint Commission and late[r] of the Trusteeship Agency. Thus raw enthusiasm on our part to assist and remake the Koreans at this time sometimes strikes a sour note among the Koreans.

6. In the Dept’s thesis that a superior American program in Southern Korea will undermine our [Communist?] position in the south, this is a mistaken notion in my view. The Soviets now take pains to prevent abuses of the Korean people by their soldiery, the administration is outwardly 100% Korean, lands of Japanese and native landlords have been distributed free to tenant farmers and landless refugees, former Japanese factories are operated by committees or organized workers and officials instead of by industrialists under an operating mandate as in our zone, labor law has been passed, and the people are now very much left to their own devices. These reforms have fallen heavily on the unfortunate conservative and propertied classes, many of whom have taken refuge in our zone, and even the peasantry and poor townspeople have not gotten over the earlier excesses and exactions of the Soviet soldiery, but large elements of the population now like their new deal, including a new class of officials and committee men with central and local executive and administrative powers. The small but well organized Communist Party in South Korea, which has close connections with the Kremlin-controlled party in the north, energetically advertises the good life of the proletariat in the north and is having some success in breeding discontent with our administration among farmers, mill and mine laborers, student and certain intellectual groups.

7. The cleavages in Korean society, between north and south and between Right and Left, widen with the passage of time. In one locality in our zone mobs attacked the police in three or four instances on the occasion of the surrender anniversary. Not a note of joy or optimism featured Seoul editorial comment on that day, which ended “A year of excitement and confusion” (Rightist Journal) with Korea “enslaved politically and economically” (Leftist Journal) and with “Chaos in ideology, restlessness in everyday living, crimes increasing, and waste of time and energy spent in making duplicate official documents—one in Korean and one in English” (Rightist Journal). “Should we celebrate this day with joy or with tears” asked the last journal. While due allowance should be made in these pessimistic expressions for the volatile and sometimes exaggerated nature of Korean emotions they nevertheless reflect the current low morale prevalent among literate elements in South Korea.

8. In the foregoing passages I have set down my views as to the problems we must face if we adopt a policy of drift in respect to Korea’s international relations and of liberal reforms in respect to the administration of our zone. To recapitulate these problems: widening sectional and ideological cleavages in Korean society; diminishing popularity of the US among Koreans generally; apathy from the right; non-cooperation or opposition from the Left, to any non-essential administrative activity or any innovation in MG; entrenchment of Soviet influence and system in North Korea. In the face of these problems I am of the opinion that protracted delay in reconvening the Joint Commission is harmful to our objective of an independent Korea.

9. I appreciate it would be bad tactics to indicate impatience to the Soviets by governmental approach at this time, particularly as General Hodge, in his very reasonable letter of August 13 to General Chistiakov, has put the next move squarely up to the Soviets. On the other hand, there would seem to be very good reason for Great Britain and China, as interested parties to the Moscow Agreement, to be impatient with both the US and the Soviets in this question, and it is wondered whether we could not use for our purposes real or pretended impatience on their part. Specifically, I offer the suggestion that those two govts be discreetly inspired by US to make strong parallel representation now to the Soviet and US Govts, accompanied by appropriate publicity that they discharge without further delay the allied mandates to them of creating a provisional Korean Govt. On the pretext of such pressure, Washington might formally take up with Moscow the question of prompt reconvening of the Joint Commission.

[

Langdon

]

41. See footnote 34, p. 719.